Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1971

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

OTA SIK
The Impact of Stalinism

GALIA GOLAN
The Road to Reform

CHILE

LEON GOURÉ
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LUIS E. AGUILAR

SPECIAL REPORT

ZEV KATZ
Soviet Sociology



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Problems of Communism

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MAY-JUNE 1971 VOL XX

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

HOW TO SUBSCRIBE: Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $3.00.

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Prague's Spring: Roots and Reasons

EDITORS' NOTE: The developments that led to the brief Czechoslovak "liberalization" in the spring of 1968 and the subsequent Soviet invasion in August of that year are still in need of explanation. Lacking are answers to two basic questions: Why did the Czechoslovaks, once the most dependable of Soviet allies, embark on what turned out to be a collision course with Russian power? And how did the Czechoslovaks set about establishing their policies and programs while dominated by the Soviets? In supplying an answer to the first question, Mr. Sik, himself a leading participant in the liberalization movement, analyzes the intolerable burden placed on Czechoslovakia's economy by the imposition of a Soviet-type command system during the years 1950-65. Addressing herself to the second question, Miss Golan describes the Czechoslovaks' response, which took the form of a methodical and thorough preparation for the establishment of economic and political democracy within the framework of socialism. Tragically, the Soviet intervention forestalled that possibility for the foreseeable future.

The Economic Impact of Stalinism

By Ota Sik

It is ironic that Soviet communism, which claims to be the sole exemplar and champion of a universal socialist evolution, has, in fact, become the most formidable obstacle to any advance toward a progressive and humane socialism. Those who might be potential adherents to socialism, particularly in developed capitalist states, must recoil with horror at the thought of socialism in its Soviet variant being established in their countries. They must surely be appalled by even the remote prospect of living under a Stalinist type of socialism characterized by an undemocratic political system; the subjugation of individuals to an all-powerful bureaucracy; the repression of criticism, discussion and new ideas; and a rigidly centralized system of state planning and administration of the economy, prone to weakness in the areas of technological development and foreign trade, and unable to satisfy consumer demands for goods and services. Refusing to grasp these realities, the present Soviet rulers

Chief architect of Czechoslovakia's economic reform program of 1965–68, Mr. Sik was formerly Vice Premier of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee. At present he is Professor of Economics at the University of Basel, Switzerland. His latest work to appear in English is Plan and Market Under Socialism *(White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1970).*

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persist in branding every critic of Soviet society as "antisocialist" and in perpetuating the Stalinist apotheosis of a Soviet-type "socialism" which brooks no rival.

Yet even more than the ideological enshrinement of Stalinist "socialism," it is the political practice of the Soviet rulers which repels potential socialist forces. The USSR has repeatedly seen fit to impose its model—invested with the authority of a moral absolute—by brute force on countries held in political subjugation, in total disregard of the individual peculiarities of those countries. In so doing, the Soviet rulers have discredited socialism among large numbers of people who have felt that, to be acceptable, socialism must be indivisibly connected with the historical development of a given country, its progressive democratic traditions, its economic level, and its wealth of indigenous customs, culture and ideas.

The forceful intervention in 1968 against the emerging Czechoslovak model of a democratic and humane socialism was only the most recent and most flagrant example of such Soviet power plays. It marked the second time that the Soviet Union has interfered with the socialist development of Czechoslovakia by eliminating from power those progressive Czechoslovak Communists who had the courage to develop a socialist system in forms adapted to the specific conditions of Czechoslovakia and approved by her people—*i.e.*, a socialist system deviating from the Soviet model. As in the 1950's, the Communist leaders thus cast aside on Soviet orders are relentlessly accused of every imaginable antisocialist sin and denounced as enemies of socialism. Once again such leaders have been replaced by men who are totally subservient to Moscow and who are ready to reimpose a Stalinist centralized bureaucratic system on Czechoslovakia.

While the outrage of the recent Soviet action is much fresher in the reader's memory, it is to the imposition of a Stalinist system on Czechoslovakia in the early 1950's—an occurrence with equally devastating consequences for Czechoslovak internal developments—that I shall now turn. The tragedy of these earlier events was particularly stark in light of the fact that at the time Stalinism was forced upon it, Czechoslovak society was far more advanced than the Soviet "model" in terms of democratic traditions, level and composition of foreign trade, sophistication of industrial production, modern management experience, and standard of living.

Prior to World War II, Czechoslovakia was already a highly developed country, with industry accounting for more than half the national income. However, like most small industrial nations, prewar Czechoslovakia was dependent on imports for the major portion of its raw materials and therefore had to seek to export a large portion of its industrial output. This dependence on foreign markets caused serious structural problems for the Czechoslovak economy—*e.g.*, overemphasis on the production of certain heavy industrial lines—and thus a search had already begun for a concept of development that would ensure an expansion of Czechoslovak imports and exports and at the same time provide for growth in national income.

MODEL BUILDING

In mid-August 1968 Czechoslovakia stood on the threshold of a bloody counterrevolution and civil war. . . . What was intended in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was *the overthrow of the political power of socialism*. . . .

Even before January 1968, the rightist-opportunists and revisionists were attacking everything that formed the content of our socialist life. . . . They wanted to write off, in what was called a "creative way," everything that has been created by the Soviet people in the past 50 years under the leadership of the CPSU . . . [and they] reached as far as the need to draw up a *new, specifically Czechoslovak model of socialism*. (Emphasis added.)

—From speech of CPCS Presidium member Vasil Bilak, Radio Prague, Nov. 5, 1970.

Positive Postwar Trends

The search for means to integrate the Czechoslovak economy more successfully into world trade grew more intense after World War II, although in a changed set of internal and external economic conditions. During and after the war, industry's share in Czechoslovakia's social product [roughly equivalent to gross national product—Ed.] continued to rise, reaching 61.7 percent by 1948.[1] It was essential to devise a structure of industrial production that would enable Czechoslovakia to make

[1] *Analysis of Economic Development and Prices in 1968*, government proposal, Prague, 1968, p. 33. This analysis, prepared by a government commission responsible to the author (in his function as Vice-Premier of the CSSR) was widely circulated among Czechoslovak government officials and economists just prior to the Soviet invasion. There has been no official publication of the study in Czechoslovakia.

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optimal use of its national labor force, its intellectual capacities and experience, its technological and productive potential, and its domestic raw material resources, in order to expand its exports and thereby be able to import those raw materials not available domestically. One distinct possibility was to expand the production and export of machinery. Machinery production had increased during the war, but in occupied Czechoslovakia the output was concentrated in armaments and heavy machinery. In the immediate postwar period, Czechoslovakia moved toward the production of precision and light machinery, appliances and electronic products, as well as chemicals, ceramics, and construction materials. Exports of these new products to traditional Western markets were to be complemented on a mounting scale by exports to new East European markets. The latter policy was motivated by the hope of increasing overall exports and by the necessity of securing raw materials for domestic production of consumer goods and machines.

As important as economic factors in determining the development of any economy are the political institutions and objectives of the given society. In the early postwar period (1945-48) Czechoslovak developments in this area were promising. Hand-in-hand with profound modifications in property ownership and socio-economic relations—which, in retrospect, can be seen to have created the base for socialism in Czechoslovakia—there developed a system of democratic administration of the economy. Cooperative and large nationalized enterprises emerged rapidly alongside the private sector. Up to 1949, this mixed economy compelled the socialist enterprises to engage, on equal terms, in a healthy competition with private firms and to apply a democratic system of management, which was supplemented by democratic planning and guidance of the economy on the part of the state. These factors remained operative, although on a steadily diminishing scale, until 1952.

The large nationalized enterprises were administered by general directorates or enterprise directorates, headed by generally competent directors appointed by executive boards. The latter, in turn, were appointed, in part by the political parties comprising the National Front (the coalition of the Czechoslovak and Slovak Communist parties, the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, the National Socialists, the Czechoslovak People's Party, and the Slovak Democratic Party, which governed postwar Czechoslovakia until February 1948), and in part by the labor unions.

A national economic plan for the years 1946-48, which constituted the economic program of the government and which was considered a binding directive for government bodies dealing with the economy, gave macro-economic indicative guidance to the enterprises. The plan constituted a first attempt at combining a market system with economic planning on a macro (national) level. This plan was established democratically, through the cooperative and aggregative work of a number of committees comprising representatives of management, labor unions, and interested political and other public organizations. With the help of small professional staffs, these committees set targets and established a basic orientation of the economy which was responsive to the long-term interests of the workers, and which, at the same time, allowed for the independent operations of competing enterprises in a market environment.

The developments described above facilitated the postwar reconstruction of the economy, ensured a swift changeover to peacetime production, promoted a rapid advance of Czechoslovak products on foreign markets, created a favorable balance of payments, and led to a relatively quick rise in the standard of living. The government's policy sought to overcome as quickly as possible the effects of postwar inflation and was to a certain extent successful in reviving the regulating function of the market.

Enter Stalinism

However, before it was possible to restore the internal balance of the economy and to establish a true market based on demand, the development of this democratic economic system was brought to a halt by coercive means. Almost overnight, economic processes were subordinated to the political objectives of a new regime, in defiance of all economic logic. The instruments of power were utilized to impose on the CSSR an ineffective long-term structure of production which took no account of the economic requirements of the society at large and which hampered the advance of technology. Tremendous economic losses were suffered owing to the economically irrational actions of the political leadership.

What caused this dramatic shift? The political stage for the developments of the 1950's had been set in 1948 when a radical change brought to power a Communist regime—a regime oriented toward Moscow. But various other objective and subjective

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THE CURSE OF STALINISM

The degree of development of the socialist states in the early 1950's and the standstill in the creative development of knowledge which accompanied the personality cult also conditioned the mechanical adoption and dissemination of ideas, habits and political concepts which contrasted with our conditions and traditions. The then leading organs and institutions of the party and state bear full responsibility for this mechanical adoption. . . . The irretrievable losses our movement suffered then will forever remain a warning against such methods. . . . The main link in this circle consisted in the remnants of, or relapses into, bureaucratic, sectarian approaches in the party itself. The insufficient development of socialist democracy in the party, the unfavorable atmosphere for the development of activity, the intimidation or even suppression of criticism—all this made impossible a rapid, timely and thorough redress. The party organs took onto themselves tasks of state and economic organs and of social organizations. There occurred a wrong merging of party and state management and a monopolist power position of certain sectors. This led to unqualified interference, to the stifling of initiative on all levels, to indifference, to a cult of the average and an unsound anonymity. This, in turn, engendered irresponsibility and lack of discipline. Many correct decisions were not implemented. This gravely affected theoretical thought and made impossible the timely detection of the shortcomings and dangers linked with the old management system. . . .

—From the Action Program of the CPCS, *Rude pravo*, (Prague), April 10, 1968.

factors also combined to cause, inexorably, a distortion in the economies of Czechoslovakia and the other developing socialist countries.

Beginning in 1947, international relations came to be increasingly dominated by the Cold War, which brought both sides to the brink of a new, catastrophic struggle. In 1950 the Cold War actually flared into a hot war in Korea. The war crisis generated a need to strengthen the military forces of the socialist countries—a factor which in turn entailed in Eastern Europe an acceleration of industrialization, with particular emphasis on heavy industry.

The distortion of Czechoslovakia's economic development was due far less to the objective threat of war, however, than to the emergence of certain subjective political concepts which—in utter disregard of basic economic laws—became the decisive determinants of economic policy over a long period. Under Soviet influence, totally unrealistic goals were set—among them, "catching up with and overtaking" the developed capitalist states in per capita performance in all major production lines in a brief span of time, and constructing broad-based heavy industry in even the smallest of the socialist countries. At a meeting with Czechoslovakia's new Communist leadership early in 1950, Stalin personally demanded a shift in the orientation and structure of Czechoslovakia's production and export trade 180 degrees toward the East, a rapid increase in the output of its heavy industry, and massive deliveries of heavy industry products to other socialist countries (in particular, the USSR). In February 1950 the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party compliantly voted to increase the planned growth rate for industrial production—particularly the output of heavy industry—by a substantial margin.[2]

In implementing this decision, the regime rapidly accelerated investment in heavy industry. The share of investment in the three major branches of heavy industry alone accounted for almost one-half of aggregate industrial investment in Czechoslovakia for the years 1948-53, as indicated below: [3]

Industrial Investment, 1948-53

Branch	Share of Total (%)
Coal mining	9.1
Metallurgy	18.0
Machinebuilding	19.5
All other branches	53.4
Total	100.0

The orientation of export trade was also radically changed. Whereas in 1948 Czechoslovakia's exports to capitalist and non-Communist developing countries had been much larger than those to Communist countries, the opposite was true in 1953: [4]

Export Trade

Trading partners	1948	1953
Socialist states	39.7	78.5
Capitalist states	45.7	14.9
Developing economies	14.6	6.6
Total	100.0	100.0

[2] K. Kaplan, *50 let socialisma* (50 Years of Socialism), Prague, Svoboda, 1968, p. 123.
[3] *Analysis* . . , p. 42.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

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The precipitate and insufficiently calculated alteration of the structure of industrial production, investment and foreign trade demanded by Stalin proved disastrous to the Czechoslovak economy. This departure from the original concept adopted by all political groups prior to the Communist takeover in 1948 set in motion long-run economic processes which disregarded the basic laws of economic development. Expansion of heavy industry was pushed at the expense of development of all other productive and nonproductive sectors of the economy—agriculture, light industry, consumer goods and food products industries, transportation, services, trade, and housing construction. The result was growing inefficiency of production, failure to modernize production technology, a decline in the quality of once-valued Czechoslovak exports, a loss of markets, and a drop in the effectiveness of foreign trade. The economy experienced a severe and continuing inflation and a serious lag in the tertiary sphere of economic services—an area of great importance to labor productivity. The public was subjected to a depressed rate of growth in the standard of living, mounting shortages of goods, and insufficient service facilities, which had a particularly adverse impact on the leisure time available to women.

Such a radical and rapid change in the structure and orientation of the Czechoslovak economy required extensive political and ideological preparation, as well as a thorough transformation of the system of economic planning and administration. The political phase of this preparation consisted of the prosecution of a broad array of Czechoslovak political and economic leaders in the show trials of the 1950's—part of a wave of such trials staged by the Stalinist power apparatus in all the People's Democracies for the express purpose of rendering the leaderships of those countries completely subservient to Moscow's bidding. Those who had pioneered in Czechoslovakia's postwar economic adjustment and had helped create a democratic economic system were tried as enemies of socialism and were executed, imprisoned, or removed from key positions in the government, economy, and important institutions—to be replaced by a set of party functionaries of mediocre caliber, who would not or could not devise independent political concepts for Czechoslovakia or find solutions for the country's mounting economic problems.

Only a handful of experts, whose names cannot be revealed even now, were able at the outset of the 1950's to guess at the disastrous consequences which were to ensue from these drastic political and economic changes. Most of them were silenced in one way or the other, and all independent economic and sociological research was suppressed. The bulk of economic data was declared secret; the press and other information media were subjected to strict censorship; and the flow of information from the West was shut off. A propaganda campaign of unprecedented dimensions sought to identify all concrete political, administrative and economic measures of the government with the interests of the people, and to brand all divergent views and opinions as hostile to socialism. The barrage of one-sided or restricted information, the continuous pressure of political and administrative repressions, and the absence of basic democratic freedoms combined to deprive the people for many years of the possibility of judging the merits or drawbacks of the political and economic system and the truth or falsity of official claims.

The Command Structure

Simultaneously, the existing system of economic planning and administration was discarded as a "relic of capitalism," ill-adapted to the solution of accumulating economic problems. In its place, the regime adopted the centralized, bureaucratic Soviet system. During the years 1951-52 an apparatus was created for centralizing all economic decision-making, as a result of which the enterprises ceased for all practical purposes to function as independent, responsible economic units—in the process losing their market orientation. The general directorates were replaced by numerous economic ministries and even more numerous central administrative offices. Operating through this vast bureaucratic apparatus and relying on plans elaborated from the top on the basis of artificial formulas, the state began to fix the total volume of production and the volume of specific key products to be manufactured by each enterprise, to assign these targets by administrative directive to individual enterprises and trading organizations, as well as to determine the volume and orientation of all investments, to allocate manpower, and to attempt to force growth of productivity and control production costs. The state also determined the volume, structure and orientation of export trade, fixed the prices of all products, and conducted all financing operations.

Under the new administrative system prices became mere accounting units or indicators and

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ceased to perform the economic functions of expressing true production costs and reflecting the market situation. Retail prices included turnover taxes which ranged from zero to several hundred percent. The profitability of product lines and enterprises varied widely, since it depended not on the efficiency of operations or the satisfaction of consumer demands but on the particular prices set by the bureaucracy for given products. Even large profits brought no advantages to enterprises—indeed profits ceased to have any bearing on the survival or even the operation of enterprises. Similarly, losses entailed no disadvantages for enterprises, since it was impossible to determine whether such deficits were the result of inefficient operations or of the price system. The state administered the redistribution of funds from those enterprises which enjoyed profits to those enterprises showing deficits. Even when the incentive bonuses for managers were later tied to profits, they failed to stimulate a genuine interest in increasing labor productivity and overall effectiveness of production. The official practice of assigning production tasks by mandatory directives and of siphoning off excess funds from enterprises as soon as they began to accumulate had the effect of killing any interest enterprise managers might otherwise have had in improving efficiency.

Although prices no longer served as market signals, they did exercise a negative influence on day-to-day decisions at the enterprise level. The centrally-assigned gross output targets for production were imposed on enterprises in terms of aggregate prices. As these production quotas escalated mechanically and relentlessly with each passing year, enterprises responded by changing their product mix, giving preference to the manufacture of those products which permitted the producer to show greater aggregate output in terms of prices—either because the products required more costly material inputs (which were automatically reflected in higher output prices) or because the official price for the selected product was higher than for an alternative item requiring the same input of labor. The result was a continuing decline in the manufacture of products with low material costs and disadvantageous prices. Thus, despite the command character of the completely centralized economic plans, prices did continue to influence the development of the microstructure of production. Enterprises were, in effect, attracted to the most wasteful utilization of materials and production capital. This may be seen in the table below, which gives a comparison of the consumption of energy and of steel per unit of production in the CSSR and in various non-Communist countries in 1966.[5]

Resource Consumption and GNP in 1966

Country	Energy units per $1,000 of GNP	Kg. steel per $1,000 of GNP
CSSR	5,023	485
USA	2,498	174
FRG	2,130	255
France	1,471	169
UK	2,689	202
Holland	2,105	191
Sweden	1,853	237
Switzerland	1,111	135

In addition to encouraging wasteful utilization of materials and capital equipment, the distorted system of pricing and administrative control of production fostered the output of an assortment of goods which was totally unrelated to the structure of demand, *i.e.*, the needs of consumers and customers. Growing quantities of unneeded products were forced on consumers either by direct administrative pressure or by the economic pressure of shortages or nonavailability of other, more necessary goods. Despite these pressures, stocks of useless and unsalable goods continued to grow from one year to the next. Some of these goods were periodically sacrificed at a sharp loss on less sophisticated markets (*i.e.*, in developing countries), while others were liquidated without being put to any use. Yet the producers continued to turn out such products, confident that as long as they reached their planned gross-output targets, they would receive all needed funds from the state.

The overriding interest of enterprises in expanding the *volume* of production militated against any consistent concern with quality, innovation, or technological improvement. The inflexible, politically-imposed structure of production likewise put heavy brakes on technological advance and modernization of the production base. Furthermore, the growing shortage of convertible currencies and the orientation of trade toward the USSR impeded the importation of modern technology from the more advanced non-Communist countries. As a consequence, the machines and equipment installed in newly-erected plants reached, at best, the world average

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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of technology and lagged far behind the level in the most advanced countries. Older plants failed to replace amortized equipment, resulting in obsolescence of the production base—a condition that was particularly marked in the consumer goods and food products industries. In 1966, some 45 percent of the productive equipment of heavy industry and 60 percent of the equipment of light industry had been amortized (*i.e.*, had outlived its actuarial life and yet had not been replaced).[6]

The continued use of obsolete and fully amortized production equipment contributed to a growing disparity between labor productivity in the CSSR and in industrially advanced Western countries. In 1966, the labor productivity rate in Czechoslovakia was approximately half that in Belgium, West Germany and the United Kingdom, two-fifths that in Switzerland and Sweden, and about one-fourth that in the United States.[7]

On a Treadmill

Technological backwardness, the distorted production structure (with its emphasis on heavy industry, where the time required to recoup investments in terms of output was longer than in other sectors), the wasteful utilization of material inputs, and the decelerating growth of labor productivity—all combined to produce a decline in the rate of growth of national income in the early 1960's. The regime found itself compelled to engage in an ever-expanding program of capital investment merely to sustain a flagging rate of growth in output.*

The burgeoning capital construction program had a serious impact in a number of areas. Since the decision had been to expand rather than modernize the capital plant, there was a growing manpower shortage. Instead of improving the capital stock at the disposal of the existing labor force, the regime attempted to recruit new labor from the ranks of housewives or from non-preferred branches of industry, with the latter inevitably experiencing further slowdowns as a result of the loss of manpower.

The huge investment demand placed intolerable stress on the construction industry, which was not an officially favored economic sector and was therefore subject to shortages of labor, modern equipment and materials. As the demand for construction facilities outstripped the capacity, projects became fragmented, construction delays were more frequent and prolonged, and the average period for completion of projects grew longer. By 1966, the estimated time required to build a new industrial unit in the CSSR was, on the average, five to six years. This was two to three times as long as in developed Western countries.[8] As a result, materials and labor were frozen in incompleted capital construction at enormous cost to the economy.

The expanded investment program and the continued emphasis on heavy industry inevitably generated inflationary pressures. The state countered with increasingly heavy restraints on the growth of average wages, but the labor force—particularly in heavy industry where wages were paid on a premium scale—kept growing, thereby fueling a rapid rise in the total wage bill of the economy. The supply of consumer goods increasingly failed to meet this rising purchasing power both in terms of quantity (due to priorities placed on heavy industry) and in terms of mix and quality. Particularly in the area of services and durable consumer goods—automobiles, housing, and home furnishings—consumer demand went unsatisfied. Due to administrative controls over pricing, this inflation was generally a "hidden" inflation—that is, it did not express itself in soaring prices (although there was a gradual price rise in recent years). Instead, it manifested itself indirectly in a rapid increase of personal and enterprise savings, which represented frozen or deferred purchasing power.

Nor could the inflationary pressures be eased by importing consumer goods. Terms of trade were deteriorating with the decline in the quality and relative technological sophistication of Czechoslovak industrial and consumer-goods exports. Increasing volumes of exports were required to maintain necessary imports, mainly of raw materials and semi-finished goods for Czechoslovak industry. In 1954 it took 14 *korunas* worth of Czechoslovak exports to earn a dollar of foreign exchange; by 1967 this figure had risen to 31 *korunas*.[9] As the gap widened, the balance of payments with the capitalist countries became negative, and foreign exchange reserves were depleted. It therefore became increas-

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

* The severity of the economic situation facing Czechoslovakia was highlighted by data provided in the *UN Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva), Vol. 18, No. 1, November 1966, which showed that the incremental capital-output ratio for Czechoslovakia had soared from 1.84 in 1950-55, to 2.24 in 1955-60, to a staggering 10.83 in 1960-65; in other words, during the early 1960's the CSSR had to invest nearly 11 units of capital in production for every additional unit of industrial output.—Ed.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

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ingly difficult to import needed consumer goods from the West, and socialist countries were unable to fill the vacuum. In fact, Czechoslovakia was forced to be a net exporter of consumer goods. In 1967 such goods accounted for 16.8 percent of CSSR exports to socialist countries, compared to 5.9 percent of imports from these countries. In trade with capitalist countries in the same year the comparable figures were 24 and 5 percent.[10]

The relentless pressures to export, particularly heavy industrial products, militated against any modification in the structure of industry. Furthermore, producers felt no pressure to update or improve their output for the reason that they were effectively insulated from the impact of foreign competition by the state's foreign trade organizations. The latter purchased goods for export at domestic prices and absorbed the difference between these prices and the lower prices which the goods brought on foreign markets. The trade organizations were also prohibited from passing these costs on to domestic consumers of imports by raising the prices on imports—instead, imports were charged to domestic enterprises at domestic prices. The mounting deficits of the trade organizations were covered by subsidies from the state budget, a process which glossed over the inefficiency of production and of foreign trade, but which could not eliminate the resulting losses of national income and reductions in domestic consumption.

Signs of Crisis

The accumulated problems of a distorted industrial structure, an adverse trade situation, an aging or obsolete production base, relatively low labor productivity, and wasteful utilization of production resources had by the early 1960's assumed such huge proportions that any quick resolution of Czechoslovakia's economic problems was out of the question. This was clearly evidenced by a decline in the rate of growth of the Czechoslovak economy. In the period 1948-58 the social product of Czechoslovakia grew 8.6 percent per annum. In 1958-68 it grew only 5.6 percent per annum, and in 1961-64 the rate of growth was particularly slow—2.1 percent per annum.[11]

By the latter period it was clear that an alteration of the structure of the economy—toward the end of developing effective competitive lines of production, increasing the share of consumer goods and food products in output, expanding the construction and building-materials industries and housing, and modernizing transportation—would require enormous investments and large increments of labor, both of which would have to be achieved without relative retrenchments in heavy industry. The process might be speeded by large infusions of foreign credit, by the purchase of licenses, or by cooperation with progressive foreign companies, but there was no assurance that such foreign credits and contacts would actually be used to develop maximally efficient branches of production or to bring about the expansion of effective exports necessary to ensure repayment of credits in convertible currencies.

In the final analysis, it could be seen that the structural deformations which plagued the Czechoslovak economy were inextricably linked with the centralized, bureaucratic system of economic control. While every negative economic phenomenon in the CSSR could be traced to some "objective" or "technical" economic problem, ultimately it was the command system of administration—with its

CHARTING A NEW COURSE

What we can do is create indispensable prerequisites for a consistent solution of economic questions, seeking not only to overcome current difficulties but aiming at entering the scientific and technical revolution. This means, first of all, to consistently assert the new system of management in all its substantial connections. . . . Democratization of economic administration is an inseparable part of the democratic life of society. . . .

—Alexander Dubcek's speech, Bratislava Radio, Feb. 22, 1968.

We must also intensify work on the long-term concept of development of the Czechoslovak national economy, which not only will include changes in the structure of production and its more consistent connection with the international division of labor but will also follow from the new structure of requirements of our population. Today, the material and social needs of the people are in the forefront. However, we are and must be concerned with more. Socialism—and particularly socialism on wide democratic foundations—must create a new humanism of the modern epoch, a humanism which all the other systems—despite all their technical maturity—are unable to present to mankind. . . .

—Alexander Dubcek's speech to CPCS CC Plenum, *Rude pravo* (Prague), April 2, 1968.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 61.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

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tight control over planning and the allocation of supplies and its counterproductive and distorting initiatives—which had become the insurmountable obstacle to any structural reform.

The mounting crisis culminated in an absolute decline in Czechoslovak national income and in the real wages of the Czechoslovak worker in 1963.[12] There was palpable dissatisfaction among the working people, and a number of progressive economists openly and courageously began to criticize the existing economic model. As a result, the regime appointed a special party-government commission under the leadership of the present author, which worked out a reform model for the organization, planning and stimulation of the economy. After protracted ideological and political debate, and under the pressures generated by the adverse economic situation, even those conservative forces who were committed to the old system—both intellectually and through motives of self-interest—gave their grudging acceptance to the concept of a new system of economic administration. The reform was finally adopted by a majority of the CPCS Central Committee in 1965.[13]

Reform of the Economy

As envisaged, the reform was to eliminate the centralized-bureaucratic system of planning and administering the economy by commands from the center. The old structure was to be replaced by a system consisting of a modern macro-economic plan conceived as a set of general indicators, supplemented by indirect economic measures through which the government would seek to achieve its economic goals. The government was to limit its direct investments to measures aimed at improving the society's infrastructure. The reform anticipated the revitalization of the economic functions of the market, of prices, and of money. Socialist enterprises were to be transformed back into independent, profit-oriented market entities, while the state was to limit itself to blocking monopolistic tendencies among the enterprises and seeing to it that pressures of domestic and foreign competition acted to force enterprises to operate efficiently. The administrative foreign trade monopoly was to be abolished and foreign trade activities decentralized within general state policies on trade and foreign exchange. A capital market was to be re-created on the basis of a relatively independent banking system, and it was expected that the Czechoslovak *koruna* would eventually become a convertible currency.

A system of self-administration was to be introduced in all sectors of the economy. Enterprise councils were to be elected by the workers at each enterprise for the purpose of socialist administration of the enterprises, and the work force in each enterprise was to assume the risks inherent in the entrepreneurial activities of the given economic unit—*i.e.*, the possibility of bankruptcy and cessation of operations if the unit incurred repeated losses. Application of the new system was seen to entail major staffing changes and a new method and set of criteria for selection and training of top managerial personnel and economic policymakers.

The need for new attitudes and new leaders clearly presented a challenge to those entrenched in power—the Novotny regime. A fundamental change in the political ground rules was called for if there was to be any meaningful alteration of the economic structure and of the whole administrative system. Yet, although a growing number of responsible political and economic figures, supported by large segments of the population, came to realize the necessity for radical economic reform, the conservative political dictatorship and the bureaucratic apparatus resisted and obstructed all moves toward the purposeful introduction of new measures. This, in turn, converted the fight for economic reform into

THE REAL CULPRITS

The stubbornness with which Antonin Novotny defended his personal position resulted in the efforts and attention of the Central Committee being chiefly concentrated on a solution of the problem of party leadership. Among other things, this caused the plenum [December 1967] to fail to expose in time the platform of those Central Committee members who proceeded essentially from antiparty, revisionist positions when assessing the situation. . . . Ota Sik, Vaclav Slavik, Frantisek Vodslon, Josef Smrkovsky, and others.

—CC CPCS, "Lessons Drawn from the Critical Developments in the Party and Society after the 13th CPCS Congress," *Pravda* (Bratislava), Jan. 14, 1971.

[12] Ota Sik, *Plan and Market under Socialism* (English edition), Prague, Academia, 1967, p. 71.

[13] The CPCS Central Committee resolution on economic reform, "Main Directions for Improving the Planning and Management of the National Economy," was printed in a special issue of *Rude pravo* (Prague), Jan. 30, 1965.

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a political struggle aimed first at toppling Novotny and then at democratizing the entire political system. When Novotny fell (in January 1968), there followed the Czechoslovak "spring"—a start at consistent implementation of the reform program.

Whatever objections might be entertained against the Czechoslovak reforms, it should be remembered that they were the outcome of several years of highly intensive analytical work in all departments of social science by a large number of theoreticians as well as men active in practical affairs. People in Czechoslovakia came to perceive a need for fundamental economic and political changes, and they were confident that the reform would provide a cure for their economic distress, would engender successful economic development, and would foster genuine involvement and initiative by the great masses of the people.

The reform efforts were not an attempt to restore capitalist society, as is currently claimed by Soviet-inspired propaganda emanating from Czechoslovakia; on the contrary, they were directed toward building a more modern, humane and democratic socialism in forms better adapted to Czechoslovak conditions. The goal was to transcend the rigid dogmatism of Soviet communism and to devise flexible new institutions and forms for planning and administering the economy in a system which would afford the advantages of a macro-economically regulated market among socialist enterprises. Such a system would be conducive to the introduction of effective production programs oriented to the needs of society at large. It was looked upon as an open model capable of continuing change and development generated by new knowledge and experience, not as a closed, rigid system substituting new dogmas for old.

Toward a Democratic Socialism

There was also general agreement that an essential requisite of economic and social development was the introduction of a modern, pluralist democratic system. Open criticism, free discussion, differences of opinion, and the peaceful competition of interest groups were envisaged as crucial to any progress, to any meaningful changes in society. Where political power is usurped and monopolized by a small group within the sole authorized political party, no opposing interest or dissenting idea has a chance to assert itself. Such a society will, of necessity, always be conservative, unchanging. Thus, the Czechoslovak reformers recognized that socialist development in the CSSR could be saved only by true democratization of their society. It seemed quite conceivable to them that a political democracy could be built on the basis of a socialist economic system and that such a democracy could progress further than the Western democracies, avoiding the defects of the latter. Clearly, not all of Czechoslovakia's troubles could be blamed exclusively on the shortcomings of individual Communist leaders, despite the proclivity of successive leaderships to heap denunciation on their predecessors. The ultimate causes had to be sought in the undemocratic nature of the Communist system; hence the goal was more than the mere replacement of Novotny—what was sought was a fundamental change which would do away with the whole Stalinist monopolistic power system.

Tragically, this great and humane goal of the Czechoslovak reformers was perceived by the rulers of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries as a fatal threat to their own positions. The ultimate reason for their brutal intervention was not concern for socialism in Czechoslovakia, but rather fear that the democratic contagion might spread to their own countries. Once again, as in the days of Jan Hus, Czechoslovak heretics who threatened the power of neighboring princes by their progressive thought and example had to be crushed by overpowering military might. And once again, the foreign tyrants have since tried to persuade the Czechoslovak people that their freedom has been saved by the occupation of their country.

However, the Czechoslovak populace has been inured against such attempts by long historical experience—and it was too deeply convinced of the essential correctness and necessity of the reforms that were being launched to be cowed into total submission. A return to the Soviet-style Communist system has now been ruthlessly enforced against the will and interests of the majority of the people. But regardless of its hectic demagogic propaganda, the present collaborationist regime has been unable to enlist popular support or cooperation. The result is a simmering, all-pervasive crisis in the CSSR which is bound to have momentous consequences in time to come.

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The Road to Reform

By Galia Golan

The intention of this article is not to offer one more history of the Czechoslovak reform movement but to gain a new perspective on it by focusing on three major, related facets which seem to merit special attention. First, an attempt will be made to delineate the overall development of the movement from its initial suppression over the years 1956–62 to its late start in 1963 and its exceptional climax in 1968, and to compare its pattern with that of other reform movements in Eastern Europe. Second, two salient features of the reform—its methodical, gradual and legalistic approach and its emphasis on democratic socialism rather than on nationalism—will be examined for their distinctly Czechoslovak character. And third, some conclusions will be hazarded concerning the prospects for the movement's future.

To begin with, it is essential in understanding the peculiar dynamics of the Czechoslovak reform to realize that, as compared to the Polish and Hungarian developments of 1956, the Czechoslovak movement was delayed by some six years. During the intervening period the Czechoslovak regime succeeded in nipping in the bud the kinds of demands for change which in Poland and Hungary triggered the revolts of 1956. While her neighbors were convulsed by the impact, first, of Malenkov's 1953 "New Course" (which featured collective leadership, the downgrading of the police, and the buildup of light industry and consumer goods production at the expense of heavy industry and the military) and, three years later, of Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU excoriating the cult of Stalin, Czechoslovakia stolidly continued along an orthodox course under the leadership of old-line Stalinists. One may well ask how and why, through a time of such upheaval, the CPCS (Czechoslovak Communist Party) was able and willing to minimize, and to a large degree avert altogether, pressures for reform.

The answer is that during the time in question a number of circumstances combined to militate against the liberalization of Czechoslovakia. One was the "rule of the apparatchiks," the functionaries who had risen to power during the massive purges of the CPCS in the period 1949–54. These were men who had gained their positions because of their loyal and unquestioning adherence to Stalinist methods of rule, such as the centralized administration of state and economy, and party supremacy in all matters. Once in power, these functionaries—and particularly the new party chief, First Secretary Antonin Novotny—continued to regard such methods as the most effective and desirable. In the conditions generated by the purges, more imaginative and progressive men had little hope of gaining power or even influence,[1] so the rule of the *apparat* and the perpetuation of Stalinism were more or less assured.

A much more significant obstacle to Czechoslovak liberalization was the fact that certain aspects of the destalinization process—as it had been implemented in the USSR, Poland and Hungary after 1953—were perceived as direct threats to the security and survival of the regime in Czechoslovakia. For example, a central plank of destalinization was the demand for the review of the purge trials of 1949–54 and the rehabilitation of their victims. In the Czechoslovak case, such actions would have uncovered the deep involvement of the leadership in the party's past excesses. Novotny himself and other leading members of his regime had personally participated in the preparation and conduct of the purge trials that took place after the deaths of Stalin, Gottwald and Beria (including the trials of Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" such as the present

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[1] See Karel Kaplan, "Reflections on the Political Trials," *Nova mysl* (Prague), Nos. 6-8, 1968.

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party chief, Gustav Husak), and they could not expect to survive the rectification of the injustices perpetrated at that time.[2] Hence their own sense of insecurity led these men to oppose liberalization.

It could be argued that while other East European leaders were in an equally difficult position with regard to the review of purge trials, very few of them were quite as resistant to liberalization as were the Czechoslovak leaders. However, the latter were aided in their stubborn stand by several favorable factors peculiar to Czechoslovakia. One of these was the country's relative economic stability. The economic problems of 1953—primarily severe inflation, which had been countered by a drastic monetary reform and the raising of commodity prices—had receded, certain temporary concessions had been made to consumers, and the standard of living was rising at a moderately satisfactory rate, at least as compared to the rest of Eastern Europe. Even though the economic successes of these years were only partial and later proved to have been deceptive as indicators of genuine progress, the leadership of the 1950's could point to them with pride.[3] In fact, at the end of the decade, they triumphantly announced Czechoslovakia's "ascension to socialism," expressed in the declaration of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (thus "surpassing" their East European comrades whose countries continued in the ideologically inferior status of "People's Democracies"). Despite the country's dependence upon the Soviet Union as a source of raw materials and, to a certain degree, as a market for Czechoslovak products, Czechoslovakia was in a relatively good economic position within the bloc in these years.

Noneconomic factors also played a role in the regime's successful avoidance of reform. While the strength of the Slavophile tradition in Czechoslovakia should not be exaggerated, feelings of friendship for the Russians did exist, in contrast to the historic anti-Russian sentiments prevailing in Poland and Hungary which helped to prompt destalinization and liberalization in those countries in 1956. Coupled with this national characteristic was the Czech history of passive rather than active resistance—the "wait-it-out" attitude which typified much of the period under Hapsburg rule. The serious minority problem in Czechoslovakia also made it easier for the regime to close its eyes to the changes taking place elsewhere. The Czech-Slovak conflict often set at odds, and thereby fragmented, the potential opposition forces within the party which otherwise might have coalesced into a united effort against the conservatives: in-fighting along ethnic lines and this type of polarization left the forces of opposition isolated and weak.

Reverse Trends

By the end of 1962, however, the situation had changed drastically. After the turn of the decade the Czechoslovak economy rather suddenly began to show symptoms of a critical decline. In fact, in August 1962 the Third-Five-Year Plan had to be abandoned before completion.[4] This failure, and the consequent necessity of running the country on the basis of *ad hoc* one-year plans, strongly indicated the need for reforms.

Added to the impact of economic difficulties, the chronic weakness of the regime was aggravated by a power struggle which erupted in 1961–62 between Novotny and his equally conservative, if slightly more popular, Minister of the Interior, Rudolf Barak.[5] Though Novotny emerged as the victor, this

[2] Under pressure from the Russians, Novotny did permit a limited review of the trials in 1955, but the period covered was 1949-51—extended in 1956 to include 1952, but not 1954 when he was in power. Moreover, the review merely reaffirmed the original decisions; thus it hardly constituted a genuine step towards destalinization, even though it did lead to the quiet release of some prisoners—without rehabilitation.

[3] For retrospective criticisms, see Eugene Loebl, "On Dogmatism in Economic Thinking," *Kulturny zivot* (Bratislava), Sept. 28, Oct. 5 and 12, 1963; Bohumil Haba, Radoslav Selucky, and Jan Korda, "Against Dogmatism, for a Creative Development of Economic Science," *Hospodarske noviny* (Prague), Nov. 8 and 15, 1963; and Ota Sik, "A Contribution to the Analysis of the Czechoslovak Economic Development, *Politicke ekonomie* (Prague), January 1966, pp. 1-33.

[4] "On The Outlook for the Further Development of the Czechoslovak Socialist Society," *Rude pravo* (Prague), Aug. 14, 1962.

[5] The Barak affair remains unclear to this day. It has been suggested that Barak prepared the way for a struggle against Novotny well in advance, using information he uncovered as head of the 1955 and 1956 committees to review the show trials (though it must not be forgotten that Barak too had a hand in the trials). It has also been claimed that Novotny himself confiscated incriminating material later found missing from the files. See Karel Hajek, "Miroslav Mamula, The Man in the Background Explains," *Reporter* (Prague), June 5-12, 1968. It has also been suggested that the Soviets were grooming Barak to replace Novotny or at least had some hand in the whole affair. See William Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1963, p. 74; Victor Velen, "Czech Stalinists Die Hard," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1964, pp. 321-22; and G. H. Skilling, *Communism, National and International*, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1969, p. 98. Further Czech sources on the Barak affair are Jiri Ondracek, "The Criminal Case against R. Barak and Collaborators," *Kulturni noviny* (Prague), March 29 and April 5, 1968; Jarmila Barakova, "My Husband Is Not a Careerist, Not a Thief," *ibid.*, April 5, 1968; and B. Navratil and Z. Pejoch, "The 'Pensioned' Politician in Cell No. 8," *Reporter*, June 5-12, 1968.

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infighting at the top impaired the unity of the *apparat* and the party at large. Although it did not render the alternative of destalinization any more attractive or "safe" in Novotny's eyes, it did weaken his ability to withstand increasing domestic pressures for liberalization.[6] Moreover, progressive party members were alarmed by the potential threat of a show trial—a prospect conjured up by the Novotny-Barak struggle—at a time when many countries of Eastern Europe were renouncing such methods and carrying out rehabilitations of the victims of past trials.[7]

While circumstances inside Czechoslovakia were changing, outside pressure for reforms was increasing. In 1961, the 22nd Congress of the CPSU heralded the second wave of destalinization in the Soviet Union, and steps in the same direction were demanded from various parties in Eastern Europe, including the CPCS. Indeed, it can be surmised that such pressure was not unconnected with Soviet concern over the poor state of the Czechoslovak economy. Moscow's past willingness to tolerate the rule of old-fashioned Stalinism in Prague (long after that particular orthodoxy was considered to have outlived its usefulness in the USSR) may have been conditioned by the direct and indirect economic benefits which had accrued to the Soviet Union from the Czechoslovak performance. Once, however, the Stalinist economic model was no longer working satisfactorily in Czechoslovakia, thus placing in jeopardy the benefits to the Soviet Union and her allies, Moscow may well have pushed the argument that the destalinization demanded by the 22nd Congress could provide the tools necessary to put the Czechoslovak economy back into good working order.

In this critical situation, with the economy near collapse and the regime's failures apparent in many areas, the Slovaks, who formed something of a natural faction in what was intended as a monolithic party, were stirred into action. By 1962 many of them realized that specific Slovak interests might best be served by destalinization and even liberalization, and that the time was ripe for them to press toward this goal in cooperation with like-minded Czechs, putting aside their usual ethnic conflicts. Their immediate demand was for the reversal of the verdicts rendered against the "bourgeois nationalist" Slovak party and its leadership at the show trials of the 1950's. To them, destalinization meant first and foremost the rehabilitation of former Slovak leaders, including Husak, Laco Novomesky and (posthumously) Vladimir Clementis.

This confluence of economic crisis, political instability, pressure from Moscow, and Slovak exploitation of the situation forced a reluctant Novotny to agree to a very limited form of destalinization. In August 1962 he appointed a fact-finding commission to review the show trials, a decision announced at the 12th Congress of the CPCS in December. At the Congress he also announced the initiation of an investigation of economic reforms, to be carried out by the party.[8] Nonetheless, the overall tone of the Congress was conservative and even dogmatic, prob-

[6] Novotny himself admitted the disarray in the party as a result of the Barak affair. See *Usnesni dokumenty Ustredniho vyboru KSC: Od Celostatni Konference KSC 1960 do XII Sjezdu KSC*, Vol. 2, Prague, Nakladatelstvi Politicke Literatury, 1963, pp. 244-45.

[7] This crisis was more or less simultaneous with a less serious but nonetheless disturbing development involving party disciplinary action against the so-called "Yugoslav Council"—a group of CPCS members who had advocated a more flexible policy towards Yugoslavia. See Jiri Pelikan, *Das Unterdrückte Dossier*, Wien, Europa Verlag, 1970, pp. 32-39.

[8] See resolutions of the 12th Party Congress, in *Rude pravo*, Dec. 9, 1962; see also speech by Drahomir Kolder in *ibid.*, April 6, 1968.

COMMENT ON THE TIMES

Caption: "Today and always we must fight for a better tomorrow. For, if we stop fighting, yesterday will return and we shall hang."

—From *Rohac* (Bratislava), April 16, 1969.

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ably reflecting an effort by Novotny to minimize the significance of these acts—an indication that he was still thinking in terms of merely symbolic gestures and that he felt as vulnerable in 1962 as he had in 1956, when he had scrupulously avoided destalinization. In fact, the new pressures on Novotny —which now specifically included a demand for review of the 1954 trial of the Slovak "nationalists" during his rule—placed him in even more direct danger than before. Liberalization could open Pandora's box for Novotny and for most of the party leadership. It could—and did—lead to a critical look not only at the specific role which Novotny and the others had played in the preparation of the trials, but at the methods and ideas of the entire Stalinist period—this at a time when Stalinism was still very much in evidence in the country.[9]

The Tide for Reform

Early in 1963 the by now familiar signs of a reform movement began to appear in Czechoslovakia. Carried forward by the same kind of inner dynamic and exhibiting much the same pattern as its precursors in Hungary and Poland, the Czechoslovak reform movement got underway in the form of a thaw brought about by the combined pressures emanating from within the party, from the economy and from Moscow. As a result of the thaw a "revolt of the intellectuals" was initiated. Exploiting the small opening for action provided by the regime's decision to destalinize, the intellectuals seized their opportunity, aided by (and perhaps dependent on support from) persons high in party circles. Soon criticisms of the status quo and demands for change in almost every sphere of Czechoslovak society began to appear, all in the name of "anti-cultism." Along with these pressures and the purges and rehabilitations resulting from the review of the trials, some of the reformers managed to attain positions of influence and power. Thus alternatives to the conservative leadership and its policies were emerging, and Novotny found it difficult to maintain his control over certain party sections and outlying offices.

Gradually, though not without numerous setbacks and difficulties (particularly in 1966–67, when the party issued strictures against the press and disciplined a number of dissident writers and intellectuals), the reformist line gained strength and even won over parts of the *apparat*, till then the base of conservative strength. Finally the liberals gained the majority in leading party circles and took over power in January 1968—a success due in no small measure to the negative impact of the conservatives' blundering attempts to reverse the tide.[10]

While the initial impetus for reform had developed within the party, once a party majority was won over to the new program, the movement for reform began to develop contacts with the workers. This alliance between the liberal elements of the party, primarily the intellectuals, and the masses, and more particularly the workers, was to a large degree forged by the students who acted as a bridge between the two groups. During most of the period of the thaw (1963-1967), the masses, including the workers, had remained indifferent, if not hostile, to the struggle of the liberals. They had tended to see the struggle as party infighting which might even result in a deterioration of their own job security and well-being, due to certain aspects of the proposed economic reforms (in this, the Czechoslovak workers differed from their Polish and Hungarian confrères, who joined their efforts to those of the intellectuals and students at an early date and thus provided the essential element in the victory, however brief, of the liberal forces in their countries). The students, however, had quickly grasped the significance of the struggle and joined their demands to those of the liberals. They were the only organized group outside the party, and yet sufficiently close to it, to serve as a bridge and agent of enlightenment for both party and workers.[11]

When the Czechoslovak workers finally did ally themselves with the students in early 1968, their effort—late though it came—was probably just as crucial to the successful promulgation of the reform program as it had been to the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary. Without active worker support at some point, such basic changes as the economic reform would not have stood much chance of succeeding,

[9] Novotny sought to deflect blame from himself by taking the line that "all were guilty" for the excesses of the Stalinist period, and he even claimed that he himself was slated to be a victim in the 1950's (see, for example, the interview he gave *Der Stern*, [Hamburg], October 10, 1963, p. 31). His efforts in this direction were presumably designed to obfuscate the public recognition he had once received for his role in the trials even before he took over the party (see *Rude pravo*, Dec. 18, 1952, for the statement by the then security chief, Karol Bacilek).

[10] For a more detailed account of this period, see G. Golan, "The Short-Lived Liberal Experiment in Czechoslovak Socialism," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1970, pp. 1096-1116.

[11] See G. Golan, "Youth and Politics in Czechoslovakia," *Journal of Contemporary History* (London), No. 1, 1970, pp. 3-22.

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and conservative efforts to sabotage the efforts of the reform leaders might well have succeeded.[12]

In early 1968, a mass movement emerged, with radio, television and pressure from below assuming the communicating and energizing functions supplied earlier by the specialized journals of the intellectuals and by pressures from above. Traditional pressure groups began to operate again, together with even more important new ones such as the independent clubs KAN, K–231, the Circle of Non-Party Writers, etc., until almost all the signs of a nascent pluralism were present in the summer of 1968. Unfortunately, these signs were interpreted by some elements—especially the predominant political forces in the Soviet Union—as a threat to the party, with consequences which put a sudden and tragic end to the Czechoslovak reform movement.

Pace of Progress

Let us now turn from consideration of those traits which the Czechoslovak reform movement shared with the Hungarian and Polish reform movements to discussion of those characteristics which were peculiar to it, namely its special approach to the question of what constituted the proper methods of reform and to the related question of what ought to constitute the long-term content of the reform.

The methods of the Czechoslovak reformers were slow, systematic and time-consuming. By comparison, the Hungarian revolution was short-lived and highly emotional, with little time or effort to develop more than the outline of what was basically an anti-Russian, albeit humanistic, program; while the primarily humanistic, albeit nationalistically motivated, Polish experiment surfaced dramatically and was neutralized almost as quickly.[13] The Czechoslovak liberalization movement inched forward during 1963–67, propelled by mundane but durable developments, including the formation of committees for political reform, the compilation of blueprints for economic, educational and governmental reform, and the formulation of legalistic action programs in every sphere of society from the cultural organs to the court system.

To be sure, there was a snowballing effect in 1968 when the liberals actually took power. The eight months of liberal rule saw much more speed, emotionalism, and even confusion of purpose than the preceding five years of "pre-liberalization" liberalization, largely because the movement was now a mass movement. Yet its methodical and thorough character, its legalistic and genuinely democratic thrust were not lost, even though these characteristics annoyed many people, particularly the young, who believed that things were moving too slowly. There were not a few complaints that a passion for legalism and an exaggerated emphasis on democratic methods tended to give an advantage to the enemies of reform, who were not bound by such scruples.[14]

If, these complaints notwithstanding, the Czechoslovak reformers persevered with their slow and methodical approach, it was not merely because of the country's long legalistic-parliamentary tradition —though this was a contributory factor. Nor was it merely because the Czechoslovak reformers had learned their lesson from the ease with which the neo-Stalinists in Poland had reversed that country's reform, demonstrating that *ad hoc* changes, informal improvements, and dramatic gestures did not constitute a sufficiently solid foundation for a lasting reform.

Some Negations

The basic reason for the distinctive characteristics of Czechoslovak reform methods was the specific nature of the Czechoslovak goals which they were supposed to bring about. But before we define what these goals *were*, we ought to state what they were *not*, if only because of the numerous misconceptions that abound on this score.

[12] In a sense Czechoslovakia in March 1968 (when the workers began to join the reform movement in force) began where Poland had left off in October 1956. One is led to the conclusion that if the Soviets had been watching more closely or understood the situation in Czechoslovakia, they could have—and probably would have—put a stop to both the changes of January 1968 and the launching of the liberal program.

[13] For the distinction between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, see E. Sandor, *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1970, pp. 60-66.

[14] This phenomenon was referred to by a *Pravda* (Bratislava) editor on Prague radio, Feb. 4, 1968; see also Josef Smrkovsky, *Rude pravo*, April 4, 1968; "Friendship and Politics," *Literarni listy* (Prague), Aug. 8, 1968; Miroslav Jodl, "An Experiment in Glancing Back," *Literarni listy*, May 30, 1968; and Michal Reiman, "Democratic Socialism: Possibilities and Limitations," *Literarni listy*, July 11, 1968. It will be remembered that the "2000 Words" manifesto of June 27 calling for more speedy reform was prompted by frustrations over the slow pace and delays in the reforms, but it did not recommend antidemocratic methods to bring about democratization. (See *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1968, pp. 12-13).

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To state the matter bluntly, the Czechoslovak reform movement was not anti-Russian, it did not seek to gain Czechoslovakia's independence from the USSR, and it was not even a nationalistic movement in the narrow sense of that word. That contrary opinions gained wide currency is probably a result of the overly simplistic approach of foreign observers to East European events, engendered by two decades of Cold War. The specific imputation of anti-Russian motives to the Czechoslovak movement may be the result of a confusion of what happened in Czechoslovakia with the anti-Russian aspects of the Hungarian and Polish events of 1956, or of Romania's more recent bid for independence. But these analogies are misleading, if only because the most active adherents and many of the leaders of the Czechoslovak reform movement were recruited from among the most senior, loyal and pro-Russian members of the CPCS.[15] While this is not to say that twenty years of Stalinism had not taken their toll on Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship, especially in the eyes of the public, it was only with the rising interference of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1968 that anti-Russian sentiments began to be heard in some Czech and Slovak reform circles.

Similarly, political independence from the USSR was not a plank of the Czechoslovak reform. It is true that certain reform proposals were premised, implicitly or explicitly, on the extension of autonomy, but they referred mainly to the degree of economic independence that was needed for the establishment of a viable economy free of political encumbrances, whether internal or external. There was talk (even on the part of Alexander Dubcek) of a "return to Europe," but only in terms of economic, cultural and diplomatic contacts, not direct political alliances or even neutrality.[16] It is also true that the realization of many of the economic and political reforms might eventually have led to a desire for independence of a political and economic nature, because the principle common to most of them was decentralization of authority and the establishment of an economic, social and political system based on the free expression and fulfillment of the real interests of its component parts. Indeed, in the summer of 1968, as pressure from the Soviet Union grew, voices were raised to this effect. But such demands were neither the point nor the goal of the reforms as originally proposed.[17]

Finally, the argument has been aired that Czechoslovak reform was triggered by narrowly nationalistic impulses. This is perhaps the most popular argument of all since it is derived from the view—held by most experts in the field—that nationalism constitutes the single most important problem in Europe, particularly since Stalin's death. While I do not disagree with this view in principle, I find it inadequate as applied to the specific case of the Czechoslovak reform. That the Czechoslovak reformers were not nationalistic in the sense of being anti-Russian or demanding political independence from the Soviet Union has been argued already; it remains to examine the view that the movement was the expression of nationalism construed as the pursuit of national interest.

If the pursuit of national interest is interpreted to mean a nationalistic yearning to free Czechoslovakia from Soviet tutelage and to establish a genuinely Czechoslovak system, then the argument is surely false, for the Czechoslovaks were not interested in the establishment of such a system for the sake of national pride.

Perhaps the best proof that the Czechoslovaks were not so motivated lies in an examination of the nature of the real objectives and the real motivations of the reformers. It is this writer's view that the Czechs and Slovaks did indeed desire the establishment of their own system[18]—reflecting their own

[15] Frantisek Vodslon could be counted among these, and Dubcek himself was indeed among the most pro-Russian of the leaders. In fact such persons as Sik and Smrkovsky had Stalinist backgrounds untainted by "nationalism" or anti-Russianism.

[16] See *e.g.*, Dubcek's speech cited in *Rude pravo*, Feb. 23, 1968. For comments on this idea, see also item in *Pravda* (Bratislava), March 21, 1968, and Milan Simecka, "A Return to Europe," *Kulturny zivot*, March 15, 1968. The present regime has tried to exaggerate the existence of demands for neutralism and to date them earlier.

[17] Brzezinski's distinction (in *Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967) between national communism and domesticism might be helpful for understanding the Czechoslovak phenomenon, but even the domesticism of Prague was less nationalistically and more pragmatically motivated than that of the Poles in 1956. Talk of special or local conditions, sovereignty, and freedom from outside interference came more as an afterthought, as a means to defend the new policies rather than as motivating principles.

[18] Miroslav Jodl was one of the first to bring up the issue of Czechoslovakia's national traditions and the question of relations with the USSR. On the first he said: "Among all the nations of the Soviet bloc we are probably the most democratic one, a nation with the strongest traditions of local autonomy, a nation which has known and appreciates fully the freedom of expression and of association, and yet a nation whose most progressive leaders, as well as whose masses, have always connected the concept of democracy with the social and socialist concept." He praised Czechoslovak links with the Soviet Union and condemned any Czech or Slovak "who fails to understand the conditions of our present national existence and would prejudice his nation and its statehood." Pragmatic perhaps, but typical. ("Do We Have a Mission?," *Literarni noviny* [Prague], Jan. 7, 1967.)

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traditions, realities and needs—and release from the Soviet model. However, what motivated them was not vague nationalistic yearnings but the recognition that the Soviet system could not satisfy their needs for very specific practical and theoretical reasons.

The Practical Goals

On the level of *praxis* (to lapse into Marxian terminology), by 1962 the party was faced with failure in almost every area of national life. The once exemplary educational system had deteriorated into a collection of second-rate institutions producing a generation of young people indifferent to the exhortations of the party; the cultural world was dull and unimaginative, yet seething with frustration and potential opposition; bureaucracy stifled almost all hope of efficiency; and the economy was tottering. Once world-renowned, the quality of Czechoslovak goods had fallen off so drastically that even the more backward East European countries rejected them; morale was so low that worker productivity could not begin to make up for the shortage of labor. Moreover, all attempts at solving these problems were frustrated at the same point: halfway measures would not do; partial adjustments of the system would not work. Only a total revamping of the nation's institutions, beginning with and based upon political reform, could succeed.

One liberal stated the problem thus:

As we have gotten into a situation where worker morale, the quality of work, accuracy, and the sense of personal responsibility have fallen off, we shall have to review the position in its whole complexity and from every point of view—economic, moral and political.[19]

And another liberal said:

If Lenin regarded politics as the concentrated expression of economic processes, it follows that contradictions in the economy can find their concentrated expression in politics. . . . Thus the question [is] whether the existing structure of political power meets the requirements of the economic development of socialism.[20]

[19] Jan Uher, "The Choice of Alternatives and the Freedom of Action," *Kulturny zivot*, Feb. 4, 1966.

[20] Julius Strinka, "Reticent Dogmatism and Revolutionary Dialectics," *Kulturny zivot*, Nov. 26, 1965.

This broadening of the call for economic reform to take in the demand for a radical revamping of the political structure (as a requisite to change in the entire system) constituted the inner dynamic of the reform. This was the view put forth by Czechoslovakia's chief economic reformer Ota Sik in 1966 at the 13th Party Congress, to Novotny's consternation, and it was reiterated by Dubcek himself shortly after he took office.[21] Had the reform program been implemented without interference, it is clear that some of the economic measures, along with democratization of the security system and the centers of power, would have had the effect of removing certain Czechoslovak institutions from Soviet influence; yet this conclusion was not widely aired until the last weeks before the invasion. Rather, the reformers simply said that the Soviet model—the strong, omnipotent, centralist state of Stalin and the Leninist concept of the party, at least as interpreted by Stalin—was not suitable for Czechoslovakia.[22] Whether it was suitable for others, *i.e.*, whether it was good or bad *per se*, was not of great interest, for the intention was not to criticize or arouse the Soviets or to challenge their claim to leadership. All the reformers said—cautiously, and more often than not without mentioning the source of the model—was that for the Czechoslovakia of today it did not work.

Supporting Theories

On a more theoretical level, they phrased the problem somewhat differently. To consolidate a number of theses put forward at the time, the argument of the reformers went somewhat as follows.[23]

[21] For Sik's speech, see *Rude pravo*, June 5, 1966. Novotny's angry reaction came in a speech to the party Presidium on Sept. 5, 1967, and was reported in "Antonin Novotny and the Leading Role of the Party," *Kulturny zivot*, July 5, 1968. Dubcek's speech was made Feb. 22, 1968, and was reported in *Rude pravo* the next day.

[22] See, *e.g.*, Andrej Kopcok, *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 8, 1963, or Michal Lakatos, "On Certain Problems of the Structure of Our Political System," *Pravny obzor* (Bratislava), January 1965. Lakatos did not mention Czechoslovakia but rather criticized the "deification of the state and its functions" as a phenomenon of Stalinism which was objectively wrong for a socialist society. After January 1968 the reformers were more careful to say that their suggestions implied no criticism of practices elsewhere but merely reflected the needs of Czechoslovakia.

[23] *E.g.*, contributions by Zdenek Mlynar, Josef Valenta and Milos Kalab to a Prague radio discussion of March 11, 1966, on the then forthcoming congress; interview by Eduard Goldstücker in *Volksstimme* (Vienna), April 12, 1968; Josef Smrkovsky, *Rude pravo*, Feb. 9, 1968; and the Dubcek regime's Action Program in *Rude pravo*, April 10, 1968.

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Czechoslovakia had achieved a stage of development not yet reached by other socialist societies; hence, it could not follow an existing blueprint. It was a modern 20th-century society, highly developed and industrialized, classless (in the Marxist sense of passing through the final stages of socialism), with a democratic tradition and a desire to restore a democratic way of life. As a stage of any significant duration before the transition to communism, this development was unforeseen by the founders of communism.[24] The existing institutions, including the state and party structures, were not suitable to serve during a long period of advanced socialism. They had been designed for the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which a strong state ruled dictatorially through the party in the name of the proletariat in order to stamp out capitalism and the classes created by the relationships of capitalist production.[25] This goal had already been accomplished in Czechoslovakia, but until the other conditions necessary for the establishment of communism were achieved, the state would have to be perpetuated.

In the eyes of the Czechoslovak reformers, the Soviet answer to this dilemma, the "all-people state" proclaimed by Khrushchev in 1961, with its retention of the ubiquitous and dominating role of the party, was not satisfactory. One reason for this insufficiency, the Czechoslovak reformers thought, was that Khrushchev's formula assumed that nationalization placed all workers into the same relationship with the means of production, and hence into the same class—thereby eliminating all conflicting interests. Khrushchev's formula allowed merely for *different* interests susceptible of being harmonized without conflict. The Czechoslovak reformers disagreed; they felt that *conflicting* interests were to be found even in a socialist society. Moreover, the political structure of socialist society, as exemplified by the Soviet state or their own, could not generate or guarantee the institutions necessary for the genuine expression of conflicting interests[26]—for example, the freedom from centralized party control required both for the functioning of a market economy and for the effective representation by mass organizations of their members' interests. In a sense, what the Czechoslovak reformers were searching for were new concepts and institutions to adapt Marxism-Leninism to what they considered the new reality of a modern, industrialized, classless, but still precommunist society, with conflicting internal interest groups and strata.

The Drive to Democratize

The solutions proposed by the Czechoslovak reformers were many and varied, but their overall thrust was clearly toward the democratization of society. It was suggested earlier in this article that the ideal of democracy inspired the legalism, the methodical approach, and the deliberate slowness of the reform program. It should be stressed that the choice of these democratic measures was based on the explicit assumption that only by democratic means could the desired end result of a democratic society be achieved. Indeed, the establishment of a democracy was the basic aim of the Czechoslovak reform—and what gave it its special distinction.

The organic connection between means and ends was clearly recognized by Czechoslovak thinkers in their insistence that the reform was to be accomplished through the gradual change of existing institutions and the lasting institutionalization of change. Said Slovak philosopher Miroslav Kusy:

This is a revolution which aims at a qualitative change of . . . the entire institutional structure of our society. . . . What is involved is an institutional revolution.[27]

Hence the reformers sought to build the machinery for genuine democracy by rebuilding each and every institution, separating it from the party's domination and rendering it an effective component of a democratic society. In this way, the rebuilt institutions might themselves protect and guarantee full and genuine implementation of the reforms. In this

[24] See Z. Mlynar, "Problems of Political Leadership and the New Economic System," *World Marxist Review* (Prague), December 1965, pp. 58-64.

[25] See, *e.g.*, J. Ceconik, "The Advanced Socialist Society," *Kulturny zivot*, Sept. 9, 1966; and Z. Mlynar in *Rude pravo*, Feb. 13, 1968.

[26] *Cf.* Z. Mlynar, *loc. cit.* (footnote 24); Strinka, *op. cit.*; Kopcok, *op. cit.*; Michal Suchy, *Otazky marxisticky filosofie* (Bratislava), No. 5, 1964, pp. 409-14; Ivan Bystrina, *Literarni noviny*, Dec. 17, 1966; and M. Lakatos, *Pravny obzor*, No. 7, 1963, pp. 385-94; *ibid.*, No. 1, 1965, pp. 26-36; *ibid.*, No. 3, 1966, pp. 212-23; and *Kulturny zivot*, March 3, 1967.

[27] "The Czechoslovak Political Crisis," *Nova mysl* (Prague), November 1968. Kusy's remarks were intended principally to indicate the lack of anti-Communist character in the movement, but were nonetheless an apt characterization. See also Julius Strinka, "Reticent Dogmatism and Revolutionary Dialectics," *Kulturny zivot*, Nov. 26, 1968, and "Two Concepts of the Dialectics of Socialism," *Otazky marxisticky filosofie*, No. 1, 1963, pp. 82-88.

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PROGRAMMED FOR ACTION

Comrades, the meaning of the submitted action program is twofold. Above all, it is to create a unity of action for the realization of the main tasks of our development, to provide enough stimuli for the development of the people's socialist initiative, to point out the road and eliminate the obstacles which have so far obstructed our further advance and which mainly consist of *excessive centralism in the methods of administration and management,* whose roots lie above all in the field of political control. The second and more profound meaning of the program lies in the fact that it gives scope for principled structural changes in our society and for the creation of a new dynamic of socialism, a dynamic which would correspond both to changed social, economic and cultural conditions, and to specific national conditions. (Emphasis added.)

—Alexander Dubcek's address to the CPCS Central Committee, *Rude pravo* (Prague), April 2, 1968.

context, it is significant that the democratic content of the institutions proposed by the reformers for their future society was very high. They featured the encouragement of greater individual initiative and genuine popular participation in political decision-making. Stressing the scope to be given in the projected modern, industrialized, classless system to conflicting interests, groups and strata, the proposals provided for the granting of more independence and responsibility to a great number of groupings of management personnel, workers, farmers, intellectuals, students, and religious and ethnic minorities, as well as local government bodies, courts, mass organizations and various other non-party institutions and associations. This kind of diffusion of power was acceptable to the Czechs because it conformed to their traditions, while many Slovaks embraced it for the more parochial reason that it was bound to help them in their continual tug-of-war with Prague.[28]

To be implemented, the process of democratization demanded by the reformers clearly required changes in the fundamental bases of the system—the constitution, the role of the Communist Party, and the whole framework of Czechoslovak society. The prospect of such radical changes was bound to rouse the conservatives, both inside and outside Czechoslovakia, and it did. On the practical side, the Czechoslovak conservatives feared for their jobs and personal power; on a more theoretical level, they feared that communism (or their idea of communism) could not be attained without the continued and unchallenged domination of the party, and that the party could not maintain its leading role in a truly pluralistic or democratic system. In this they may have been right; it seems entirely possible that the immanent logic of the movement might ultimately have impelled the reformers toward an "anti-Communist" course. Even in the short run, the onslaught by the party's conservative wing on the reform's pluralistic and democratic goals could have set the Czechoslovak population against the party. However, most people realized that the reform movement had started within the party, that it had found its most vivid expression in party documents such as the Action Program of April 1968, and that, despite delays and setbacks, it was being promoted and defended by the new leadership. For this reason, the Czechoslovak people rallied to the party led by Dubcek, even if in some cases skeptically, thus providing it with the broad-based support which, in this writer's opinion, would have carried the movement toward at least an attempt at genuine democratic socialism, had it not been so tragically interrupted.

The Prospects Ahead

Let us now turn to the future of Czechoslovakia's reform movement. There are several reasons why one might speculate that, despite the present bleak situation in the country, the movement will in the long run be reactivated, or, at least, that it will not be totally suppressed. The very slowness of its development suggests that the reform put down deep roots. Its broad appeal—broad both in the number of its adherents and in the spectrum of its ideas—only contributes to its endurance. At the height of their influence, the reformers were supported by men and women from all professions, backgrounds and beliefs, and it is probably safe to say that the entire population shared the hopes—and many of the benefits—of the liberalization from January to August 1968. An experience so exhilarating and profound cannot easily or quickly be erased from the memories of millions.

[28] The participation of the Slovaks in the reform movement is a complicated matter. Many Slovaks were genuinely interested in liberalization and believed that Slovak rights could be guaranteed only in a society which guaranteed all the usual liberal rights. There were other Slovaks, however, who saw liberalization only as a means to gain specific Slovak demands and whose liberalism went no deeper than the acquisition of federation and certain other Slovak rights.

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While there must eventually be a return to "normalcy" (though the resistance to normalization has gone on for two years now, greatly delaying and undermining the projects of the new leaders), the Husak regime may find it more difficult to achieve the kind of docility and readiness to collaborate characteristic of Czechoslovakia in earlier times. The average citizen knows that millions of his countrymen think as he does, and while this knowledge in itself may not spur him to action, it does eliminate one of the barriers that reformers must otherwise break down to achieve their ends—*i.e.*, the isolation and mistrust which makes each man fearful of exposing his views.[29]

[29] This obstacle was pointed out earlier by Z. Mlynar in *Praca* (Bratislava), Jan. 25, 1966.

Almost every major social institution was affected by reform efforts in the course of liberalization. While many changes probably did not last long enough to leave an indelible mark on society, they still cannot easily be undone. The revamping of the educational system, for example, was accomplished in 1965 and probably had only begun to show results; yet, while there are hints that the new regime plans to return to the old "unified" system (which emphasized polytechnical subjects at the expense of the humanities and paid insufficient attention to individual capabilities), such a reconversion will not be easily achieved.[30] Similarly, the dis-

[30] See *Rude pravo*, Feb. 26, 1970, on the educational system; on the return to the cadre system, minority problems, etc., see *ibid.*, Feb. 10 and 19, 1970.

WHO INVITED WHOM?

The question poses itself, Who invited these armies in? . . . The question was never discussed to the end; it has not been resolved. No names have been published. When the matter was discussed in Bratislava, Prague and Moscow with our leaders, all members of the leadership of the federal and the Slovak parties, without exception, gave their word of honor that they were not involved in any such *démarche* and had no knowledge of it. *I know of no leading personality in Czech or Slovak political life of whom it could be said with certainty he had taken this step.* . . . (Emphasis added.)

—Gustav Husak's statement, reported in *Pravda* (Bratislava), Aug. 29, 1968.

[The Soviet occupation] is an act of use of force which cannot be justified by any means. It did not take place upon request or demand of the Czechoslovak government, nor of any other constitutional organs of this republic.

—Speech of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek at the UN Security Council, New York, Aug. 24, 1968, *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1968.

[The occupation] happened without the knowledge of the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the National Assembly, the Premier, or the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee.

—Radio Prague, Aug. 21, 1968, attributed to the Presidium of the CPCS Central Committee.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia knew nothing of any invitation to the armies of the Warsaw Pact. We are dissociating ourselves from everything that has been done and is being done except by the legally, democratically elected leadership of the party and state.

—Radio Czechoslovakia in Slovakia, Aug. 22, 1968.

Heeding the *appeal of the party and state leaders* and the Communist and working people of Czechoslovakia, and taking into consideration *the danger created for the gains of socialism in that country,* at that time we, together with the fraternal socialist countries, adopted the decision to give Czechoslovakia international aid in defense of socialism. . . . (Emphasis added.)

—Leonid I. Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress, Moscow Radio, March 30, 1971.

Thousands of Communists, individual citizens, and entire collectives of the working people, representatives of all strata of the people and of diverse organizations, *including members of the CPCS Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, as well as members of the Czechoslovak government and deputies to the National Assembly and the Slovak National Council* . . . began to turn to the leaderships of the fraternal parties and also to the governments of our allies, begging them in this historically grave moment to grant international assistance to the Czechoslovak people in the defense of socialism. . . . (Emphasis added.)

—CC CPCS, "Lessons Drawn from the Critical Developments in the Party and Society after the 13th CPCS Congress," *Pravda* (Bratislava), Jan. 14, 1971.

On behalf of our delegation, we want to express from the rostrum of this Congress [the 24th CPSU Congress] our sincere thanks to the CPSU, to the Soviet government and the Soviet people for having understood the anxieties of the Czechoslovak Communists regarding socialism and their appeals for help. . . .

—Gustav Husak's address to the 24th CPSU Congress, Radio Moscow, April 1, 1971.

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mantling of enterprise councils, the limited restalinization of the legal system, and the reintroduction of the cadre system (with its preference for persons of known political loyalty and "proper" class background rather than candidates with professional qualifications) are bound to cause serious disruption.

Even in institutions untouched by the reform, alternatives to Soviet techniques and programs are now known to exist. The Action Program, the basic document of the liberalization, was published and widely circulated, and the people are familiar with the vast literature of programmatic material issued on the reforms: farmers know that but for the Soviet invasion, they could have had a union, the workers know that they could have had power, minorities know that they could have had significant rights (including the Slovaks, who cannot long be placated by the pseudo-federalism permitted them by the Soviets)—and all of this within the framework of socialism. Looking backward for a comparison, the threat of the "alternative" seems far greater today than was the threat of a return to the republicanism of the Benes regime in the early days of the party-state.

There is always the possibility, of course, that the traditional Czechoslovak penchant for passive, long-suffering resistance will return the people to their former apathetic state, and young people in particular appear sensitive to this danger. There is not much they can do to combat it, however, given the pressures applied by the regime.

At the same time, there is the possibility that the tradition of passivity has broken down. The impetus to press on toward the goals that seemed so nearly in reach in 1968 may well create new pressures for reform, both in imitation of and in departure from the tactics of the past. Thus, on the one hand, there is a good chance that the liberals may slowly and laboriously work to regain positions of influence within the party, hoping to reactivate the reformist spirit—although the present leadership is of course familiar with this technique and likely to provide special safeguards against it.[31] On the other hand, more insistent pressures could develop. There is today a good deal of bitterness in Czechoslovakia over what is called "Dubcek's weakness" and his refusal during his short reign to use undemocratic means to attain liberal ends (such as neutralizing the conservative foes of reform). While this disappointment might not be sufficient to convert traditional democratic inclinations into radicalism or revolutionary effort, it might give greater toughness to the reform forces than they possessed prior to August 1968. It is, however, very difficult to gauge the depth and range of this feeling, particularly in view of the present regime's encouragement of such a view of Dubcek.

What is much more clear and certain is the deep and genuine anti-Russian feeling now general in the country. While Czechoslovak sympathies for the Russians had gradually declined in the period of Stalinist rule, it took the invasion of August 1968 to convert the Czechoslovak nation's basically good-natured attitude of superiority mixed with tolerance toward the Russians into a distinct and palpable hatred. It is most unlikely that any reform movement in Czechoslovakia today, or in the future, can be devoid of nationalist sentiment. It is in fact more likely that nationalism will—and already does—play a significant role as a motivating force and as a guiding principle among reformist elements.

For the time being, however, there is little that Czechoslovakia's citizens can do to vent their frustrations against Moscow. Thus, even while there are many reasons to hope that reformist tendencies will eventually reassert themselves, it is necessary to end on a rather bleak note with respect to the short run. Indeed, awareness that Moscow is the major obstacle to Czechoslovakia's liberalization has led to the depressing but widespread belief that no reform can be achieved until and unless the Soviet Union itself experiences liberalization—or else loses its power to act in Europe because of the Chinese threat. Given these circumstances—along with the curious combination of skill and desperation that characterizes the tightrope course of the present regime in Prague—there are few grounds for expecting a reactivation of Czechoslovakia's reform movement now or in the immediate future.

[31] See, *e.g.*, "Today's Strategy," *Rudo pravo*, March 21, 1970 (referring to the strategy of the liberals).

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Sociology in the Soviet Union

By Zev Katz

After a long period of total suppression under Stalin, sociology has experienced a gradual rebirth in the Soviet Union in the last decade and a half until today it has become one of the most active—if not yet fully legitimized—fields of scientific inquiry. At present, there is scarcely any branch of sociological research in which no work is being done in the USSR; Soviet delegations regularly participate in international conferences of sociologists; and in methodology and conceptualization—particularly in the application of sophisticated mathematical methods to research and model-building—Soviet social scientists in the leading academic centers have attained professional standards as high as those reached anywhere else in the world. Yet, Soviet sociologists have not achieved their present level of recognition at home without a long and, perforce, cautious struggle, and their activity continues to be carefully watched and circumscribed lest it undermine the ideological foundations of the Communist Party's monopoly of power. Still, progress goes on.

As relatively little has yet been written in the West about this highly significant development, it seems appropriate here to inquire into the reasons for the renaissance of sociology in the USSR; to survey the institutions engaged in sociological research, the principal areas of study, and some of the findings in these areas; and finally to offer an assessment of the broader implications of the development of sociology for the future evolution of Soviet society.

Currently with the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, Mr. Katz is an eminent authority on Soviet sociology and has published numerous monographs on the subject. His article is a shortened version of part of a longer study on sociology in the USSR, supported by a grant from the Harvard University Russian Research Center. Preparatory work was done at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Glasgow University, Scotland.

Why the Rebirth?

What, then, has brought about the reemergence of sociology in the Soviet Union after its long relegation to the status of a proscribed "bourgeois pseudo-science"? Certainly, a large part of the answer is to be found in the far-reaching process of change that has been going on in Soviet society since the death of Stalin. Slowly, the post-Stalin leadership has tended to move away from reliance on mass terror towards more subtle and sophisticated methods of persuasion and social manipulation. This, in turn, has prompted an increased reliance on "science" (*nauka*) in the broadest sense, and in particular on sociological research, such as the scientific, empirical investigation and analysis of social structure, attitudes, motivations and behavior, etc., as a means of devising more effective methods of social control and system legitimization.

It is, above all, this "objective" need for new and more efficient instrumentalities in these areas that has induced the post-Stalin Soviet regimes to tolerate the revival of sociology. This tolerance has, however, been grudging and guarded, as many old-line Soviet ideologues have continued to view an independent and non-dogmatic theoretical sociology as a direct challenge to the official "sociology" as embodied in Soviet-Marxist historical materialism and its "laws" of social relations and development. It has consequently been only through persistent

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pressure from below, by the sociologists themselves, that the party elite has been persuaded gradually to widen the areas of permissible sociological research —and then only if it deemed such research useful.

Another factor that has contributed to the recent development of Soviet sociology has been the attenuation of the Stalinist isolation which long cut off Soviet science from scientific developments in the rest of the world. When, a few years after the death of Stalin, small Soviet delegations composed mostly of old-time theoreticians appeared at international conferences such as that of the International Sociological Association in Amsterdam in 1956,[1] their members—accustomed to regarding themselves as possessors of the ultimate scientific truth about the laws of social development—must have been disturbed to find that virtually a whole new social science had developed not only in the West but even, to some extent, in Eastern Europe (particularly in Poland), and that they knew next to nothing about it. They realized that Soviet scholars would have little to contribute in this area—either at international conferences or at home—unless they mastered this new development. Hence, the development of sociology in the Soviet Union became imperative as part of the "ideological struggle" against the capitalist system and as a matter of national prestige.

There has been still another powerful motivation, although it has been less openly acknowledged. More than half a century after the Bolshevik Revolution, many members of the Soviet educated elite—especially among the rising generation of academicians, scientists and technocrats—have come to recognize that much of actual social development in the world has not conformed to the "scientific" laws of Marxism-Leninism, and that even if some of these laws may yet prove valid in the long run, they cannot be substituted for the study of actual processes in society. For such study, they acknowledge, the modern methods of sociological investigation developed in the West are indispensable. And they argue that for a totally-planned and highly centralistic society approaching the stage of mature, complex industrialization, such research is even more essential than it is for the free-enterprise, pluralistic societies of the West.

It should be added that the preeminently science-oriented young Soviet intelligentsia of today have embraced sociology with special enthusiasm. To them it comes as something novel and fascinating; it is mathematical, neutral and pragmatic; it pushes aside outworn dogmas and clichés. It posits the ability of the individual social scientist, through the systematic gathering of empirical data and the processing of these data with the aid of modern electronic devices, to make precise measurements of social phenomena and thereby gain "objective" insights into ongoing social processes. Moreover, since this new and valuable science is beyond the ken of the party professionals and elder masters of Soviet-Marxist "social science," it offers its young practitioners the possibility of getting ahead rapidly in their careers.[2]

The partial legitimization of sociology may also have been influenced by the "discovery" that Lenin himself took a positive view of sociology, that considerable empirical social research was done in the Soviet Union during the 1920's, and that many non-Soviet Marxists in Eastern Europe and the West were working towards a modern Marxist sociology.

Academic Institutions

In a Soviet-type system, every activity that affects society must of course be carried on within an appropriate institutionalized framework. In the case of sociological research in the USSR, it should be noted that, as a result of a unique development, there are in fact two seemingly parallel sets of institutions, one of which has become part of the academic establishment, while the other has developed as an adjunct of the party. A third set of institutions, consisting of bodies set up to conduct applied-sociological studies at industrial enterprises, collective farms, or local administrations, is still only in the embryonic stage.[3]

[1] Ten years later (1966), when the Sixth Congress of the Association was held at Evian, France, the Soviet delegation numbered no less than 83 persons and included a sizable number of young professional sociologists. (For the first time, the Congress elected a representative from a Communist country—the distinguished Polish sociologist, Jan Szczepanski—to the presidency of the ISA). The Seventh ISA Congress in September 1970 was actually held *in* a Communist country (at Varna, Bulgaria), with the Soviet delegation of 400 persons easily outnumbering all the rest, including an American contingent of over 300.

[2] Zygmunt Bauman has elaborated on this point in an unpublished paper, "Eastern European and Soviet Social Science, A Case Study in Stimulus Diffusion," presented at a conference organized by the University of Michigan Center for Russian and East European Studies in May 1970.

[3] See, *e.g.*, I. Titarenko, "Sotsiologi prishli na zavod" (Sociologists Have Come to the Factory), *Pravda* (Moscow), April 24, 1968; and I. Golembiovsky, "Sotsiolog na zavode" (The Sociologist at the Factory), *Izvestia* (Moscow), Oct. 27, 1969.

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On the academic side, three major central institutions concerned with sociological work have been established: the Learned Council on Problems of Applied Social Research (*Nauchnyi Soviet o Problemakh Konkretnykh Sotsialnykh Issledovanii);* the Institute for Applied Social Research (*Institut Konkretnykh Sotsialnykh Issledovanii*—henceforth IASR) within the USSR Academy of Science; and the Soviet Sociological Association (*Sovetskaia Sotsiologicheskaia Assotsiatsiia*—SSA). Of these, the most important is the IASR inasmuch as the Learned Council appears to function largely as a sort of umbrella organization for coordinating work of a sociological nature in the various specialized institutes of the Academy of Sciences.

The IASR came into being only in 1968 following a protracted struggle that amply illustrated the resistance to investing sociology with the status of an independent discipline. The first meager concession in this direction had been the establishment within the Academy's Institute of Philosophy of a "section for the study of new forms of labor and everyday life," [4] which was later reconstituted under the more straightforward title of "Section for Applied Sociological Research." It was clear from the outset, however, that a mere section under the command of the conservative-minded members of the Institute of Philosophy would never be able to function effectively as the main center for the development of sociology in the USSR. The sociologists therefore kept up their pressure until finally, in 1968, the IASR was created as a full-fledged institute, with Academician A.F. Rumiantsev as its head. Typically, however, it was not named the Institute of Sociology but rather the Institute for Applied Social Research, suggesting an effort by the conservatives to diminish its stature and to limit its activity to empirical studies only.[5]

The Soviet Sociological Association, on the other hand, has been in existence since 1958 and has become one of the more active professional organizations in the USSR. Though primarily academic in character, it includes party sociologists and party sociological institutions as well. It reportedly has 24 permanent research committees, as well as branches in a number of major cities and scientific centers, including Novosibirsk, Kiev, Leningrad and Perm;[6] and though it does not hold regular annual meetings, it has convened occasional conferences on sociological questions. The SSA has also sponsored the publication of numerous monographs and serves as a medium for contacts with similar associations abroad. In September 1970, it had 1,469 individual and 273 collective (*i.e.,* organizations and institutions) members, as compared with 580 and 79, respectively, in 1966.[7]

Apart from the Academy of Sciences, sociological work is being carried on at other central academic institutions (*e.g.,* the USSR Academies of Architecture, Pedagogical Science, and Medicine, and various Institutes within the Academy of Sciences, such as those of Ethnography, Economics, State and Law, etc.); at the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the famous "science city" of Akademgorodok; at the academies of the several republics as well as at research institutions in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, East Siberia and the Buriat Autonomous Region; and at the major university centers, such as Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Gorky and Rostov. According to Academician P.N. Fedoseev, there were, already in 1968, some 2,000 persons (including personnel in party as well as academic organizations) and about 50 university departments actively engaged in "social research." [8] It should nevertheless be borne in mind that in many instances the establishment of separate departments for sociological research in academic institutions was accomplished only after overcoming strong internal opposition.[9]

While resistance to research activity in the sociological field thus appears to have diminished considerably in recent years, the same cannot be said of opposition to the teaching of sociology. It is true that some courses in the general field of sociology are given at a few Soviet universities, and some of the research institutions provide training programs

[4] A. G. Zdravomyslov, *Metodologiia i protsedury sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii* (Methodology and Procedures of Sociological Research), Moscow, Mysl, 1969, p. 3.

[5] For details about the IASR and its predecessor, see the Soviet Sociological Association's series entitled *Sotsialnye issledovaniia* (Social Research), Vol. II, 1968, pp. 22-23; David Lane, "Ideology and Sociology in the USSR," *The British Journal of Sociology,* December 1969, pp. 43-51; *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 2, 1969, pp. 137-39.

[6] *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 8, 1958, pp. 185-86; and *Soviet Sociology,* Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 57-64.

[7] See G. V. Osipov, *Sotsiologiia i konkretnye sotsialnye issledovaniia v SSSR* (Sociology and Applied Social Research in the USSR), Moscow, Soviet Organizing Committee for the Seventh World Congress of Sociology, 1970; and (on 1966 figures) E. V. Beliaev *et al.*, "Vsesoiuznyi simposium sotsiologov" (All-Union Symposium of Sociologists), *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 10, 1966.

[8] Writing in *Sotsialnye issledovaniia,* Vol. II, 1968, p. 12.

[9] A specialist in Soviet constitutional law told the author, for instance, that heated debates preceded the decision to establish a sociological section in the Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law.

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in sociology for university graduates. Nevertheless, it is a striking fact that at the present time there is not a single proper teaching department of sociology at any higher educational institution in the Soviet Union. Moscow University, for example, has a sociological laboratory, a Laboratory for Labor Resources, and a Center for the Study of Population Problems, but these are engaged solely in research. Although the University has at last established its first chair of sociology, the course is restricted to graduates. Hence, to quote Novosibirsk's pioneering specialist in studies of manpower resources, V. Perevedentsev, sociology in the USSR still remains very much "a sociology without sociologists." [10]

Reflective of this lack of progress in the teaching of sociology is the fact that while some methodological manuals and lecture courses have been published by academic institutions or professional bodies, usually in small editions and mainly for internal use,[11] a comprehensive textbook on sociology by a Soviet author has yet to appear in print. Curiously enough, the first textbook on the *methodology* of sociological research, published in 1969, was produced not by an academic institution but by one of the party agencies described farther on in this article.[12]

It is no less significant that there is as yet not a single professional journal in the Soviet Union devoted to sociology, in striking contrast to Poland, where there are five, including one in English. To some extent, however, the absence of sociological journals is offset by the fact that academic and professional organizations can publish specialized series, a number of which have dealt with sociology-related subjects. At the same time one might say that some of the leading professional journals (*e.g., Voprosy filosofii, Filosofskie nauki)* and intellectual periodicals have become "sociologized." For example, *Literaturnaia gazeta* has become a major medium for the popularization of sociological research and thought, and the same was true of *Novyi mir* at least until the replacement of its liberal editor, Aleksandr Tvardovsky, last year. Even such party and government organs as *Pravda, Partiinaia zhizn* and *Izvestia* publish occasional articles on sociological subjects, and the Communist Youth League organ *Komsomolskaia pravda* has displayed a noteworthy interest and initiative in this field.

Party Institutions

The existence of a separate set of sociological research institutions attached to the ruling party is a phenomenon unique to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. It stems from the fact that in these societies the Communist Party is not just an ordinary political party like those in pluralistic-democratic societies, but rather the paramount element in a system which aims at total social control on the basis of a chiliastic ideology. As such, the party cannot leave any form of social research activity to take its own autonomous course. Not only does the party make every effort to control academic sociology to the fullest degree possible; it has also developed its own sociological establishment.

The central institution in this establishment is the Academy of Social Sciences (*Akademiia Obshchestvennykh Nauk*) attached to the CPSU Central Committee. Operating within it are several specialized units such as the Research Team on the Effectiveness of Ideological Work (established in 1964), the Sociological Section of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, and the Sociological Group on the Scientific Management of Society in the Department of Scientific Communism[13] (headed by Professor V.G. Afanasev)—the titles of which are indicative of some of the principal preoccupations of party-directed sociological work. Sociology is also taught at the annual seminars conducted at the Academy for party officials and scientific cadres.

One of the first party organizations to take an active interest in developing sociological studies was the Central Committee of the Komsomol. It was the Committee's official organ, *Komsomolskaia pravda,* which established an Institute of Public Opinion in the spring of 1960—the first such institution in the Soviet Union. The Institute initiated a series of what were, in the beginning, rather amateurish public opinion polls, using *Komsomolskaia pravda* to put

[10] "Otkuda berutsia sotsiologi?" (Where Do Sociologists Come From?), in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 12, 1970, p. 12.

[11] For example, in 1968 Tartu University in Estonia published a mimeographed transcript of a series of lectures given by Professor V. A. Yadov of Leningrad University on "the methodology and procedures of sociological research." Similarly, the Soviet Sociological Association's *Informatsionnyi biulleten* (Information Bulletin) carried a series of lectures on sociology by Yuri Levada: see Nos. 5 (20) and 6, Part 2.

[12] Zdravomyslov, *op. cit.* (see fn. 4). This book was published under the auspices of the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, with the cooperation of the Higher Party School.

[13] This department publishes two series related to sociological problems: *Nauchnoe upravlenie obshchestvom* (The Scientific Direction of Society) and *Problemy nauchnovo kommunizma* (Problems of Scientific Communism).

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certain questions to the paper's readers and invite their answers.[14] Komsomol officials have been especially outspoken in stressing the importance of sociology for party work. Writing in the first of a series of studies based on a 1967 conference on "Socialism and the Young" organized by the Komsomol, Yu. Torsuev, a secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, stated unequivocally that a Komsomol official

. . . cannot do without a knowledge of sociology, without understanding the social processes in society and in the world, without the ability to see the full complexity and variety of relations between the individual and society.[15]

In view of this high-level endorsement, it is not surprising that 30 Komsomol regional (oblast) committees in various parts of the Soviet Union have enlisted the services of outside sociological institutes and research teams to work on special projects.[16]

A similar situation exists in the regular party organization, where some 40 regional party committees now have staff or outside specialists carrying on sociological investigations of various kinds.[17] At an all-Union seminar convened in Moscow in June 1966 by the Department of Scientific Communism of the party's Academy of Social Sciences to discuss "applied sociological research and ideological work," a number of regional party organizations were recognized as having effectively utilized knowledge gained through such research to improve their work, particularly in the field of propaganda. They included the party organizations of such far-flung regions as Krasnoiarsk in Siberia, Krasnodar near the Black Sea, the Tatar ASSR, and Cheliabinsk in the Urals. The seminar also noted that sociological research was being actively carried on in the party organizations of many of the republics, including Estonia and Lithuania.[18] The Estonian party Central Committee established a Sociological Commission to supervise all sociological research in the republic, while the party Central Committee of Lithuania encouraged all party committees below it to "engage more widely in empirical sociological research." [19]

Needless to say, the essential purpose of the expanding sociological research activity being carried on under the direct auspices of the party is to enable the party decision-making organs to perform more efficiently their directive role in an increasingly diverse and complex society. This is readily apparent from the fact that a very large proportion of the party-sponsored studies focus on such topics of central concern as the effectiveness of the party's political education work and propaganda among different social groups, particularly the workers, the intelligentsia, and the young; the causes of worker dissatisfaction, of infractions of labor discipline, and of "deviant" attitudes among youth; the most effective methods of coping with these problems; and so on.

All this points up what appears to be a highly significant trend affecting the party's approach to decision-making. Hitherto, the standard practice in preparing for a meeting of a party organ—or for that matter of any official decision-making body—was to assign the advance preparation of the agenda and working materials for the meeting to regular party professionals or committees composed of such professionals. In the last few years, however, an increasing share of the advance preparation of working materials has been entrusted to sociological research establishments or groups. In this way, the party organs have begun to base their decisions on the more objective information gathered by outside researchers and assembled in "scientific" studies which often set forth a number of options for consideration. Thus, also, the party has acquired an additional apparatus for information-gathering and situation reports.

To illustrate, a plenary session of the Gorky party committee, in considering steps to combat violations of labor discipline, had at its disposal a sociological study which showed that most of the transgressors, contrary to previous assumptions, were not young people but workers with considerable seniority, and that the latter were more effectively influenced by being called to order at a general workers' meeting than by direct official censure. Similarly, the Belorussian party Central Committee had its Propaganda

[14] See *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), May 19, 1960; also, B. A. Grushin, *Mneniia o mire i mir mnenii* (Opinions on the World and the World of Opinion), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1967, pp. 12-16; and Ann Weinberg, *Soviet Sociology, 1960-63*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Center for International Studies, 1967.

[15] *Molodezh, yeio interesy, stremleniia, idealy*, (Youth, Its Interests, Aspirations and Ideals), Moscow, Molodaia Gvardia, 1969, pp. 5-7.

[16] D. D. Lubsanov *et al.*, Eds., *Iz opyta konkretno-sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii* (From the Experience of Applied Sociological Research), Ulan-Ude, Buriatskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 1968, p. 6.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Problemy nauchnovo kommunizma* (see fn. 13), No. 2, 1968, pp. 5-8, 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-91, 94-98, 113-17.

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Department issue new instructions on the basis of a poll of students at party schools showing that the majority of students considered it most important for the party's propagandists to have a more thorough knowledge of the subjects they were supposed to explain.[20] The importance of such sociological investigations from the party's standpoint was succinctly summed up by A. Voss, first secretary of the Latvian party Central Committee, who wrote in 1967:

Sociological studies have made us give up many old conceptions; they have caused us to review the forms and methods of party work. . . . [*they provide*] *a more precise analysis of the actual situation and of the results of measures undertaken by party committees.*[21]

There are evidences, however, that not all the "sociological" work carried out by party agencies or under party auspices serves the purposes or measures up to the standards of objectivity implied in Voss's remark. For instance, the party committee of the Kostroma region, near Moscow, set up a so-called "Institute of Applied Sociological Research" which had as its head the chief of the committee's Propaganda Department, with the regional and city party secretaries included among its directors and the chief of police serving as one of its researchers. When this agency conducted a study of alcoholism, the interviewers were police officers, and the "precise information" they obtained principally concerned what shops were violating the regulations governing the sale of liquor.[22] In another instance, *Partiinaia zhizn* (No. 19, 1967, p. 36) reported a poll conducted by the party organization in Irkutsk "to counter the bourgeois allegation that there is a conflict of generations in the Soviet Union." A typical question put to those interviewed was "Which of our younger generation's qualities do you like most of all?" As might have been expected, the results of the poll refuted the alleged existence of a "generation gap."

From the institutional standpoint, then, the Soviet sociological establishment has its distinct academic and party branches. It would be mistaken, however, to conclude from this that there is a hard-and-fast dividing line between the two, or that they practice or represent two different "schools" or types of sociology. In fact, there is a considerable overlap in terms of both personnel and substantive work, as well as a sort of "dialectical interaction" which will be explained below. And while there are certainly differences, they are for the most part differences of degree rather than of fundamentals.

Dialectical Interaction

To begin with, in the matter of personnel, it must be borne in mind that the majority not only of party but of academic sociologists as well are Communist Party members. In addition, many academic sociologists have their feet in both camps, so to speak, in that they not only hold academic positions but also are enlisted to work on sociological studies for the party, in many cases as a "public service." Not infrequently, the same people work part of the time as academic sociologists in universities and research institutes and the rest of the time as members of the party's sociological establishment in a given region or locality. Still further, the academic and party sociological establishments sometimes join forces in carrying out a major social study—especially when it is undertaken under explicit instructions emanating from higher party organs.[23]

Secondly, there is what I have termed the "dialectical interaction" between the two institutional sectors of the sociological community. There is no question that by and large the academic sociologists approach their work from a more objective or, if you will, "critical" viewpoint, while the party sociologists tend more to take what has been termed an "instrumental" approach—that is to say, they seek primarily to use sociology as an instrument for bolstering the existing system of party rule by mak-

[20] *Ibid.* See also R. I. Kosolapov and P. I. Simush, "Partiinaia rabota i konkretnye sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia" (Party Work and Applied Sociological Research), in A. M. Korolev and S. I. Mosiagin, Eds., *Ideologicheskaia rabota partiinykh organizatsii* (Ideological Work of Party Organizations), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1969, pp. 236-55.

[21] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, 1967, pp. 76-77.

[22] M. Krivich, "Interviu s gorozhaninom" (Interview with a City Dweller), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Jan. 21, 1970, p. 12.

[23] An excellent example of such a major coordinated study is one that is being made of the city of Taganrog on the Black Sea (population 250,000), which is considered representative of Soviet urban life. Various academic and party sociological agencies have been assigned to investigate different, specific aspects of the city's life, including public opinion, letters from citizens to the authorities, the activities of public organizations, the communications media, attitudes of citizens toward cultural activities, the everyday life of workers, living standards, and problems of crime. See A. Levikov, "Puteshestvie v srednii gorod" (Journey to an Average Town), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 10, 1970, pp. 12-13; B. A. Grushin *et al.*, Eds., "47 Piatnits" (47 Fridays), Part 1, SSA *Informatsionnyi biulleten*, No. 25, 1969.

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ing it more efficient.[24] In actuality, however, the roles are sometimes reversed. On the one hand, academic sociologists, because they want to win the party's official stamp of legitimacy and a broader freedom of inquiry for their craft, often undertake research calculated to serve the purposes of the party leaders. On the other hand, party sociologists occasionally perform unbiased research that makes a genuine contribution to professional sociology, presenting well-corroborated data and analyses of the actual processes going on in Soviet society, even though their findings sometimes contradict the picture presented or anticipated by the party dogmatists.

Thirdly, insofar as party control is concerned, the differences between academic and party sociologists is only one of degree, since both, in the last analysis, are subject to the direction, supervision and censorship of the party authorities—like any other professional group or activity in Soviet society. Academic sociologists, at least when they are working on non-party projects in the academic institutions (universities and research institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences), undoubtedly enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than the sociologists working under direct party supervision as members of the party sociological establishment. But it is still only a matter of degree.

So much for the relationship and differences between "academic" and "party" sociology. At this point, one more very important matter must be mentioned. Not infrequently, the studies performed by academic sociologists—and, in some rarer instances, by party sociologists—result in findings or theories that are at variance with official doctrine or the current party line. However, it does not at all follow that these sociologists are anti-Communist. The sociological community in the Soviet Union is a rapidly growing and rather diverse one in which many different political attitudes may be found, but there is no positive evidence that a significant segment of this community is hostile to the Soviet system. It is significant in this connection that, in contrast to the situation in the literary field, not a single piece of sociological writing suppressed in the USSR has been published abroad; there is not a single Soviet sociologist who is an expatriate in the West; nor do the signatures of Soviet sociologists usually appear on protest documents. This would seem to indicate that even the most critical members of the Soviet sociological community accept the basic principles of socialism as their point of departure, although many of them, one suspects, would like to see—and promote—an evolution of the system in the direction of the humanist ideals of Marxism and the Bolshevik Revolution. When they are critical, their criticism and their constructive proposals for change appear to be motivated by such a desire rather than by any thought of overthrowing the system altogether. Indeed, such an attitude may be an indispensable precondition for a major contribution by sociology to a positive transformation of Soviet society.

[24] Zygmunt Bauman is one prominent scholar who distinguishes between "critical" and "instrumental" sociology, but he considers Soviet sociology in general to be of the "instrumental" variety, whereas he views Polish sociology as "critical" by tradition (see footnote 2).

The Class Structure

Turning to the actual work that is being done in Soviet sociology today, we find that it is characterized by a great unevenness. While, as pointed out earlier, almost no area has been left entirely untouched, there is on the other hand no single area which has been explored thoroughly, without restrictions, bias and censorship. At one extreme, sociological research has barely ventured—or been permitted to venture—into such risky areas as the existing power structure and elite studies in general. At the other, there is a steadily growing volume of highly sophisticated and quite objective research being done in a number of important fields such as the motivations of labor turnover and migration, studies of leisure time and time budgets, the sociology of the family, youth aspirations and problems, problems of urbanization and the social consequences of technological progress, sociology of the mass media, of science and management, of religion and culture—to mention only a few. In general, activity is greatest in those fields were the regime stands to benefit most from it.

Yet, notwithstanding restrictions and taboos, Soviet sociologists have dared to extend their investigations into some areas that have a critical bearing on certain aspects of orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Inasmuch as it would be impossible, within present space limitations, to present a cross-section of the whole range of Soviet sociological research, attention will be primarily focused here on some of these more delicate fields of inquiry.

One important area in which Soviet sociologists have recently tended to take positions clearly at variance with official doctrine is that involving analy-

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sis of the class and social structure of socialist societies. (It should be noted that the Soviet Union is still officially represented as a "socialist" society in which "exploiting classes" have been abolished, but which has not yet reached the "classless" stage of full communism.[25]) Following Lenin's elaborations of Marx, the official theory holds relationship to the means of production to be the main determinant of class; and since there are just two forms of ownership of the means of production—*i.e.,* nationalized (state) property, including state farms, and cooperatively-owned property (collective farms)—there are only two classes in Soviet society: the working class, related to the first form of ownership; and the collective-farm peasantry, related to the second. The "intelligentsia," defined as embracing all non-manual workers, is not recognized as an independent class because it has no specific relationship to the means of production, but is held to be merely a "stratum" serving these two classes.[26]

Notwithstanding the party's reservation to itself of the exclusive right to reinterpret or revise Leninist dicta, this simplistic official theory came under critical scrutiny at a conference of sociologists on "the social structure of socialist societies," held at Minsk in 1966. Some of the participants suggested that Lenin's definition of class was no longer applicable to present-day socialist societies, and they proposed various criteria for revising the official theory of the class structure, their proposals involving the elimination of some hitherto recognized social categories or the shifting of parts of them from one "class" to another.[27] Since then, discussion of this issue has continued unabated, with the discussants usually expounding the official view first and then adding various qualifying statements which, in effect, render it untenable or alter it substantially.

This point is well illustrated by a major study of the Soviet rural population made by Yu. V. Arutiunian. At the outset he "accepts" the official formulation of the class structure, according to which peasants working on state farms (*sovkhozy*) belong to the "working class" while those on the collective farms (*kolkhozy*) are placed in the separate and totally different "class of collective farmers." Then, however, in accordance with the main thrust of his research material, Arutiunian proceeds to argue that there are more substantial differences *within* each of these two groups of the peasant population than there are *between* similarly employed workers in both groups. That is to say, in wages, attitudes, conditions of work, education, and so on, there is very little difference between the mechanical workers on both types of farms, whereas there are great differences between mechanical workers and field hands within each type of farm. Yet, under the official theory, mechanical workers on collective farms belong to the peasantry, and those on state farms to the working class.[28]

Another Soviet specialist, O. N. Alterovich, has similarly challenged the validity of basing class divisions on the presence of two different forms of "socialist ownership"—nationalized and collective-cooperative. Noting that this reduces the whole problem of eliminating class differences simply to the liquidation of the differences between these two forms of ownership, he goes on to say:

It seems that this attitude toward solving the problem is insufficient. . . . The existence of two forms of ownership . . . has a secondary and not a primary determining character . . . [*and*] *various forms of ownership do not always totally predetermine the presence of various classes.*[29]

One factor that has contributed greatly to the obsolescence of the official class theory is the growth of the intelligentsia, which the official theory classifies as a mere stratum. This was perhaps appropriate in the 1920's when the intelligentsia constituted only a tiny percentage of the Soviet employed population. By 1959, however, it had grown to 20.5 percent of the labor force, as compared with the workers' 48 percent and the collective farmers' 31.5 percent; and by 1968, to no less than 29.5 percent, with the workers remaining almost stationary at 48.25 percent and the collective farmers falling below the intelligentsia at 22.25 percent.[30] At pres-

[25] See V. A. Fomina, Ed., *Problemy nauchnovo kommunizma* (Problems of Scientific Communism), Moscow University Press, 1969, p. 68.

[26] Ts. A. Stepanian and V. S. Semenov, Eds., *Klassy, sotsialnye sloi i gruppy v SSSR* (Classes, Social Strata and Groups in the USSR), Moscow, Nauka, 1968, pp. 136-43.

[27] On the discussions at the Minsk conference, see *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 5, 1966, pp. 143-54; *Filosofiia nauki* (Moscow), No. 3, 1966, pp. 133-38; also, Stepanian and Semenov, Eds., *op. cit.,* and *Problemy izmeneniia sotsialnoi struktury sotsialisticheskovo obshchestva* (Problems of Changes in the Social Structure of Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1968.

[28] Yu. V. Arutiunian, "Social Structure of the Rural Population," trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York—hereafter cited as *CDSP*), July 13, 1966.

[29] In Stepanian and Semenov, Eds., *Problemy . . .*, pp. 125-26.

[30] Estimated percentages based on *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1968), Moscow, 1968, p. 35, and *Itogi perepisi naseleniia SSSR, svodnyi tom* (Results of the Population Census of the USSR, Summary Volume), Moscow, Statistika, 1962, pp. 90-92.

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ent, the intelligentsia numbers about 30 million as compared with about 18 million collective farmers—a ratio of approximately 28 to 17. Moreover, one Soviet expert foresees that by the end of this century the intelligentsia will outnumber the working class as well.[31]

Obviously, all this renders the official doctrine more and more incongruous, particularly in a socialist society where the working class supposedly constitutes the leading force. Some Soviet sociologists, in an attempt to "save" the working class from being overshadowed by the intelligentsia and thus to reconcile the doctrine with reality, have suggested that all technical specialists working in factories, even though performing mental rather than manual labor, be considered members of the working class rather than of the intelligentsia. Others, however, reject this, while still others contend that occupational structure has now become more important than class structure.[32]

Social Differentiation

Recent Soviet sociological research has called into question not only the established concept of the class structure but also the official contention that interclass differences are gradually being overcome and that the Soviet Union is well on the way to achieving a socially homogeneous, classless society. Contrary to this official claim, the findings of the sociologists have revealed that Soviet society is becoming increasingly diversified and differentiated in terms of social groupings having differing and often conflicting group interests.[33]

This recognition of the existence of a multiplicitly of social groups with specific interests of their own which may clash not only with each other but also with the "common interest" of society at large poses a further ideological problem inasmuch as orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine has always considered the working class to represent the interests of society as a whole and therefore rules out the possibility of legitimate clashes of interest. This has led Soviet theorists to advance some interesting reinterpretations of the established doctrine. S.S. Vishnevsky, for example, wrote in 1967:

The general interests of the people and class interests are in a complex dialectical interrelation with each other. Recognition that the general interest is decisive is an objective necessity, but it does not mean that the general interest is identical with class interests, or that the latter should be fully subordinated to the former.[34]

Another, G.F. Laverichev, seems to be taking a somewhat Maoist way out of the dilemma in arguing:

Non-basic class, collective, and individual interests may enter into non-antagonistic contradictions with the basic interests of socialist society. . . . Apart from the interests of the working class, which are uniform for society as a whole, there are special interests of classes, groups, . . . collectives, individuals. . . . Conflict is internal to socialism; its causes can by no means be reduced to survivals of capitalism alone.[35]

These developments indicate that Soviet social thinking, under the impact of sociological research, has become more sophisticated and more attuned to the realities of present-day Soviet life. It is still difficult to see how the new ideas about a complex diversification of social strata and interest groups can be fully squared with the official projection of steady progress toward a classless society and of the supposedly total "ideological-political unity of the Soviet people"—especially since it is a basic tenet of Marxism that divergencies of material interest necessarily project themselves into the areas of the ideological and political. Yet, in a curious sort of dialectical process, the very recognition that conflicts of interest exist in Soviet society and are in fact rooted in socialism has promptly been seized upon by party ideologues as a new justification for

[31] See F. A. Arab-Ogly, Ed., *Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i obshchestvennyi progress* (The Scientific-technical Revolution and Societal Progress), Moscow, Mysl, 1969, pp. 8-10.

[32] M. N. Rutkevich, "O poniatii intelligentsii kak sotsialnovo sloia sotsialisticheskovo obshchestva," (On the Concept of the Intelligentsia as a Social Stratum of Socialist Society), *Filosofskie nauki*, No. 4, 1966, pp. 2-23; and Stepanian and Semenov, Eds., *Klassy . . .*, pp. 137-38.

[33] See Rutkevich, *loc. cit.;* also his "The Social Sources of the Replenishment of the Intelligentsia," trans. in *CDSP*, No. 9, 1967; and "Kolichestvennye izmeneniia v sotsialnoi strukture sovetskovo obshchestva v 60-e gody" (Quantitative Changes in the Social Structure of Soviet Society in the 1960's), in *Sotsialnye razlichiia* (Sverdlovsk), No. 3, pp. 5-19. See also O. I. Shkaratan, "The Social Structure of the Soviet Working Class," *CDSP*, No. 12, 1968.

[34] In *Nauchnoe upravlenie obshchestvom* (The Scientific Management of Society), Moscow, Mysl, 1967, pp. 183-89.

[35] In I. L. Marinko, Ed., *O nauchnykh osnovakh upravleniia sotsialisticheskim obshchestvom* (On the Scientific Principles of the Management of Socialist Society), Moscow University Press, pp. 130-32, 169. See also V. Afansasev *et al.*, *Fundamentals of Scientific Socialism*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969, p. 284.

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party rule. Thus, Laverichev, for example, sees this feature of socialist development as the *raison d'être* for a "political regulatory system" and argues that "the scientific political ideology (Marxism-Leninism), together with the political organization (party and state), assures a correct correlation of interests ensuring that the interests of the whole people always have the leading role." [36] Much the same argument was echoed by party General Secretary Brezhnev in a speech during the Lenin centennary celebrations, when he said:

We neither have nor can have any other political force that would be capable of taking into account, combining and coordinating the interests and requirements of all classes and social groups, of all nationalities and ethnic groups, and of all generations of our society, as fully and consistently as the Communist Party does. The party acts as the organizing nucleus of the entire social system [and] as the collective reason of the entire Soviet people.[37]

It is worth noting that this representation of the party comes closer than the original Leninist idea of the party to accepted Western concepts of the function of the political system as a mechanism for the resolution of conflicts of interest.[38]

Stratification and Education

Recent Soviet sociological research has also shed light on another aspect of social development in the USSR that flies in the face of official claims that there is no hierarchical gradation of social strata in the Soviet Union, and that whatever "gaps" still exist between the urban industrial worker and the collective farmer or between both these groups and the intelligentsia, for example, are rapidly being overcome. Contrary to such claims, sociological studies have revealed a clear-cut trend toward the stratification of Soviet society, which is related to continuing inequalities of access to higher education.

The phenomenon of differential access to education has been strikingly documented by a number of sociological studies inquiring into the ability of children of various family backgrounds to realize their personal choice between joining the active labor force upon leaving secondary *(i.e.,* high) school or continuing on to higher education (presumably to qualify themselves for more attractive

[36] Laverichev, *loc. cit.* (fn. 35), pp. 130-32.

[37] *Izvestia,* April 22, 1970.

[38] On the problem of "interests" in Soviet theory, see A. G. Zdravomyslov, "Interes kak kategoriia istoricheskovo materializma" (Interest as a Category of Historical Materialism), *Vestnik Leningradskovo Universiteta,* Economic and Sociological Theory Series, Leningrad University Press, 1964. There is now a growing volume of studies by Western scholars on "interest groups" in Soviet society: *e.g.,* the writings of Gordon Skilling, Andrew Janos, T. H. Rigby, Joel J. Schwartz, W. R. Keech, Milton Lodge, and others.

Table I: Work-vs.-Study Plans of High-School Leavers And Their Implementation
(in percent)

Children of:	1963 Work	1963 Study	1964 Work	1964 Study	1965 Work	1965 Study	1966 Work	1966 Study	4-yr Average
Collective Farmers:									
Planned	13	76	13	77	11	79	11	70	75.5
Achieved	55	44	52	48	45	46	43	51	47.3
Workers:									
Planned	10	74	8	79	6	78	11	67	75.0
Achieved	49	47	47	49	45	49	44	45	45.0
White-collar Workers: [a]									
Planned	9	75	6	81	7	81	6	80	79.0
Achieved	42	50	45	52	40	53	36	55	52.5
Intelligentsia: [b]									
Planned	2	95	3	92	3	89	5	85	92.5
Achieved	24	74	25	72	24	68	32	62	69.0

[a] Without higher education
[b] With higher education
Source: G. M. Kochetev, *Young People's Occupational Plans and Their Fulfillment.* Paper prepared for the Seventh World Congress of Sociology at Varna (Bulgaria), 1970.

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subsequent employment). One of the most recent as well as best-developed and most revealing samplings was conducted at Novosibirsk over a span of four successive years (1963–66), and the findings were set forth in a paper presented at the 1970 World Congress of Sociology at Varna (Bulgaria). As summarized in accompanying Table I, the study showed that, on average for the four-year period, approximately 75 percent of the sampled children of collective farmer and worker families desired to receive higher education, but that less than 50 percent were able to do so. On the other hand, more than 90 percent of the children whose parents belonged to the intelligentsia wanted to go on to higher education, and more than two-thirds of them realized their desire.

The disparities revealed by the Novosibirsk study were brought into even sharper relief by an earlier (1965) survey which broke down the family origins of the children surveyed into more narrowly defined urban and rural socio-occupational groups (see accompanying Table II). As the table shows, the ratio of children of farmer parents realizing their aspiration to continue schooling beyond the secondary level to children of the urban intelligentsia achieving the same goal was only about 1:8 (see column 2), although there was only a slight disparity between the two groups with respect to their desire for higher schooling—*i.e.*, 76:93 (see column 1). Table II further reveals a smaller but still considerable gap between the children of agricultural families and those of parents belonging to the rural (village) intelligentsia, as well as between children of the urban intelligentsia and those whose parents are white-collar service personnel.

Actually, the disparities between the different social groups are much greater than indicated, because surveys of this kind often relate to "high school leavers," a term which includes children who enter and complete some but not necessarily full secondary schooling. The percentage of children of farm families actually *completing* general (non-vocational) high school is significantly lower than the corresponding percentage for children from the urban intelligentsia. If we assume that the ratio of the first group to the second is somewhere between 1:2 and 1:3—which is a moderate estimate—the overall ratio between the two groups with respect to the chances of attaining higher education becomes something between 1:16 and 1:24 instead of the 1:8 ratio indicated in Table II. If data were available for still more narrowly defined groups, such as the children of *unskilled* farm laborers and of parents belonging to the *higher* intelligentsia, the disparity in chances for higher education would probably be twice or three times greater.

The correlation between stratification and inequalities of access to education, particularly to higher education, is indicated by other surveys besides those just discussed. A study of the average length of schooling received by children in three broad social groups in the towns of Ufa and Orenburg, for example, showed that the children of peasant families received an average of 7.31 years of schooling, the children of working-class families 7.66 years, and the children of the intelligentsia (broadly defined to include all non-manuals) 12.22 years.[39] This

[39] R. Gurova, "Soiuzniki—i vsegda" (Partners—And Forever), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Aug. 14, 1968, p. 10.

Table II: Personal Plans of High-School Leavers and Their Realization, by Socio-Occupational Status of Parents

Status of Parents	percentages of children who					
	wanted to study	went to study	wanted to work	went to work	wanted to work & study	went to work & study
Urban intelligentsia	93	82	2	15	5	3
Industry & construction	83	61	11	36	6	3
Service personnel	76	59	9	38	15	3
Village intelligentsia	76	58	11	42	13	—
Transport & communications	82	45	—	55	18	—
Agriculture	76	10	10	90	14	—
Others	50	25	12	63	38	12

Source: V. M. Shubkin, "Molodezh vstupaet v zhizn" (Youth Enters Life), *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 5, 1965, pp. 61-62.

Note: Socio-occupational groups have been rearranged in order of decreasing realization of children's desire to continue study (see second column of figures: went to study).

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means that the average peasant and working-class child did not even complete the obligatory eight years of schooling, while the average child from the intelligentsia or non-manual group received more than two years of higher education (past the ten-year level for complete secondary schooling).

It is also significant that in the higher grades of general secondary schools, which prepare students for university, the percentage of children of working-class families is going down and that of children from the intelligentsia is going up. Conversely, a survey of vocational schools (training skilled workers) in Sverdlovsk revealed that 71.5 percent of the students were from working-class families, and only 11.5 percent from families belonging to the intelligentsia.[40]

Of particular interest is the fact that disparities of access to the education of one's choice appear to exist even at the university level, with social origin a decisive factor. A study of the students enrolled in three high-prestige departments of Leningrad University in the summer of 1967 showed that offspring of specialists, who are classed as members of the higher intelligentsia and constitute only 10 percent of the population, occupied 60.6 percent of the available places, while the offspring of all other social groups had to share the remaining 39.4 percent.[41] This clearly underlines the superior advantages in education that are enjoyed by children from the educated, well-to-do urban intelligentsia.

Alienation

According to Marx, alienation is essentially a condition which man suffers when he ceases to be the master of the fruits of his own labor, and this would be eliminated in a Communist society where the means of production would belong to and be controlled by the workers themselves.[42] The Soviet Union, while it does not claim to have yet attained the Communist millenium, does maintain the fiction that the means of production have been vested in the workers through state ownership, and that alienation cannot therefore exist in Soviet society. Soviet sociologists themselves are generally chary of using the term "alienation" in dealing with the attitudes of Soviet workers; nevertheless, some of their studies have pointed to the existence among the working population of attitudes that closely approximate alienation in the Marxist sense.

Table III: Satisfaction with Job, by Age Group
(in percent)

Satisfied with:	Under-30 Age Group	Over-30 Age Group
Job as a whole	51.1	60.0
Amount of wages	34.0	46.3
Content of work	58.2	59.0

Source: A. G. Zdravomyslov *et al.*, Eds., *Man and His Work*, White Plains, New York, International Arts & Sciences Press, 1970, p. 132.

That a substantial amount of dissatisfaction does exist in the labor force was suggested by a 1966 Leningrad study of the attitudes of representative samples of workers in two broad age groups: below 30 and over 30. As accompanying Table III shows, dissatisfaction was noticeably higher among the under-30 age group, where only slightly more than half the workers polled expressed overall satisfaction with their jobs, but even in the over-30 age group no less than 40 percent apparently were dissatisfied. In a later article written by V. Yadov, one of the authors of the same Leningrad study, a more detailed statistical breakdown of the under-30 age group indicated that only 16.7 percent of those polled were completely satisfied, 24.6 percent were more satisfied than dissatisfied, and the remaining 58.7 percent were either dissatisfied, more dissatisfied than satisfied, or of uncertain opinion.[43]

Similar studies of the attitudes of workers at the shop-foreman and medium-management levels indicate that dissatisfaction progressively declines the higher the worker's position in the plant hierarchy, but that a significant amount of dissatisfaction still exists at the lower levels (see accompanying Table IV). The existence of worker dissatisfaction is also evidenced indirectly by such conditions as a relatively high incidence of labor turnover and of infractions of labor discipline.

In spite of the touchiness of the subject, considerable probing also appears to have been done into the causes of worker dissatisfaction. Though

[40] M. Yanowitch and N. Dodge, "Social Class and Education: Soviet Findings and Reactions," *Comparative Education Review*, October 1968, p. 255.

[41] G. A. Zhuravleva and Z. V. Sikievich, "Sotsialnaia obuslovlennost podgotovlennosti abiturienta v vuz" (The Social Conditioning of the College Applicant's Preparation), *Chelovek i obshchestvo* (Man and Society—Leningrad), No. 7, 1970, pp. 56-69.

[42] For a more elaborate philosophical definition of alienation, see Henri Lefebvre, *The Sociology of Marx*, New York, Vintage Books, 1969, pp. 4-10, 131-32.

[43] V. Yadov, *Izvestia*, March 3, 1970, p. 3 (trans. in *CDSP*, March 31, 1970, pp. 15-16).

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Table IV: Satisfaction With Job Conditions by Management Level
(in percent)

Position	Satisfied	Not Wholly Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Total Cols. 2 & 3	Don't know
Senior foremen	61.9	23.3	14.1	37.4	0.7
Foremen	63.9	17.4	16.1	33.5	2.6
Shop & department managers	70.6	19.5	9.9	29.4	—
Other technical-managerial personnel at shop level	74.2	12.8	11.4	24.2	1.6
Heads of factory services (divisions)	78.2	16.8	2.9	19.7	2.1
Other technical-managerial personnel at factory head office	84.0	8.0	8.0	16.0	—

Source: Yu. F. Bukhalov and E. A. Yakuba, Eds., *Rol obshchestvennosti v upravlenii proizvodstvom* (The Role of the Public in the Management of Production), Kharkov University Press, 1968, p. 82.

very little of the results of research in this area have been published, there have been occasional admissions in Soviet sociological writings and even in the press that the causes go much deeper than merely the workers' inability to realize their material aspirations. Thus, for example, the earlier-mentioned Leningrad study of the attitudes of young workers by A.G. Zdravomyslov, V. Yadov and others, although pointing to a relatively high degree of ideological motivation, concluded that for many young workers labor has not become the personal need that it was supposed to be.[44] Others have acknowledged that the ordinary Soviet worker, notwithstanding all the efforts of the system to imbue him with a feeling of being a real "co-owner" (*khoziain*) of the means of production, lacks any genuine sense of such "co-ownership" in his factory or in the national economy in general. Recognition of this fact has been reflected even in the daily press, where occasional editorials and articles have stressed the need to develop "a feeling of ownership" in every Soviet worker.[45]

All this comes close to acknowledging, in roundabout fashion, that alienation does exist among Soviet workers in all but name. Some Soviet writers on the economy have suggested that it stems in part from the fact that until only recently enterprise collectives were denied any "real self-management" and that such forms of workers' participation in management as have been introduced still remain "consultative only." [46] To remedy the situation, there have been various proposals for "democratizing" enterprise management—*e.g.*, by having plant managers elected by the collective instead of appointed from above and making them accountable to their electors, etc. However, a poll of enterprise managers, party secretaries, and trade union officials in Kiev in mid-1966 revealed that an overwhelming majority were flatly opposed to such democratic innovations as the election of managers.[47] Hence, one of the root causes of alienation still remains.

Problems of Youth

Some of the most interesting findings of recent Soviet sociology have to do with the attitudes of today's younger generation of Soviet citizens. The members of the present younger generation, it should be remembered, have not only themselves

[44] A. G. Zdravomyslov *et al.*, Eds., *Man and His Work*, White Plains, New York, International Arts & Sciences Press, 1970, pp. 292-96.

[45] *E.g.*, editorial entitled "Chuvstvo khoziaina" (A Sense of Proprietorship), *Pravda*, Aug. 14, 1969; also A. Kiriukov, "Khoziain zavoda kazhdyi" (Each an Owner of the Plant), *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1969, p. 2.

[46] *E.g.*, B. V. Rakitsky, *Formy khoziaistvennovo rukovodstva predpriiatiiami* (Forms of Economic Direction of Enterprises), Moscow, Nauka, 1968, pp. 183-88; V. V. Laptev, in *Pravovye problemy nauki upravleniia* (Legal Problems of the Science of Management), Moscow, Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1966, p. 89; and V. M. Bednenko, *Obshchestvennye nachala v upravlenii proizvodstvom* (Principles of Public Participation in the Management of Production), Moscow, Mysl, pp. 162-65.

[47] Of 101 persons polled, only 29 favored the principle of electing managers and only on condition that it be introduced by gradual stages starting with team managers, foremen, and department and shop managers. Seventy-two respondents were against, one of the reasons given being that enterprises still lacked a sufficient number of qualified specialists from among whom managers could be elected. See F. M. Rudich, *O sochetanii gosudarstvennykh i obshchestvennykh nachal v upravlenii proizvodstvom* (On Combining State and Public Principles [of Participation] in the Management of Production), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1968, pp. 75-6.

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been reared entirely under the Soviet system but are also the children of parents brought up wholly under that system. As second-generation (and sometimes even third-generation) products of Soviet upbringing, they should exhibit all the qualities of the long-heralded "New Soviet Man"—high ideological and political motivation, readiness to subordinate one's individual desires and interests to the needs and interests of the whole community, greater concern for moral than for material values, and so on. Yet, recent sociological studies have shown present-day Soviet youth to be lacking in some, if not all, of these ideal qualities and, indeed, to share many of the same faults and shortcomings, as well as aspirations, of their counterparts reared in the "decadent capitalist" societies of the West. Needless to say, such findings are hardly likely to be very pleasing to the party leadership, and it is perhaps a hopeful sign that the sociologists have been allowed to probe into this delicate area as deeply as they have.

One of the things that is expected of the ideal socialist youth is that he not only regard labor as a personal need but also be willing and eager to work when and where the regime feels he is most needed, be it as a kolkhoz farmer, a pioneer developing the "virgin lands," or a laborer on a construction site. Yet, undoubtedly the most salient fact brought out by all sociological studies of the attitudes and aspirations of today's Soviet younger generation is that, in the land of "workers and peasants," very few among the youth aspire to be ordinary workers, much less peasants. On the contrary—and quite naturally—the overwhelming majority of teenagers graduating from secondary school would prefer to continue their education rather than join the labor force, hoping thereby to qualify themselves to become members of the elite groups in Soviet society.

This fact has already been partially documented by the material presented earlier under the heading of "Stratification and Education." Suffice it here to offer a tabular summary of the results of surveys conducted at different times in five widely scattered Soviet cities or regions and in the Estonian SSR regarding the work-vs.-study preferences of high-school graduates (see Table V). As can be seen, averaging the figures for the different cities or regions, we find that no less than 80 percent desire to go on studying exclusively, while only 8 percent desire to join the labor force immediately and only a slightly larger 11.6 percent want to combine work and study. These preferences are obviously far out of line with actual possibilities, given the fact that workers, peasants and white-collar employees (without higher education) constitute about 89 percent of the labor force.

Even more interesting are the results of investigations into the aspirations and occupational preferences of Soviet young people. Earlier questionnaires on youth aspirations and motivations, it should be noted, were generally worded in such a way as to elicit such ideologically-inspired choices as "helping to build communism," "serving the fatherland," or "winning the approval of the collective." The more recent surveys, however, have been less tainted by ideological bias and better designed to elicit spontaneous answers reflecting genuine attitudes. Accompanying Table VI, for example, shows the results

Table V: Immediate Plans of High School Graduates
(in percent)

Geographic Area	Want to: Study	Want to: Work	Work & Study	Don't know, or No Answer	Number Interviewed
Leningrad City and Province	88.0	3.0	3.0	9.0	1,872
Sverdlovsk City and one district	84.6	14.2	—	1.2	567
Novosibirsk province, 1963	80.0	8.0	12.0	—	—
Kazan City, 1964	71.5	7.3	10.2	11.0	2,000
Ufa City	65.3	3.7	22.5	8.5	2,500
Estonian SSSR, 1966	58.5	21.0	12.0	8.5	2,260

Sources: (Leningrad) V. V. Vodzinskaia, *Vybor professii kak sotssialnaia problema* (Choice of Occupation as a Social Problem), Dissertation at Leningrad University, 1968, pp. 7-8; (Sverdlovsk) Ya. M. Tkach, in *Zhiznennye plany molodezhi* (Life Plans of Youth), Sverdlovsk, 1966, pp. 89-93; (Novosibirsk) same source as Table II; (Kazan) M. Ch. Titma, in V. A. Yadov and V. I. Dobrynina, Eds., *Molodezh i trud* (Youth and Labor), Moscow, Molodaia Gvardiia, 1970, p. 72; (Ufa) N. A. Aitov, "Obrazovanie rabochikh i ikh trud" (Formation of Workers and Their Labor), *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 11, 1966, p. 23; (Estonian SSR) same source as for Kazan.

Note: Year of survey provided where available.

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of a poll conducted in Leningrad in 1966 inquiring into the near-term aspirations of a sample of 2,204 young people. The most striking thing about the results is the frankness with which sizable percentages of those questioned acknowledged their quest for material well-being—*e.g.*, better housing and even the luxury (for Soviet citizens) of owning a car—while only a handful expressed readiness to volunteer for such civic-minded service as work on a new construction project.

The occupational preferences of the young were studied in another Leningrad survey conducted in 1965, in which 624 high-school "leavers" were asked to give ratings to 80 different occupations (see accompanying Table VII). The ratings shown in the table are composite figures calculated from separate ratings given by the pollees to each occupation from the standpoint of prestige, pay, possibilities for creative work, and possibilities for career advancement. Included are only the 12 highest- and 6 lowest-rated occupations, plus some selected from among those which received intermediate ratings (the exact numerical ranking of these is not available). It is quite clear from the table that Soviet young people today look upon the scientific and technological professions as the elite and most desirable career occupations, while they have little taste for such public-service work as primary school teaching or for clerical, manual and farm labor. It is interesting to note that, among the scientific professions listed, "social scientist in philosophy"—which has most to do with Marxist-Leninist ideology—was rated lowest, while a military career was also in the middle range. It should also be noted that politically sensitive occupations—*e.g.*, party officials and security police—were not included in the list of occupations to be rated and as a general rule are excluded from such polls.

Other surveys of youth attitudes have uncovered tendencies which must be of great concern to the Soviet leadership, such as a lack of interest in political studies, dissatisfaction with the teaching of social sciences and with party political socialization activities, and a decline of student participation in voluntary public-service projects, especially among university students. A survey made in Rostov showed that whereas 57 percent of students below university level participated in some form of voluntary public service, the rate of participation dropped sharply at the university level, reaching a low of three percent in the fifth year of university study. More than half those polled who *were* engaged in voluntary public work admitted that they were doing it out of a sense of "being obligated" or because of pressures within "the collective," while only 15.5 percent cited "moral and ideological" reasons. The

Table VI: Near-Term Aspirations of Young People

Ranking	Aspiration	Number choosing	% of total respondents	1st Priority	2nd Priority
				(in percent)	
1	To get an interesting and well-liked job	1,339	60.6	89.3	10.6
2	To get a higher education	1,316	59.7	82.6	17.3
3	To visit other countries	1,269	57.5	38.8	61.1
4	To achieve material well-being	1,209	54.9	69.8	30.1
5	To achieve good housing conditions	1,202	54.6	72.7	27.2
6	To raise professional qualifications	965	43.7	81.4	18.5
7	To find true friends	951	43.2	88.1	11.8
8	To raise children to be exemplary human beings	921	41.8	80.5	19.4
9	To find one's lovemate	916	41.5	72.9	27.0
10	To marry	705	32.0	38.9	61.0
11	To have an automobile [a]	693	31.4	32.7	67.2
12	To get a secondary education	487	22.0	85.4	14.5
13	To work on a construction project	405	18.4	34.5	65.4
14	Other	148	6.7	11.6	8.3

[a] 40.2 percent of male respondents and 22.8 percent of female respondents.

Note: Unlimited number of choices allowed.

Source: S. N. Ikennikova and V. T. Lisovsky, *Molodezh o sebe, o svoikh sverstnikakh* (Young People's Views of Themselves and Their Peers), Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1969.

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survey further revealed that only 18 percent of the students polled read items about "the Communist and workers' movement" in the newspapers.[48]

Sociological research concerning family problems, in which A. G. Kharchev, of Leningrad University, has been foremost, has also ventured recently into the hitherto largely taboo area of youth attitudes toward sex. A survey conducted by Kharchev and his coworkers revealed the fact that no less than 85 percent of a sample of male university students acknowledged having premarital sex relations, and that of these 85 percent had such relations before age 21. For a similar group of female students, the corresponding percentages were 47 and 65 percent. Somewhat inconsistently, in another survey in which students were asked whether they approved or disapproved of premarital sex relations, only 53 percent of males expressed approval, and 16 percent disapproved, with 38 percent of females approving and 27 percent disapproving. Still another inquiry into the factors that inhibited young people from indulging in premarital sex showed that, of the male sample, only 24.5 percent cited moral reasons, 6.5 percent cited fear of the consequences, and 48.5 percent cited merely lack of opportunity. For the female sample, the corresponding figures were 34.5, 11.5, and 5 percent.[49] All this would appear to suggest that the development of a "sexual revolution" among the young in many Western societies has a parallel in the Soviet Union.

Ethnic Relations

Relations involving the national minorities in the Soviet Union understandably constitute one of the touchiest problem areas facing Soviet policymakers. Yet here, too, Soviet sociologists have recently been carrying out interesting and revealing research into various aspects of ethnic relations and particularly into the prevalence of what are termed "negative national attitudes" among the minority peoples.

[48] B. Rubin and Yu. Kolesnikov, *Student glazami sotsiologa,* (The Student Through the Eyes of the Sociologist), Rostov University Press, 1968, pp. 145-47, 177-85.

[49] A. G. Kharchev and S. I. Golod, "Molodezh i brak" (Youth and Marriage), *Chelovek i obshchestvo* (Leningrad), Issue No. 6, 1969, pp. 125-42. It should be noted that whereas a high rate of divorce and "amoral sexual behavior" used to be treated as "survivals of bourgeois morality," the authors of this study point to "the unbelievably difficult conditions" which prevailed in the Soviet Union following the Revolution as the cause of "the disorganization and primitivization of sexual life . . . which are still manifest in the behavior of a segment of young people."

Table VII: Occupational Preferences of High-School Leavers
(Highest: 10—Lowest: 1)

Numerical Ranking	Occupation	Overall Rating
1	Physicist	6.6
2	Engineer—radio technician	6.5
3	Medical scientist	6.4
4	Engineer—geologist	6.2
5	Mathematician	6.1
6	Chemist	5.9
7	Radio technician	5.8
8	Aircraft pilot	5.7
9	Engineer in chemical industry	5.5
10	Biologist	5.4
11	Physician	5.3
12	Writer, artist	5.2
	University teacher	4.5
not	Professional military	4.3
avail-	Social scientist in philosophy	4.2
able	Primary school teacher	2.5
	Miner	2.4
	Tailor, seamstress	1.9
75	Salesman, shop assistant	1.8
76	Accountant, bookkeeper	1.7
77	Painter (in construction)	1.6
78	Agricultural worker	1.6
79	Printing press operator	1.5
80	Housing maintenance worker	1.2

Source: Overall ratings calculated on the basis of a graph in a paper by V. V. Vodzinskaia published in *Sotsialnye problemy truda i proizvodstva* (Social Problems of Labor and Production), Moscow, Mysl, 1969, p. 39. For discussion, see also pp. 46-49.

A good example of such research is provided by a study of ethnic relations in the Tatar ASSR, carried out by a team under the leadership of Professor Yuri Arutiunian as part of a larger survey of the rural population of the region. One part of the ethnic study was courageously devoted to negative national attitudes detectable among different strata of the social structure and revealed some interesting results, summarized in accompanying Table VIII.

The Tatars interviewed in this poll were asked if they thought it important (1) that enterprise or collective farm managers in their region be of their own nationality; and (2) to marry someone of the same nationality. The figures given in parentheses in the table represent the "remainders" who did not manifest a "positive national attitude"—*i.e.,* those who expressed a preference for persons of their own nationality or said it was "difficult to answer" or "don't know."

The overall picture provided by the table is complex. The highest "remainder" falls among the top

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Table VIII: Nationalist Attitudes among Tatars, by Socio-Occupational Group

Socio-occupational Group	Nationality not important in relation to:	
	Managers	Marriage
	(in percent)	
Intelligentsia:		
Top managers	64 (36)	68 (32)
Top specialists	76 (24)	68 (32)
Middle-level managers	71 (29)	78 (22)
Middle-level specialists	67 (33)	63 (37)
White-collar workers	78 (22)	71 (29)
Machine operators	80 (20)	79 (21)
Unskilled workers and collective farmers		
Permanent	71 (29)	74 (26)
Seasonal	70 (30)	72 (28)

Note: Figures in parentheses represent "remainder" who considered nationality important, who were uncertain or did not answer.

Source: Yu. Arutiunian, "Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie nationalnykh otnoshenii" (Applied-Sociological Study of National Attitudes), *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 12, 1969, pp. 129-139.

managers (who could naturally be expected to favor greater opportunities for Tatars to become managers), and the second-highest among the middle-level specialists. The machine operators show the lowest "remainder." The white-collar employees manifest less objection to managers of non-Tatar nationality than to intermarriage, while the sentiments of the middle-level managers are the other way around. The authors of the study did conclude, however, that there was a relatively higher incidence of nationalistic attitudes among the Tatar intelligentsia than among the other strata despite the fact that the intelligentsia had achieved greater success "in education and in overcoming survivals of the traditional culture." [50]

The Arutiunian study also looked into the impact on nationalist attitudes of a number of variables: education in Soviet schools, knowledge of the Russian language, and interethnic contacts either as a result of living in mixed communities or intermarriage within one's family. The findings showed that these factors tended to reduce "negative national attitudes" among Tatars with less education and of lower socio-occupational status, but that such attitudes remained rather pronounced among the intelligentsia. It was further found that negative attitudes were particularly strong among Tatars who had experienced downward social mobility.

[50] See citation of source for Table VIII.

Arutiunian's general conclusion was that the survey indicated the existence of two types of nationalism. One was the traditional type of national prejudice resulting from lack of education, religious prejudice, and lack of interethnic contacts—a type which tends to be diminished as these conditions are overcome. The other was designated as "nationalism of a new type," which tends to be actually generated by the conditions of a mixed national environment "in which there is an intensification of competition" for prestigious jobs, etc.

The low key of Arutiunian's conclusions should not distract the Western observer from the revolutionary character of his findings. In effect, he demonstrates a significant coincidence (indeed, a correlation) between the level of achievement among members of an ethnic minority group and the level of nationalist prejudice among them toward the dominant and other ethnic groups (there can be little doubt that the objects of the Tatar prejudice revealed in this sample are primarily the Russians, who are significantly over-represented in supervisory positions in non-Russian national areas). Such a finding must be profoundly disturbing to the Soviet leaders—almost all of them Slavs—for at least three reasons: First, it runs counter to one of the basic assumptions of Soviet ideology, namely, that socialist progress automatically wipes out national prejudices of all kinds. Secondly, it may seem to reward their socialist development effort and Russian investments of labor and capital in the non-Russian national areas with rank ingratitude. And finally, the rapid population growth of the minority nationalities and the even quicker growth of their intelligentsias must lead the Soviet leaders to fear that their policies are strengthening precisely those elements most likely to develop the negative attitudes of the "new nationalism." This may heighten the possibility of future tension in the especially thorny area of the "national problem" in the multiracial Soviet Union.

The Dual Role of Sociology

In the light of the foregoing survey, it is apparent that sociology in the Soviet Union has made remarkable strides forward in the face of a host of obstacles and restraints, many of them unique to the Soviet party-state. On the threshold of the 1970's, it still continues to be plagued by paradoxes, taboos, and limitations upon its scope of inquiry; yet, in the relatively short span of a decade and a half, virtually the entire conceptual framework as

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well as the methodology and much of the jargon of modern Western sociology have been absorbed into Soviet social science and have even begun to exert a subtle but profound influence on the party's whole approach to social policymaking. In the process, Soviet sociological research has largely emancipated itself from the grip of dogmatic ideological terms and concepts to the point where one can now read articles or studies by Soviet sociologists without once encountering the old, outworn clichés. "Building communism" has become "socio-economic development"; instead of "the system of proletarian dictatorship" or "the state of the whole people," it is simply "the political organization of society" to which the Soviet social scientist addresses himself; and so on.

How, then, can one assess the role of sociology in the USSR today and its impact on the present and future evolution of Soviet society? It is a complex question to which no simple or definitive answer can be given. However, some tentative remarks may be offered.

The complexity of the question stems from a singular paradox. On the one hand, sociology has gained the degree of acceptance that it now enjoys in the Soviet Union because it has been recognized as a useful instrument in the hands of the party and state apparatus for legitimizing and perpetuating the existing system on a more modern, rational and efficient basis. Yet, on the other hand, it is simultaneously generating a gradual erosion of the traditional totalitarian system of rule and contributing toward a transmutation of that system into something else. Why this is so will perhaps become clearer if we look more closely at a number of specific ways in which the development of sociology is affecting the established system.

First, as the preceding survey of Soviet sociological findings has clearly illustrated, sociological research and theorizing have challenged the validity of various aspects of official Marxist-Leninist theory and eroded a number of the official dogmas and images. For decades Marxism-Leninism was officially proclaimed to be the sole embodiment of scientific truth about man and society and the sole basis for correct policy decisions. Each successive Soviet leader from Lenin through Khrushchev wore the dual mantle of supreme ruler and supreme social theorist. In recent years, however, there has been a growing tendency among all but the more hidebound party ideologues to accept Marxism-Leninism only as general theory and to concede that for studying actual social processes and as a basis for scientific policy-making, the new science of sociology must be utilized. Hence, it is possible to say that sociology is eroding the position of Marxism-Leninism as a unique and exclusive guide to decision-making.

Second, to turn from ideology to the realm of practical policy, it is apparent that the rise of sociology is tending to reinforce the pressures for a transformation of traditional (*i.e.,* Stalinist) economic and social policies and planning. Sociological research illuminates the actual processes going on in Soviet society, helps to clarify the problems that exist, and provides a scientific basis for mitigating these problems or overcoming them altogether. Soviet sociologists are, in fact, already active in suggesting concrete ways and means of resolving some of the grave problems facing Soviet society in a variety of fields. This tends to erode one of the key prerogatives of the party *apparat*—its monopoly on the initiative in policymaking.

Third, the creation of a whole new network of sociological institutions impinges on other traditional monopoly functions of the party and the security apparatus. Formerly, it was the party and the police who alone gathered and possessed information regarding the actual state of affairs in the nation and what people were thinking. Now, an increasing share of the gathering, processing and analysis of primary information on social trends and the attitudes of citizens, as well as the dissemination of this information and theorizing about the research findings, is being performed by the sociological institutions, whether academic or working as adjuncts of the party. In either case, the party leaders, who are still mainly generalists by training and experience, are becoming increasingly dependent on what might be called the new "sociological technocrats" for their supply of information and expert advice.

Fourth, the growing reliance upon sociology as an aid to government is bound to have an important long-range impact on the composition of the party, state, and scientific elite. Because the party *needs* personnel with sociological expertise, sociology is becoming an aid to more rapid career advancement in the party, state, and academic apparatuses for younger people of the non-Stalinist generation, many of whom see in sociology the "wave of the future" in the social science field. Already, in fact, a middle generation of social scientists and party officials with at least some sociological training is beginning slowly to displace the old-line ideologues and generalist professionals and to take over more and more of their functions and authority, even though at present the latter still remain in ultimate command.

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Fifth, it can be said that, beyond the increasing influence of sociological experts within the various apparatuses, the spread of sociological knowledge is having a growing impact directly on the values and orientations, the modes of thinking and action, of the Soviet elites in general. In simple terms, it is causing the members of these elites—be they party apparatchiks, state functionaries, economic managers, officers of the armed services, or intellectuals —to take a less dogmatic, less ideologically-colored, and conversely a more objective and scientific view of Soviet society and its problems. As a result, they may depart more and more from the pattern of their Stalinist and neo-Stalinist forebears.

Sixth, sociological research in the Soviet Union is a major factor contributing to a radical transformation of the general image of Soviet society. Until not so long ago, that society was represented as a unique model building a new type of cohesive social relations and an ever more homogeneous social structure through rapid industrialization and a scientific system of economic planning—a society uniquely free of the grave problems afflicting non-Communist industrial societies. It was said to have created a new breed of citizen motivated by total dedication to the common good, to have devised effective solutions for such worldwide problems as worker alienation (through new forms of socialist labor) and the deep-seated ills of the peasantry (through agricultural collectivization), and so on. Many outside the Soviet Union, to be sure, suspected that this image was not entirely true, but there was a lack of objective, fully corroborated evidence. Now, notwithstanding the limitations imposed on sociological research and censorship of its findings, enough of these findings is becoming publicly available to make it clear that the unique and miraculous solutions the Soviet leaders claimed to have found for the ills of mankind are something less than a total success, and that Soviet society today finds itself beset with many of the same difficult problems that confront Western democratic, market-economy societies, even though the manifestations of these problems may differ considerably.

All this serves to explain why the Soviet party leaders continue to be ambivalent toward the development of sociology. They—and, indeed, the sociologists themselves—find themselves in a painful dilemma. For if sociology is to be a truly effective instrument for improving the Soviet system, it must be allowed to be somewhat independent and critical, to point out where the failings of the system lie. This, of course, means weakening the positive image of Soviet society artificially built up during the years of Stalinist totalitarianism. The party is as yet reluctant to do this, and it therefore continues to try to keep sociology within safe bounds. While suppressing inconvenient findings, it tries at the same time to interpret published findings—as far as possible—in such a way as to provide continued ideological justification for party rule.

It is impossible to foresee at present which of the contradictory dual roles of sociology will have the greater impact—its role as an instrument for shoring up the existing system or its role as an erosive of totalitarian rule. What is certain, however, is that it is a potent factor for change in Soviet society. It should not be taken for granted that this process of change is in the direction of Western-style democracy, or that it will necessarily involve a revolutionary explosion. The situation in the Soviet Union today is exceedingly complex, and the possible paths of future development are by no means limited to such simple dichotomies as totalitarianism or liberal democracy, status quo or revolutionary upheaval. There are various other possibilities and mixed intermediate models that have to be considered.[51]

In general, the progress of sociology in the Soviet Union appears to be fostering trends in the direction of greater reliance on scientific research and advice in policymaking, a freer climate for research and contacts with the outside world, a wider flow of information, a shift away from "command" management toward collective decision-making and greater participation for the ordinary citizen, and some measure of pluralism, albeit limited and controlled. What the end result of this process of transformation will be can only be surmised. The development of sociology will undoubtedly be among the factors influencing the outcome, but it will not be the sole nor the determining one.

[51] For a discussion of the possible courses of future Soviet evolution, see for example Zbigniew Brzezinski, "What Future for Soviet Power?", *Encounter* (London), March 1970, pp. 3-16.

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Industrial Cooperation: East Europe Looks West

By Michael Gamarnikow

In their dealings with the non-Communist world, the nations of Eastern Europe are increasingly entering into a new form of economic relationship—industrial cooperation between "socialist" enterprises and "capitalist" firms.[1] In the last half decade more than 200 such joint ventures, coproduction arrangements, and cooperation deals have been concluded, and the trend appears to be gaining momentum. The deals range from the manufacture and delivery of shoe soles and heels to complex arrangements in the joint production and marketing of machinery, trucks and tractors. A distinguishing feature is the transfer of capital and technology across national borders, and in this respect the agreements reflect the traditional pattern of industrial expansion elsewhere in the world. However, political and ideological considerations add a unique dimension, if only because the recipient of the advanced technology is now a nationalized enterprise or agency. As a result, questions of economic advantage on the macro-economic (national) scale, or even of the positive interest of a given socialist enterprise in a proposed joint venture, while important, ultimately are subordinate to the basic political attitude of the given Communist government.

Before examining the motives which lead East European regimes to promote or countenance industrial cooperative relationships, it would be well to define "industrial cooperation." A convenient starting point is the test formula applied by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe:

In order to qualify under the heading of industrial cooperation, it seems reasonable to require that agreements between enterprises pass the following test: that they involve a joint interest of the partners, over a longer period of time, in some significant technological process or production operation of the respective enterprises—the joint interest often extending, in more complex types of cooperation, to related marketing activities and after-sales services.[2]

This definition is not fully adequate, since some East European governments (*e.g.*, Bulgaria, Romania and, until the end of 1968, Poland) still discourage direct enterprise-to-enterprise dealings and demand that the appropriate state trading agency play an intermediary role. Nevertheless, based on the ECE definition and the evidence of actual agreements, one can devise the following typology of industrial cooperation agreements.

Cooperation in production. This may range from simpler forms of subcontracting—on the basis of

[1] This study examines developments in seven East European states: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia (there is no evidence of Albanian involvement in industrial cooperation). International cooperative ventures involving the Soviet Union, such as the much publicized deal with Fiat, are excluded from consideration here on the grounds that the magnitude, rarity and political impact of such projects place them in a separate category.

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[2] "A Research Note on Industrial Cooperation as a Factor in the Growth of East-West European Trade," *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (New York and Geneva), Vol. 21, No. 1, 1970, p. 77.

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the Western partner's design, patents and licenses, and even contribution of investment capital—to a full-scale coproduction scheme involving the transfer of capital and technological know-how, or even establishment of jointly operated industrial plants.

Cooperation in marketing and after-sales services. Parties to such an agreement look to it as the best means to penetrate a given trading area. As a rule, it is the Eastern partner who wishes to take advantage of the sales and service network of the Western firm, although Western firms are also anxious in some cases to penetrate Iron Curtain markets or even Third World markets through Iron Curtain intermediaries.

Cooperation in joint investment projects. This type of cooperative agreement usually involves joint acceptance of a contract to design, construct, and sometimes even finance a project in a third country (more often than not, a less developed country). The cooperation may range from a simple subcontract arrangement to a joint venture on a full partnership basis.

Cooperation in technology and research. This can range from periodic exchanges of technical information and scientific data to more institutionalized forms of joint research and technological development projects or establishment of new production facilities. Unless combined with other forms of cooperation, this type of arrangement very rarely involves individual enterprises. The pertinent agreements are usually concluded on the state level, and the joint projects are run by intergovernmental agencies or specialized institutes.[3]

Any of the above categories may be divided into many subtypes, and any two or more categories may be present in a concrete cooperation deal. The variety of species may be nearly as great as the number of agreements concluded, a diversity which is best illustrated by examining a number of actual agreements.

Perhaps the most typical form of "cooperation in production" (or, for that matter, of all cooperation agreements) is the so-called "subcontract-plus" arrangement. Broadly speaking, it contains two kinds of stipulations: one, the subcontract itself, involving obligations by a socialist enterprise to make one-way deliveries of manufactured inputs to a capitalist firm, over a stipulated period of time and within precise specifications; and two, some elements of capital and/or technology transfer.

Thus, the Swedish firm "Electrolux" obtains metal and plastic boxes for the assembly of refrigerators from a Polish subcontractor whom it supplies with up-to-date machines and equipment to manufacture the boxes. The Swedish furniture manufacturer IKEA ships high-quality cabinet wood and other raw materials to a group of Polish furniture factories, which utilize Swedish machines and designs and, under the guidance of resident Swedish specialists, produce semifinished furniture. These pieces are finished back in Sweden and marketed worldwide by IKEA.[4] Another example is the arrangement between the Hungarian Cold Storage Industry and the Swedish firm Findus—one of the largest frozen-food distributors in Western Europe. Because of climatic conditions and also the availability of cheap labor, Findus prefers to produce and process certain frozen fruits in Hungary. The Swedish firm provides seeds and plants, the latest technological know-how for processing and deepfreezing, and the necessary equipment and machinery. The products are packed in boxes bearing the Findus label and are sold through the international marketing network of the Swedish concern.[5]

Stress on Machinery

Although the variety of goods produced under coproduction arrangements is great, the majority of such ventures involve production of machinery and other engineering equipment. Simmons Corporation of Albany, New York, has an agreement with the Skoda Works of Plzen, Czechoslovakia, under which the latter produces tools according to Simmons' technical documentation. They are distributed in the West by Simmons and in the Comecon area by Skoda. In another arrangement the Bulgarian foreign trade agency Machinoexport sends semifinished parts for grinding equipment to the Italian firm Mechaniche Gaetano Zocca for finishing and final assembly. The two firms divide marketing responsibilities on their respective sides of the Iron Curtain, with profits of marketing and servicing in both parts of the world shared on a prearranged per-

[3] For example, see a report on the cooperation arrangement between the Hungarian Research Institute of Plastic Materials Industry and the Centre d'Etudes des Matériels Plastiques in Paris, published in *Vilaggazdasag* (Budapest), April 11, 1970.

[4] J. Hlebowicz, "Polish-Swedish Economic Cooperation," *Slowo powszechne* (Warsaw), March 24, 1969.

[5] F. I., "4000 Tons of Deepfrozen Food Produced within the Framework of a Swedish-Hungarian Cooperative Agreement," *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), Nov. 6, 1970.

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centage basis.[6] The Ikarus Works of Hungary and the Steyer concern of Austria cooperate in producing various types of buses;[7] and agricultural machinery is jointly produced by the West German Hako Works and the Hungarian Hodmezovasarhely enterprise, with the former furnishing small tractors and the latter furnishing working tools and adapters to go with the tractors.[8]

A joint venture of the West German firm Hermann Schwartz A. G. and the Hungarian enterprise Nikex assigns the Western associate production of the more sophisticated parts and special castings for semihydraulic mining equipment, but the Hungarian partner manufactures some 70 percent of the components (by number) of the final products. The British firm Callaghan and Son, Ltd., and the Czechoslovak enterprise Kdynske Strojirny jointly produce and market textile equipment on both sides of the Iron Curtain, sharing profits on a 50–50 basis. The British associate produces automatic textile machines, and the Czechoslovak firm produces automatic textile finishing equipment.[9] The Zamech Mechanical Works in Elblag, Poland, and the French firm Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne cooperate in producing mechanical presses. The French associate supplies hydraulic equipment and electrical installations, while the Polish partner manufactures less sophisticated components. The end product is marketed worldwide under a joint trade mark—"Zamech-Loire."[10]

More complex still are the provisions of the coproduction agreement between the Yugoslav enterprise Rade Koncar and the Italian firm Zanussi concerning joint manufacture of household appliances. The Italian firm will provide the technical documentation and also 49 percent of the cost of expanding and re-equipping a Yugoslav plant, besides being responsible for all marketing.[11] In a coproduction deal between the Swedish firm SKF and the Yugoslav enterprise Unis, the Swedish associate will provide 23 percent of investment costs (totalling over 13 million dollars) to construct and equip a ball bearing factory in Sarajevo. Under an unusual marketing clause, the Swedish partner has obligated itself to sell at least 20 percent of the Sarajevo plant's output for hard currencies.[12]

A cooperative agreement between Daimler-Benz and the Yugoslav Automobile Works Fap Famos will see the West German associate provide some 6.5 million dollars in investment capital and production licenses valued at three million dollars to expand and modernize the Yugoslav plant, which, in turn, undertakes to deliver spare parts and aggregates to Daimler-Benz factories in West Germany and elsewhere. This deal also apparently involves another aspect of cooperation—various (still unspecified) joint ventures in third countries.[13] The way such joint ventures might work is seen in the agreement established between Austria's Simmering-Graz-Pauker and a Polish enterprise for the purpose of building a sugar factory in Greece. The Poles will supply the equipment; the Austrians will put up the plant.[14]

A recent development in industrial cooperation is the establishment by the socialist enterprise and its Western capitalist partner of a joint, 50–50 venture in a third—capitalist—country for operations in both non-Communist and Communist areas. Profits are split between the partners. *E.g.*, the Toronto-based Tower International, Inc., proposes to set up a joint venture in Switzerland which will market tires produced by a new plant to be constructed on the basis of Western know-how in a yet unspecified East European country. The Swiss firm will reportedly buy the tires at "cost" (apparently on the basis of material costs in Western Europe plus a percentage) and possibly market them to the Western company that provided the know-how. The profits of the Swiss firm will then be shared by the partners. Another joint venture—the Yugoslav-American Corporation—has set up its headquarters in the Bahamas, with offices in Belgrade and New York from which it handles export-import trade, development financing and other US-Yugoslav joint ventures.[15]

As noted at the outset, industrial cooperation such as the arrangements described above requires a suitable political environment, a conscious decision by East European regimes to promote such a development. The first (and broadest) invitation to Western businessmen by an East European regime

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[6] Z. Hebdzynska, "Industrial Cooperation—A New Form of Foreign Trade Between East and West," *Rynki zagraniczne* (Warsaw), Jan. 28, 1966.

[7] *Vilaggazdasag*, March 11, 1970.

[8] *Magyar hislap* (Budapest), May 13, 1969.

[9] Z. Hebdzynska, *supra*.

[10] "A Profitable Cooperation," *Glos pracy* (Warsaw), Feb. 23, 1970.

[11] V. Zacevic, "Agreement on Industrial Cooperation between Rade Koncar and Zanussi Has Been Signed," *Politika* (Belgrade), Sept. 10, 1969.

[12] E. M., "Yugoslavia—Investments of Foreign Capital," *Rynki zagraniczne*, Aug. 1, 1970.

[13] Radio Zagreb, July 13, 1970.

[14] *Business Week* (New York), Jan 16, 1971, p. 41.

[15] *Ibid.*

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was made in November 1964 by Romanian Deputy Premier Gaston-Marin:

You are constantly seeking new markets and fresh opportunities for investing capital. You will find a wide scope for profitable investment in our country. We have raw materials and plenty of cheap labor. What we lack is capital, and the knowledge of the more sophisticated modern technological processes. Let us form a partnership. You contribute factory equipment and other capital requirements. You also make available to us your technological know-how. We, in turn, will erect the factory buildings and take responsibility for the supply of raw materials. We will also provide the necessary labor force.[16]

The Romanian official assured prospective capitalist partners in his country's development that they would be free of any threat of nationalization of assets and would be able to withdraw their share of profits of joint ventures in hard currency.

Such indiscriminate solicitation of Western investors (and by a rigidly centralized socialist state) is an exception to the rule, presumably occasioned by Romania's conflict at the time with Comecon (the Soviet-dominated Council on Mutual Economic Assistance) over Bucharest's desire to massively expand Romania's industrial potential. Only remotely comparable was the bill approved in July 1967 by the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, designed to clear the way for and to regulate foreign investment in Yugoslavia. However, the bill had certain drawbacks, including the requirement that the foreign investor reinvest 20 percent of his share of profits *in* Yugoslavia. [17] Elsewhere, Hungarian and Polish spokesmen have increasingly advocated industrial cooperation arrangements, presumably reflecting a favorable governmental attitude.[18] Prior to the Soviet invasion of August 1968, Czechoslovakia, too, had shown enthusiasm for industrial cooperation with the West; since the 1968 events, this enthusiasm has been muted, although the two dozen agreements concluded previously are apparently still operative. Bulgaria and East Germany also discreetly enter into cooperation deals, although they avoid much public endorsement of the phenomenon.[19]

One is tempted to conclude that there is some correlation between the degree of a given Communist regime's commitment to economic reform and political tolerance, on the one hand, and the regime's eagerness to promote industrial cooperation with Western firms on the other, although Romania provides a striking exception to this tentative rule of thumb. It is politically permissive and economically pragmatic Hungary and Yugoslavia which are well ahead in the cooperation field, while East Germany, which might be considered an ideal cooperation partner because of its relatively advanced level of technology and its significant unused productive capacity, lags the farthest behind. Of the more than 200 cooperation deals in existence, Hungary alone accounts for at least 127.[20] Although Poland claims that "about 50 Polish enterprises in various branches of industry are cooperating at present with Western firms," [21] it is believed that only 30 to 35 of these arrangements are *bona fide* cases of industrial cooperation. Prior to the August 1968 Soviet invasion, Czechoslovakia had concluded some 20 to 25 agreements. Romania, Bulgaria and East Germany can probably claim no more than a dozen cooperation agreements each. Sketchy Yugoslav data indicate that some 20 to 24 agreements have been concluded since enactment of the July 1967 law.[22]

Capital and Technology

What are the factors and considerations which have led East European regimes and their subordinate enterprises and agencies to seek cooperation deals with the capitalists? One factor is the scarcity of investment capital in these countries. Traditional

[16] Interview in the *New York Journal American*, Nov. 23, 1964.

[17] "The Law on the Taxation and Earnings of Foreign Persons Investing Capital in Domestic Business Organizations for the Purpose of Joint Ventures," *Sluzbeni list* (Belgrade), July 19, 1967, pp. 901-902.

[18] See Dr. Jozsef Biro, "Trade Relations between Developed Capitalist Countries and Our Own," *Kozgazdasag szemle* (Budapest), September 1968; *Vilaggazdasag*, Jan. 13 and March 13, 1970; and Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party, "Decision on the Guiding Principles of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75)," *Nepszabadsag*, July 18, 1970; also see statement of Witold Gorski, a department director in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade, *Journal of Commerce* (Washington), May 19, 1970.

[19] To give just two examples: a Bulgarian foreign trade enterprise concluded a cooperation agreement with the West German concern Siemens A. G. in September 1969; also, the Swedish firm Svenska Ugnabolaged has a long-term coproduction agreement with the East German enterprise Stahlmetall.

[20] D. Huszti, "Intercoop—the Balance of the First Year," *Figyelo* (Budapest), Aug. 19, 1970.

[21] PAP (Polish Press Agency) broadcast, March 23, 1970.

[22] *Politika*, July 5, 1970, and *Nedeljne informativne novine* (Belgrade), Aug. 2, 1970.

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tactics of capital accumulation, such as the financial squeeze of agriculture and suppression of consumer demand, are no longer acceptable. Many East European economies are still underdeveloped, and investment needs are further inflated by the professed objective of maintaining relatively high growth rates while increasingly seeking to satisfy growing consumer demand. Industrial cooperation therefore offers one means of attracting Western capital.

More important than the need for investment capital, however, is the East European countries' reliance on industrial cooperation to provide them with sorely needed technological know-how. As a Polish expert noted:

Access to modern technology is the most important advantage which a socialist country can derive from cooperative agreements with Western firms.[23]

The need for a broad transfer of technology is patent. For years now, the structure of industry in all countries of East Europe has been undergoing a rapid change occasioned by the development of more sophisticated production branches—chemicals, electronics and plastics. Existing production lines—from textiles to motor vehicles—are in need of modern designs and up-to-date production techniques in order to measure up to world standards. East Europe can bridge the technological gap over the long run by stepping up industrial research, but in the short run there are only two possibilities: wholesale purchases of licenses and patents, or acquisition of technological know-how as part and parcel of cooperation deals.

Purchase of licenses and patents is exorbitantly expensive and has "definite limits set by the chronic shortages of hard currencies" in Eastern Europe.[24] Another major drawback to the purchasing of Western licenses is that the East European country or enterprise acquires only *current* industrial processes, production techniques and designs, and therefore has no legal claim to any *future* technological advances, a critical factor in light of the rapid progress of technological change.

In contrast, any long-term cooperation agreement —especially if it involves some form of joint production—usually is based on the understanding that the Eastern partner will share in any new technological breakthrough achieved by the Western associate. Industrial cooperation ensures access to up-to-date production techniques not only in the narrow technological sense, but through training programs and periodic exchanges of technical personnel. This gives the Eastern partner the additional benefit of exposure to Western management techniques and production organization (notorious weak spots in any Soviet-bloc enterprise).[25] Exchanges of specialists also occur in license purchase agreements, but only for a short initial period. As the *Economic Bulletin for Europe* concluded, industrial cooperation is "the most suitable vehicle for accelerating the transfer and exchange of technology between East and West." [26]

Another factor of great importance to the various East European economies was pointed out by a Polish economist:

Industrial cooperation gives us a unique chance to acquire the advantages of an international division of labor on a micro-economic scale.[27]

In effect, the socialist enterprise is permitted to make more rational use of its productive capacity by specializing output and achieving economies of scale, thanks to new markets developed via its cooperative partner. This expansion of production and of exports takes place without the normal risks involved in attempting to expand exports on one's own account. Cooperative deals assure outlets for products on world markets for definite time spans and shield output from the fluctuations of world price levels—a particularly attractive feature to Communist planners, who like to keep their profit margins stable. In addition, cooperation provides the Eastern partner access to capitalist sales organizations and techniques, the latter a lost art in Eastern Europe after nearly a quarter century of arbitrarily controlled distribution. It is not surprising that most cooperative deals stipulate that the Western associate will be responsible for marketing, except in Comecon areas.

Exposure to capitalist markets through industrial cooperation brings coveted hard-currency earnings to

[23] L. Seroczynski, "Industrial Cooperation between East and West," *Rynki zagraniczne*, Feb. 3, 1970. See also G. Adam, "New Features of East-West Economic Relations, *Gozdasag* (Budapest), November 1967, and V. Vari, "Industrial Cooperation in Our Relations with the West," *Figyelo*, Aug. 23, 1967.

[24] T. Checinski, "Foreign Trade and the Technological Gap," *Rynki zagraniczne*, Oct. 17, 1970.

[25] V. Vari, *loc. cit.*

[26] *Supra.*

[27] J. Szoguld, "Industrial Cooperation with Partners in the Developed Capitalist Countries," *Rynki zagraniczne*, June 21, 1969.

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the socialist enterprise and its nation's economy. In fact, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Prof. Jozsef Bognar, has suggested that industrial cooperation may be "the most effective way of enhancing the profitability of foreign trade." [28] Not only does the conclusion of a specific agreement provide an immediate short-term increase in the volume and value of exports, but it also can improve the overall export performance of domestic industries in the long run. In this sense, cooperation is one way of fulfilling the economic reformers' prescription that East European economies must be fired in the crucible of international competition if they are ever to meet international standards of quality and efficiency. Industrial cooperation may achieve some of these goals without the dire dislocations of direct international competition.

A final factor disposing East European governments favorably toward joint ventures and coproduction arrangements is the need to make productive use of existing or future pools of unemployed or underemployed manpower. Skilled and unskilled workers alike may face unemployment and the need to relocate, as East European enterprises grapple with the complex issues of economic reform and structural adjustment. Industrial cooperation may permit socialist regimes to ease such dislocations, although the geographical dispersion of underutilized manpower resources and social overhead expenses involved in developing modern industrial environments may militate against such solutions in individual cases.

The eagerness of Eastern Europe to promote business cooperation with Western firms is by no means a one-sided affair. There is ample evidence that many Western businessmen are willing to meet the Eastern associate more than halfway down the road of industrial cooperation, and such large firms as the German Krupp or Italian Fiat have shown considerable initiative in seeking profitable business opportunities behind the Iron Curtain. This interest appears to be occasioned by several factors, including the chance to employ Western reserves of capital profitably, the desire for access to raw materials, the availability of relatively cheap sources of manpower, the possibility of cutting red tape and penetrating Comecon or Third World markets through association with socialist enterprises, and finally the opportunity for achieving cost reductions through product specialization and subcontracting and through the expansion of overall productive capacity without incurring high investment outlays at the home base.

Reinforcing and Limiting Factors

While the motives for industrial cooperation are readily discernible, the environment in which such arrangements must operate is not always so clear. The single most important factor here is the extent to which economic reform—with its decentralization of decisionmaking and introduction of economic self-interest as an important determinant of decisions—has been implemented in a given country. It is, as a rule, much easier for a Western firm to negotiate and effect a joint venture with a "socialist" business partner in a country where the industrial structure and economic controls have been decentralized than with a partner in a country which still maintains an arbitrary and monocentric economic control system, if only because there is likely to be less delay and red tape. While it is feasible to establish a workable business partnership through the offices of a third party—such as a state foreign trade agency—there are obvious advantages to direct enterprise-to-enterprise relationships, both in terms of technical documentation and feasibility discussions in the negotiating stage and in terms of coordination in the operational stage. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade for Hungary, Sandor Udvardi, has observed: "Implementation [of industrial cooperation agreements] was often made more difficult by the restrictions of the old economic mechanism and by excessive centralist controls," a situation which existed until the introduction of economic reforms in Hungary in January 1968 "created more favorable conditions for cooperation with enterprises of the capitalist countries." [29]

Of particular use to the development of cooperation is the creation of a suitable institutional framework within which prospective business partners can meet and conclude their agreements. Hungary blazed the trail here with the establishment in 1966 —under the joint control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of the Machine Building Industry—of a special state office to promote industrial cooperation. With the advent of the 1968

[28] "Opportunities and Prospects of European Economic Cooperation." *Magyar nemzet* (Budapest), June 18, 1967.

[29] "Cooperative Links with the Enterprises of Developed Capitalist Countries," *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 19, 1969.

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economic reform, this office was replaced by two self-financing, profit-oriented enterprises—Hunicoop and Intercoop. The first specializes in cooperation in metallurgical and machine-building production; the second handles arrangements for other industrial branches. The agencies perform the following functions: 1) conduct negotiations of cooperative proposals initiated by Hungarian or foreign enterprises; 2) assist in the drafting of agreements; 3) provide the necessary legal, technical and trade information; and 4) organize meetings of competent experts in the hope of initiating agreements.[30] In August 1970 these cooperation brokers were supplemented by a new state venture—Intercooperation—a joint-stock company capitalized at 150 million forints, which apparently is designed to seek out cooperation agreements with Western firms on behalf of groups of smaller Hungarian enterprises (rather than for single enterprises able to finance cooperation deals independently). Its Chairman is the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Jeno Baczoni.[31]

Although East European planning authorities look to cooperation as a means of exposing socialist enterprises to world competition and thereby raising the standards of domestic production, it would appear that far from all socialist enterprises (even in economies which have experienced a considerable measure of economic reform) are eager to face this trial by fire. A Polish economist has noted that Poland's enterprises "are more often than not the real culprit" in hindering cooperation agreements.[32] A similar commentary on affairs in Hungary has been expressed by Hungarian economist D. Huszti.[33] Apparently, less enterprising managers are loath to sign contracts which demand high standards of quality and firm delivery dates. Even after considerable economic reform, the prevailing system of planning and industrial management contains numerous disincentives to entering into such arrangements with demanding foreign clients; e.g., enterprises still face uncertainties in pricing, supply, profits, and foreign exchange availability. In most East European economies there is still a lack of unemployed resources and thus an inherent inflexibility, and while domestic enterprises might accept substitution of lower-quality materials in a product, the Western partner is not likely to be as accommodating.

As a result, only the most dynamic enterprise managers are likely to seek out industrial cooperation agreements with capitalist firms, and local inertia or resistance must often be overcome by direct orders from the appropriate ministry or agency. Yet, paradoxically, the latter are the organizations most likely to be sensitive to the political and ideological perils allegedly inherent in closer economic ties with the capitalist West. While most East European officials may not share the opinion of the Soviet commentator quoted below, his statement clearly sets a limit on the East European pursuit of industrial cooperation (except, of course, in the case of Yugoslavia):

There are limits to the division of labor between the two socio-political systems which, when overstepped, might jeopardize the victory of socialism in economic competition with capitalism. . . . In any development of economic cooperation with capitalist countries, the socialist countries cannot permit relaxation of control over their own economy, limitation of their freedom of action in relations with their capitalist partners, or any threat to the security of individual socialist states or the socialist community as a whole.[34] (Emphasis added)

The Data Gap

To sum up, a survey of East-West industrial cooperation provides ample evidence of widespread mutual interest in promoting all kinds of joint business ventures. But the outside observer is frustrated by a formidable information gap when it comes to substantiating the mutual advantages introduced by this recent development. One would like to know what portion of East-West trade is being conducted within the framework of industrial cooperation, what percentage of mutual commercial exchanges has been generated by cooperative agreements, and whether the performance of joint ventures has justified the hopes of their sponsors. Instead, the available data are fragmentary and unsatisfactory. Thus, the eminent Hungarian economist B. Csikos-Nagy reports that "about one percent of [Hungary's] foreign trade turnover in 1968 can be directly attrib-

[30] D. Huszti, *loc. cit.*

[31] Radio Budapest, Aug. 21, 1970.

[32] H. Chadzynski, "The Future of Industrial Cooperation: Hope and Reality," *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Oct. 14 and 15, 1970.

[33] *Loc. cit.*

[34] A. Vetrov, "Economic Ties between Socialist and Capitalist States," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1970, p. 10.

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uted to industrial cooperation," [35] and a Polish newspaper reports that some 12 percent of Poland's industrial machinery exports to the West in 1966 were within cooperative deals.[36] However, Hungary's cooperation drive did not begin until mid-1968, and total Polish machinery exports amounted to only 26 million dollars in 1966.

Faced with such a paucity of quantified macroeconomic information, one must fall back on occasional progress reports on individual cooperation schemes. Thus, we learn that "economic cooperation between Polish enterprises and Swedish firms [both in furniture manufacturing and in coproduction of electrical appliances] has proved very successful," [37] or that "the majority of cooperative agreements in the [Hungarian] machine building industry have fully justified . . . expectations." [38] However, such assessments are too subjective, fragmentary and loosely worded to provide anything more than confirmation of the initial assumption that since both sides are apparently eager to expand the area of cooperation, the arrangements must be working reasonably well.

There is every indication that more cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and that the range of products covered will continue to widen in the foreseeable future. This is not to imply that the growth will be uninterrupted, or even that it may not be abruptly terminated. While many Western firms clearly wish to exchange technological and marketing know-how for access to cheap labor resources and potentially lucrative markets, other businesses are still apprehensive about the risks which inhere in cooperative ties—*e.g.*, the possibility of delivery failures or of the disclosure of secret technological processes to third parties. On the other side of the table, the passive resistance of socialist enterprises to this new trend must be noted. Then, too, there is the very real question of how far economic reform will be permitted to go in Eastern Europe—lack of progress on this front would doubtless hinder the advance of industrial cooperation. And, as the above Soviet comment clearly indicates, political and ideological considerations may be the decisive factors placing limits on continued expansion of industrial cooperation, with Moscow calling the shots for most East European states in the matter of balancing the political risks of cooperation against the potential economic gain.

[35] "Incidence de la Réforme Economique sur le Commerce Hongrois" (Impact of Economic Reform on Hungarian Trade), *Revue de l'Est* (Paris), Vol. 1, No. 2, 1970, p. 14.

[36] Unsigned editorial, "Industrial Cooperation with the West," *Rynki zagraniczne*, May 30, 1968.

[37] J. Hlebowicz, *loc. cit.*

[38] Dr. J. Redei, "East-West Industrial Cooperation," *Figyelo*, Aug. 19, 1970.

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Whither Chile?

EDITORS' NOTE: The popular election of a Marxist president in Chile last year was a landmark event which is bound to affect not only Chile's domestic politics but Latin American and international relations. In the first of the two following articles, Messrs. Gouré and Suchlicki investigate some of the more immediate consequences of Sr. Allende's victory, including the policies he is likely to adopt for the "socialization" of Chile and the implications of the emergence of his regime for the two self-styled "socialist" superpowers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In the second article, Mr. Aguilar provides a broader historical perspective, tracing the indigenous Chilean traditions of democracy and socialism and relating them to the options open to Chile.

The Allende Regime: Actions and Reactions

By Leon Goure´ and Jaime Suchlicki

In May 1970, Chilean President Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat, outlined the impressive achievements of his regime in his last annual message to the National Congress.[1] Yet only a few months later his party suffered a humiliating defeat at the polls. Salvador Allende, leader of the leftist Popular Unity Front (*Unidad Popular,* or UP), trounced the Christian Democratic candidate, Radomiro Tomic; narrowly edged out the conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri; and assumed the presidency with the avowed intention of launching Chile on the road to "socialism." If the outcome of the election was a demonstration of the viability of Chile's democratic system, it also raised doubts about that system's long-term survival as the UP begins to try to carry out its program of profound social-economic transformation of the country and proclaims its resolve to make this process "irreversible."

Allende's government—unlike that of Fidel Castro—came to power through ballots rather than bullets and thus represents a novel experiment in peaceful socialist revolution for Latin America. While Chile possesses on the whole a more favorable social and economic base for radical internal transformation than Cuba did at the time of its revolution, the new Chilean regime faces a highly uncertain future because of the untested viability of the ruling coali-

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[1] *La Nacion* (Santiago), May 22, 1970, pp. 10-19.

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tion, the existence of strong, organized local opposition, and the continued presence in the nation of neutral and independent armed forces. It is also unclear what role the Communist powers—especially the USSR—will play in Chile; yet the degree to which they become a factor there, particularly as a source of economic assistance, will affect developments in the country. But whatever its results, the Chilean experiment is bound to have a major impact on the politics of other nations in the area.

Decline of Christian Democracy

The Christian Democrats' rise to power in Chile in 1964 was hailed throughout Latin America as a major breakthrough for reformist causes. Many in Chile viewed President Frei's election as the beginning of a major "revolution in freedom" which would profoundly transform Chile's social and economic structure.[2] However, that libertarian revolution failed to materialize.[3]

This is not to say that the Christian Democrats introduced no far-reaching changes. Indeed, they could boast of many. In 1967, Congress passed a government-sponsored agrarian reform law, and the state expropriated several million hectares of land and distributed them to an estimated 26,000 peasant families.[4] That same year, a rural unionization law led to the formation of *campesino* (peasant) unions, an innovation which enhanced the power of the rural proletariat and built a strong base of support for Christian Democracy in the countryside.[5] The Frei administration carried out a program designed to provide greater national participation in the US-controlled copper industry, which accounts for about 70 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. It significantly increased the national minimum wage and reformed the tax structure. In slum areas, it endeavored to form cohesive communities through such devices as legalizing neighborhood councils and supporting local efforts to build decent housing.[6] During its tenure, Chile's foreign debts grew more slowly than they had in the past. Concurrently, the nation's balance of trade became increasingly favorable: from $19 million in 1964 it grew to $198 million in 1968 and is estimated to have exceeded $200 million in 1969.[7]

In foreign affairs, the Frei government pursued a vigorously independent line. It established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and increased trade with both Eastern and Western Europe. It sharply criticized the United States for intervening in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and broke the Organization of American States' embargo against Cuba by selling small amounts of foodstuffs to the Castro regime. And it not only made strong demands on the United States for better trade terms for Chile's exports but also led a bloc of Latin American countries seeking to obtain better prices for Latin American products.

Yet, despite this record, the Christian Democrats did not bring about the financial stability and the dramatic improvements in Chile that they had promised upon gaining power. One of President Frei's most obvious setbacks was his failure to control inflation. According to official figures, the annual rate of inflation reached 30 percent in 1969.[8] Nature, too, worked against Frei. A severe drought in 1968-69 caused drastic regional dislocations in agricultural production.

Even Frei's "Chileanization" of the copper industry in 1965 failed to capture the imagination of the population to the extent that he had hoped. In mid-1969, therefore, he attempted again to rally popular support by announcing a "negotiated nationalization" of the Anaconda Copper Company's properties in Chile to match the agreement arrived at earlier with the Kennecott Copper Company. This accord gave Chile a controlling interest in and the eventual right to purchase full ownership of Anaconda holdings in Chile. The nationalization was timed to

[2] For information on the Christian Democrats, see Arturo Olavarria Bravo, *Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana* (3 vols.), Santiago, Editorial Nascimiento, 1966-67; Paul E. Sigmund, "Christian Democracy in Chile," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1966, pp. 332-42; and Edward J. Williams, *Latin American Christian Democratic Parties*, Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1967. Two fine studies of Chilean politics are Federico G. Gil, *The Political System of Chile*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966; and Ernst Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1965.

[3] For a discussion of the failures of the Frei regime, see Jose Joaquin Brunner, "La segunda mitad del camino," *Mensaje* (Santiago), Vol. XVII, March-April 1968, pp. 66-69; and Andres Coste, "Una nueva problematica politica," *ibid.*, September, 1968, pp. 395-97.

[4] Gonzalo Arroyo, S. J., and Sergio Gomez, "Una etapa conflictiva en la reforma agraria," *ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, October 1969, pp. 475-81; and November 1969, pp. 555-63. See also Inter-American Economic and Social Council, *Informe sobre la economia de Chile*, Washington, D. C., February 16, 1971, pp. 26-27.

[5] Gonzalo Arroyo, S. J., "Sindicalismo campesino hoy," *Mensaje*, Vol. XVII, May 1968, pp. 164-69.

[6] See Consejeria Nacional de Promocion Popular, "La labor de 'promocion popular,'" *ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, July 1969, pp. 303-04.

[7] *Ercilla (Santiago)*, July 22-28, 1970; United Nations, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1968*, New York, 1970, p. 169; United Nations, *World Trade Annual, 1969*, New York, 1970, pp. 1, 7.

[8] Inter-American Economic and Social Council, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

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strengthen the Christian Democrats before the 1970 elections.[9]

Several things contributed to the gap between the promises and the performance of the Christian Democrats. Part of the blame lay with the short period of time that they were in power and with the political system. No regime could have been expected to solve Chile's deep-seated social and economic problems in six years. Moreover, President Frei found himself trapped by his attempt to introduce profound reforms within the framework of Chile's constitutional structure, for he became deadlocked with a Congress which represented widely divergent interest groups. But the Christian Democrats also share in the blame. Riding high when they came to office with more than 50 percent of the votes, they rejected any spirit of national political reconciliation.

At any rate, many Chileans seemed dissatisfied with the Christian Democratic regime by early 1969. The 1969 parliamentary elections showed a significant decline in popular support for the Christian Democrats (they polled only 29.6 percent of the vote as compared with 42 percent in 1965) and an increasing polarization of society. The right-wing National Party and the Communists registered the most impressive gains. On one hand, many of the wealthy and conservative groups that had supported Frei in 1964 as an alternative to Salvador Allende (then, as later, the Socialist candidate running with the endorsement of the Communists) had become alienated by what they considered reforms of too radical a nature, and Chile's middle class had become angry at the inability of the Christian Democrats to control inflation. On the other hand, the poor were impatient with the slow pace of reform.

The heaviest vocal criticism came from the parties of the Right and the Left. After a minor border conflict with Argentina over the Beagle Channel in 1967, the rightist National Party played on Chilean fears of Argentina and strongly criticized the administration's weakness in handling the dispute. It also upbraided the government for a lack of zeal in combatting internal subversion and for failing to pay members of the armed forces higher salaries. On the other hand, the Communists and Socialists chastised Frei for his failure to initiate thoroughgoing social and economic reforms. Speaking at the 14th Congress of the Chilean Communist Party in November 1969, for example, Secretary-General Luis Corvalan attacked the government for "failing to bring about a national restructuring of society." [10] Already the previous year, Senator Carlos Altamirano, a radical Socialist, had told a correspondent of *Granma*, the official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, that the Christian Democrats had "failed," and he claimed that there was a "progressive feeling of betrayal; . . . people, workers and youth seek true revolutionary methods of struggle, of action. In the country, as well as in the university, highly explosive forces are being formed." [11]

Even within the Christian Democratic ranks, factions critical of Frei emerged. In a report to the Christian Democratic convention in mid-1969, Senator Renan Fuentealba, chairman of the convention, contended:

. . . in 1964 the reactionary right had no alternative but to vote for the Christian Democratic Party, which was the only force able to confront the Socialist-Communist coalition. The fear of Allende made them vote for the Christian Democrats. And in 1964 Christian Democracy was a youthful, original and uncorrupted party. Today, there is a rightist reactionism in ascendance. The Christian Democratic Party is no longer the youthful party of 1964. To run in the presidential election of September 1970 without a coalition [*with "progressive" forces*] *will lead us to death.*[12]

By this juncture, the factionalism had already led to a party split. A group which advocated faster and more profound reforms than Frei did had broken off and formed the *Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitaria* (Movement of United Popular Action, or MAPU) in May 1969. It later joined the Socialists and Communists in the UP.

By the time of the 1970 election, most political observers doubted the possibility of a Christian Democratic victory. The party's choice to succeed Frei, Radomiro Tomic, a former Chilean ambassador to Washington, lacked either charisma or a personal following. Furthermore, he tried to appeal to the

[9] The two agreements provided for 51-percent state ownership of properties in Chile and committed the copper companies to invest set amounts to increase production. See Luis Maira Aguirre, "De la chileanizacion a la nacionalizacion pactada," *Mensaje*, Vol. XVIII, August 1969, pp. 335-44; *Foreign Economic Trends: Chile*, Washington, D. C., US Department of Commerce, 1969; and "The Chileanization of the Copper Industry," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol. II, Spring 1969, pp. 158-79.

[10] *El poder popular, unica alternativa patriotica y revolucionaria. Informe al XIV Congreso Nacional del Partido*, Santiago, November 1969, pp. 4-7.

[11] *Granma* (Havana), Oct. 30, 1968.

[12] *Ercilla*, July 25, 1969.

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more liberal sectors of society and, in so doing, alienated the conservatives. Indeed, his rhetoric during the campaign seemed almost as radical as that of Allende.

Numerous voters who had supported Frei in 1964 as "the only alternative to Marxism" now backed former President Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the National Party and the Democratic Radical Party. Though to some quarters he appeared too old and sick at the age of 74 to withstand the vicissitudes of a six-year presidential term, he had a paternalistic appeal to others, and few persons questioned his integrity and patriotism.

The Popular Unity Coalition

The choice of the Left and the eventual victor was Senator Salvador Allende. A physician by training, Allende had long been a leader of the Socialist Party, which he had helped to found in the early 1930's. First elected to the Chamber of Deputies from Valparaiso in 1937, he had functioned as Minister of Public Health in the Popular Front government of Aguirre Cerda in 1939. After serving several terms in the Senate, he had run unsuccessfully for president in the elections of 1952 and 1958. In 1961, he had been reelected to the Senate, this time with the support of the Communist Party of Chile (CPCh). He had again been defeated in the 1964 presidential balloting, but in 1967 he had been chosen President of the Senate.

By any standard, Allende is quite a curious personality, for he embodies many contradictions. An avowed Marxist, he is also a Mason. Despite his Marxist convictions, he has retained the style of living of Chile's bourgeoisie, of which he is a product. For more than three decades, he has worked for change within the country's political and socio-economic system, yet he has on numerous occasions expressed his admiration for his personal friend Fidel Castro, as well as for Ho Chi Minh. Moreover, he journeyed to Havana in 1966 to participate in the Tricontinental Solidarity Conference and to help found the OLAS (Latin American Solidarity Organization), an international front which Casto has used to expand his influence in the region and to encourage the formation of guerrilla movements there. When asked recently to explain the inconsistency between his endorsement of the OLAS and his commitment to revolution through the democratic process for Chile, Allende avoided the issue by saying that "to be a revolutionary means to break economic, cultural and political dependence on the great industrial nations and especially on imperialist capital." [13] Thought by some to be anti-American and fervently nationalistic, he has nonetheless solicited American investment funds for his country.

Above all, Allende exhibits the traits of a pragmatic and crafty politician. As one student of Chilean politics has pointed out, "it would be difficult to find in either his speeches or written pronouncements a single original thought," [14] and he lacks the kind of charisma so prevalent among Latin American political leaders. Nevertheless, he has remained a constant factor in Chilean politics for many years. Although he lacked control of the Socialists or even a political machinery of his own, he managed to win nomination to the presidency three times prior to 1970—once by a Socialist faction and twice by a united Socialist Party. Furthermore, he has repeatedly demonstrated his masterful skill as a parliamentarian.

As we have indicated, Allende received the backing of a coalition of Marxist and other leftist parties (known as the Popular Unity Front[15]), but he obtained it only as a result of much bargaining. The ultra-Left, represented primarily by the *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, or MIR), refused to endorse him and reserved the right to continue its policies of revolutionary violence. His own party nominated him only after long and at times bitter internal opposition. The rest of the participants in the Unity Front—especially some non-Marxist elements led by the Radical Party—delayed for months before accepting him as their candidate. Even the Communist Party, which ultimately contributed very substantially to the success of the coalition by furnishing large numbers of propagandists and agitators as well as considerable sums of money, hesitated at first to support Allende and tentatively advanced the candidacy of one of their own, the poet Pablo Neruda.

Behind the facade of harmony, then, the victorious coalition was far from a cohesive grouping. The Socialists and Communists, indeed, have a long history of bitter rivalry. Chilean Socialism is to a large extent the product of dissatisfaction with

[13] See Norman Gall, "The Chileans Have Elected a Revolution," *The New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 1, 1970, pp. 26-27, 106-10.

[14] Halperin, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

[15] The Front includes the Socialist Party, the CPCh, a faction of the Radical Party, the *Accion Popular Independiente* (Independent Popular Action), the *Partido Social Democrata* (Social Democratic Party), and the MAPU. These elements, we should point out, have their roots in disparate socio-economic groups within the population.

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Communist leadership of the Left during the 1920's and early 1930's; ideologically, the Socialist Party has evolved into an entity more radical than the Communist Party, which it has often criticized for being too moderate. Hence, the two parties have struggled to control and influence the Chilean labor movement for several decades now, and their leaders have often waged fierce competitions for national and local political offices.[16]

Of the various elements of the Unity Front, the CPCh clearly qualified as the strongest. Prior to 1969, the Socialist Party's share of the vote had always about equalled or exceeded that of the Communist Party, but the Socialists lost their electoral advantage in the parliamentary balloting of 1969, when they garnered only 12.3 percent of the total vote as against the Communists' 15.9 percent.[17] Other members of the coalition could boast of even less imposing demonstrations of popular support than the Socialists. In addition, the CPCh is an exceptionally well-organized and disciplined party closely tied to a major foreign power (the USSR). The Socialist Party and the other partners in the Unity Front, in contrast, have a history of factionalism and sharp interparty rivalry, and they possess no international links of great import.

The results of the election of September 4, 1970, were exceedingly close. Allende obtained 1,075,616 votes, or 36.3 percent of those cast; Alessandri received 1,036,278 votes, or 34.9 percent; and Tomic got 824,849 votes, or 27.8 percent. Absenteeism was fairly low.

A few comparisons will help put these figures into perspective. Allende polled a smaller percentage of the total vote this time than he had in 1964, when he had received 38.9 percent. Alessandri, however, garnered a larger share of the total than he had in 1958, when he had been elected president. Tomic did not even come close to the 56.1 percent of the ballots that his party's candidate had won in 1964, when Frei and Allende had been the only major contenders for the presidency.

Since none of the three candidates obtained the absolute majority of the direct popular vote required to become president, Congress met on October 24, 1970, to select a president. It chose the frontrunner, Allende. However, hard bargaining between the UP and the Christian Democrats, as well as attempts on the part of the Right to sabotage Allende's bid for power,[18] preceded the election. In return for their votes in Congress, which were needed to elect Allende, the Christian Democrats extracted from him a promise to uphold a Statute of Democratic Guarantees. This commits Allende to preserve: (1) the political system and constitutional guarantees of individual liberty; (2) the existing legal system; (3) armed forces free from political interference and able to guarantee the democratic process; and (4) the independence of the educational system as well as of trade unions and social organizations.

Promises and Actions

The Popular Unity platform upon which Allende ran in 1970 attempted to reconcile the thinking and the programs of the various parties of the Chilean Left.[19] According to this platform, the revolutionary transformation of the nation would be carried out by "popular unity committees" set up in every factory, estate, village, office or school; freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, the inviolability of the home, and the workers' right to unionize would be guaranteed. The existing bicameral National Congress would be replaced by a unicameral "Assembly of the People"—a more populist representative body whose very existence would obviate the twin vices of an unrepresentative "dictatorial presidential system" and the present "corrupt parliamentary system" with its vested interests. The judiciary would continue to function on the principle of autonomy safeguarded by the Constitution, but it would be purged of its "individualist and bourgeois" features. Members of the Supreme Tribunal would be chosen by the Assembly of the People.

In the economic sphere, the power of Chilean and foreign "monopolistic capital" and of the great estates would be destroyed, and a state sector dominating but coexisting with private and mixed sectors

[16] See Halperin, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-20.

[17] It should be noted, however, that the Socialist Party managed to recoup its position in the municipal elections of April 1971. It received 22.4 percent of the total vote as compared with the CPCh's 17.0 percent.

[18] For example, Alessandri offered himself as a compromise candidate, and he promised that, if elected by Congress, he would resign and allow new presidential elections to be held. The assassination of the Army Chief of Staff, René Schneider, has also been attributed to rightist elements who wanted to disrupt the electoral process and provoke a military intervention prior to the October 24 congressional balloting.

[19] The text of the program may be found in *El Siglo* (Santiago), Dec. 23, 1969. For a critique of the program, see *Mensaje*, Vol. XIX, March-April, 1970, pp. 92-95.

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would be built up. Nationalization beyond that which had already been effected would begin with enterprises related to the basic riches of the country, such as the large copper, nitrate, iodine, iron and coal mines. Then it would be the turn of the country's financial system, "especially private banks and insurance companies." Foreign trade, the great distribution enterprises and monopolies, the strategic industrial monopolies, and in general all those activities which govern the economic and social development of Chile would also be taken over. Agrarian reform would be accelerated through the expropriation of land holdings in excess of the size prescribed for private farms, and the expropriated lands would be organized as cooperatives. A national system of comprehensive economic planning would be established.

On the social front, there would be more new housing, better medical care, "complete civil rights for married women," and an improved social security system. The communications media would be given "an educational orientation and would be liberated from their present commercial character."

In international affairs, a Popular Unity government would insist upon complete political and economic autonomy for Chile. It would denounce the Organization of American States "as an instrument of North American imperialism," and it would not only struggle against "all forms of Pan-Americanism implicit" in the OAS but would also "opt for the creation of an organism that is truly representative of Latin American countries." It would likewise "revise, denounce, and forget about . . . the treaties or agreements that mean compromises limiting Chile's sovereignty, specifically the treaties of reciprocal assistance, the mutual assistance pacts, and other pacts that Chile has signed with the United States." Asked before the election about the likely reaction of the United States to the proposed unilateral Chilean abrogation of treaties, Allende stated:

. . . despite its policy of extreme imperialism, the regime of President Nixon is beginning to lose control in its foreign outrages. . . . In addition, our country would not be an [isolated] oasis. International solidarity is today a fact. . . .[20]

A Popular Unity government would also reassert Chile's right to maintain commercial and diplomatic relations with all nations of the world. The platform expressed solidarity with the Cuban revolution, and it called for the advance of revolution and "the construction of socialism in Latin America." Furthermore, it advocated increasing ties with the "socialist" countries.

To date, however, the new administration's actions and rhetoric seem less radical than most observers expected in light of the Popular Unity platform. It is true, of course, that Allende's few months in office have witnessed an acceleration of the tempo of change. On the domestic scene, the regime is in the process of nationalizing the copper industry and expropriating additional lands, and it has already taken over a number of industries and businesses. Unable to get the Congress to pass a bill nationalizing the banking system, it has been buying controlling interest in the major banks to ensure its domination of credit. Moreover, it has begun to mobilize the peasantry and youth in its own support. In foreign affairs, it is seeking new markets for Chile's copper, and it has established trade and diplomatic links with Cuba and Communist China.

Nonetheless, a relative moderation has been evident. On several occasions, Allende has reaffirmed his campaign promises that he would implement internal reforms through constitutional means and within the framework of Chile's existing political system. He has thus been able to generate a certain amount of confidence, at least among domestic businessmen, and to alleviate the panic that ensued immediately after the balloting of September 1970.[21] He has been particularly careful to avoid creating fresh enemies at home and to compromise with some old ones. For example, he has made repeated overtures of friendship toward the Chilean military, and he has urged the MIR to forego violence and join in his revolutionary undertakings. Claiming that the "Miristas" had acted under an unjust system and with lofty ideals, he issued a decree in January 1971 pardoning MIR *profugos* (fugitives from justice) and appealed to them to renounce their violent tactics.[22] He has proved equally restrained in the international arena. Upon assuming office, he did not repudiate Chile's membership in the OAS, and he has since taken pains to assure the United States government that a "socialist" Chile represents no threat.

This moderation perhaps reflects the complex situation confronting the Chilean president. Not

[20] *Ercilla*, Feb. 4, 1970.

[21] Allende has publicly acknowledged that, between September 3 and October 20, $17 million were withdrawn from the Central Bank. Chile Domestic Radio, Jan. 6, 1971.

[22] A number of "Miristas" had been in jail, in hiding, or in exile. *ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1971.

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only does he have to maintain unity among different and at times antagonistic groups, but he also has to deal with a Congress not under UP domination, with an opposition led by the still popular Christian Democrats, and with growing economic difficulties.

Soviet Reaction

While the Popular Unity platform for the 1970 election did not specifically call for close economic and political ties between Chile and the "socialist" world, the victory and installation in office of the Unity Front were developments that neither of the major Communist powers could dismiss lightly. The USSR has greeted them with a great show of approval, but Soviet commentaries on Chile during the months preceding and since Allende's election have betrayed signs of nervousness and concern about the situation there.

The reasons for this mixed response are not too hard to discern. On the one hand, the Unity Front's accomplishments represent a triumph for the "peaceful road" and "united front" strategy that Moscow has endorsed in Latin America—a triumph achieved, in the words of a Soviet observer, only "after repeated 'attempts' and many years of effort." [23] Hence, the Chilean developments, according to another Soviet source, tend to puncture the belief widely held among Latin American revolutionaries that "truly democratic forces" cannot come to power by parliamentary means.[24] In this sense, they are held to be as significant as the Cuban revolution, which dispelled the notion that Communist revolutions could not succeed in lands near the United States. On the other hand, events in Chile may have opened a Pandora's box for the USSR. They have greatly increased the possibility that the country could become a substantial economic burden to Moscow, and they could ultimately bring about the eradication of the quite considerable gains that Moscow had made in its relations with Santiago during the Frei administration, if the Allende regime should fall and a "reactionary" government should replace it. Furthermore, since the success of the present Chilean regime constitutes the strongest vindication of the USSR's Latin American policy, the possible failure of the Popular Unity regime to achieve its goals or its collapse from internal discord would seriously damage the Kremlin's policy line and prestige in this area.

Such considerations lead one to speculate that the continuation of the Christian Democrats in power would probably have been quite acceptable to the Russians. Inasmuch as Moscow's stated objective in Latin America is the formation of a "new anti-imperialist front" in what one Soviet analyst has described as the "closest strategic rear of the United States," [25] Soviet policy focuses on the reorientation of the foreign relations of Latin American countries with a view to the reduction of US influence in the area. As long as the Latin American nations demonstrate readiness to pursue "independent" foreign policies and to free themselves from the control of US "monopolies" and their "reactionary" allies—the native business and landed oligarchies—the specific political character of the regime is of secondary concern to the Soviets. To the extent that it does matter, Soviet analysis prescribes that Latin America must pass through the stage of "people's democracies" based on coalitions of all "progressive" forces before attaining socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.[26]

Frei's policies, and even more so Tomic's proposed program, went a long way toward fulfilling the primary desires of the Soviets. Their commentators gave Frei's foreign policy especially high marks, for it embodied the sort of "independence" that accorded well with the USSR's interests at little cost.

The mounting polarization of Chilean politics in 1969 and early 1970, however, did not escape the Soviets, and it obviously worried them. Soviet sources expressed concern about the growing strength of the Right and the possibility of increased politicization of the armed forces, both of which threatened to undo the progress and policies of the Frei administration.[27] At the same time, Moscow did not appear sanguine about the outlook for the Left and particularly about the cohesion of the UP. Soviet comments made it clear that the formation of the coalition had required lengthy negotiations as well as a good deal of compromise.[28] They thus implicitly conveyed uncertainty as to whether or not the coalition would hold together.

[23] I. Zorbina, "Chili: pobeda narodnovo edinstva" (Chile: Victory of Popular Unity), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (Moscow), No. 11, November 1970, p. 85.

[24] For a Soviet argument to this effect, see R. Tuchnin, *Izvestia*, Dec. 13, 1970.

[25] See, for example, V. Korionov, *Pravda*, Dec. 30, 1970.

[26] By way of illustration, see V. Volsky, *ibid.*, June 27, 1970.

[27] See, *e.g.*, *Izvestia*, Nov. 12, 1969; *Pravda*, Nov. 30, 1969; and Zorina, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85. Also, Radio Moscow report, Dec. 8, 1969.

[28] *Ibid.* and I. N. Zorina, "Chili: novyi etap istorii" (Chile: A New Stage of History), *Latinskaia Amerika* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971, p. 19.

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Moscow, in addition, evinced some misgivings about how its staunch ally, the Communist Party of Chile, would fare within such a coalition. In June 1969, *i.e.*, prior to the formation of the coalition, *Pravda* recorded Corvalan's observation to the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties that the CPCh was "waging a struggle against opponents coming out in our own field," [29] and Soviet sources thereafter placed much emphasis on the party's defense of "its purity in the revolutionary struggle against rightism and 'left' opportunism." [30]

In the eyes of the Soviets, in short, the Chilean Communists had to combat pressures for both radicalization of the coalition and "deviation" to the right. Moscow had long been acutely aware that the Socialists, though disposed to enter into electoral alliances with the CPCh, by no means saw eye to eye with the Communists on all crucial matters. Indeed, as far back as the 13th Congress of the CPCh in 1965, Andrei Kirilenko, a Soviet Politburo member, had openly referred to the existence of "tactical disagreements" between the two parties.[31] These differences had to do not only with the tempo of revolution at home but also with attitudes toward Castro and the Chinese Communists. As we have already noted, the Socialists favored a more extreme and "leftist" approach to the domestic situation than did the Communists. Similarly, the Socialists reacted more sympathetically to the views of Castro and the Chinese Communists than did the CPCh.

On the other (right) flank of the Chilean Communists stood the "left wing" of the Christian Democrats, which *Pravda* took to task in the summer of 1970 for fearing "real socialism" despite its revolutionary phrases, for insisting on "revolution in the framework of freedom (bourgeois 'freedom for all')," and for advocating a "communitarian society of individuals"—all of which, according to the article, tended to sow "dangerous illusions among some of the workers" and to lead them "astray." [32] This criticism, however, applied equally to the MAPU and appeared also to be a sideswipe at Allende, who had stressed his commitment to the preservation of full democratic freedom for all Chileans.

Whether Moscow at any time anticipated the outcome of the 1970 election remains a moot point, for in the last months before the balloting, the Soviet press virtually ignored Chile, evidently so as not to embarrass the CPCh with Soviet support and perhaps also to protect Soviet prestige in the event of a leftist defeat.[33] But a Soviet commentator did subsequently remark that "to many political observers" Alessandri had looked to be the most probable winner.[34]

Moscow's Changing Estimates

While the Soviet media hailed the election results as a significant victory for the "progressive" forces in Latin America at large, as well as in Chile, Moscow initially entertained serious doubts that Allende would actually take office. In truth, the outcome did appear to put the UP at a tactical disadvantage. Not merely had the results alerted the opposition and alarmed Washington, but they had thrown the final decision into the Chilean Congress, which the UP did not control, and had thereby given the opposition time to mobilize its forces to block Allende's confirmation.

Soviet commentary on the situation took note of the large vote for Alessandri and played up rumors of an impending military coup, reports of various plots being hatched by Chilean "reactionaries" with US support, and warnings of possible action by Washington to protect the large US investments in Chile and prevent any further deterioration of its influence in Latin America. Significantly, one Soviet radio broadcast stated that "regardless of whom the Chilean National Congress elects," the national elections were expected to affect Chile's future political development profoundly.[35] Soviet media likewise pointed out that Allende's chances in the eventual vote in the Congress "depend on the Christian Democrats." [36] By September 17, *Izvestia* did reflect encouragement at the Christian Democrats' recognition of Allende's triumph at the polls, but it still hedged on the upcoming test in Congress by declaring that a "decisive stage" which would determine whether the "antipeople forces would succeed in holding back the revolutionary process" was at hand.

[29] *Pravda*, June 3, 1969.

[30] See, for instance, greetings of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Chile, *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1969.

[31] *Ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1965.

[32] Volsky, *loc. cit.*

[33] In his address at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1969, Corvalan had spoken of the "harping" of the reactionaries on the CPCh's "dependence" on the CPSU and of their efforts to "extort anti-Soviet declarations from our party." See *Pravda*, June 13, 1969.

[34] Zorina, "Chili: pobeda narodnovo edinstva," *loc. cit.*, p. 83.

[35] Radio Moscow, Sept. 5, 1970.

[36] *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1970.

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However, as the Chilean military and Washington failed to act and the Right proved unable to offer effective resistance, the tone of Soviet outpourings became increasingly optimistic. Commenting on the assassination of General René Schneider on the eve of the convening of the National Congress, *Izvestia* proclaimed: "No one is any longer in doubt about the name of the next head of state. He is Senator Salvador Allende. . . ." [37]

Once Allende had taken over as president, the Soviets set about promoting the Chilean "model" as a guide for other Communist and "progressive" forces. *Pravda* underlined that "only an alliance of all the forces which stand for the implementation of profound socio-economic transformation" can carry through the revolution and decisively defeat the United States in Latin America, and it reported with satisfaction that Communist parties in other Latin American countries were heeding the "slogans of unity." [38] The Argentinian, Uruguayan, and Venezuelan parties, in particular, had committed themselves to greater efforts to forge united fronts of leftist forces.[39] Soviet sources also exploited Chile in Sino-Soviet polemics by highlighting that "it has not been the gun but the actions of the revolutionary class which have enabled the people to take over political power" there.[40]

Nevertheless, Moscow continues to hedge its position by stipulating that the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America may take many forms, and it persists in citing the non-Marxist but radical military regimes of Peru and Bolivia, along with the Marxist government of Chile, as part of the general revolutionary forces of the region. Moreover, it holds that the common problem of all nations in the area is "to rid themselves of dependence on US monopolies." On this basis, it not only encourages cooperation between the "progressive" states but calls for an eventual "unity on a Latin American scale" which would "guarantee success" in the struggle against the United States.[41]

Aside from the example of the new Chilean regime's road to power, the Soviets have derived other practical gains from its advent. Its foreign policy has embodied many positive innovations from the Soviet standpoint. Allende is leading a drive to lift the OAS embargo on Cuba and to transform the character of the inter-American body. Chile appears to have given the Andean group—composed of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru—a more radical temper and to have helped accelerate a growing trend in Latin America to reduce the influence of US corporations and restrict the volume of profits that they can take out of the region. Santiago has thrown its support behind the Soviet position on Vietnam and the Middle East, and Moscow can expect to receive Chilean backing on a variety of international issues. Not least, the Allende government's closing of three small US military posts in Chile has bolstered the Soviet propaganda campaign for the elimination of all US bases in Latin America.

To date, all these gains have cost the USSR nothing and have required no involvement on its part. In view of Soviet preoccupations elsewhere, Chile's geographic remoteness, and the delicacy of Chile's internal political situation, Moscow would doubtless prefer to see this state of affairs last a long while. Yet it may find it impossible to maintain the posture of sympathetic bystander for long, given the relatively precarious position of the UP regime.

Soviet sources, for example, have been emphasizing that the UP faces "great difficulties," and they perceive a variety of threats. The Soviet media have quoted Allende and Corvalan as saying that Chile's "progressive" forces have not consolidated their power completely, since they lack control of Congress, and that the revolutionary process has not yet become "irreversible." "The greatest battles," one Soviet article observed, "are still ahead." [42] Soviet commentaries claim to have discerned growing terrorism and economic sabotage by rightist elements and have expressed concern at the "provocative activities" of extreme leftist groups, especially the instigation of illegal land seizures by peasants. These undertakings, Moscow seems to feel, could give rise to an increasingly chaotic situation, which in turn could justify military intervention.[43] It is worth recording that Régis Debray, the French revolutionary captured during Che Guevara's debacle in Bolivia and recently released by the La Paz government and expelled to Chile, has stated that "many comrades stress the possibility of a military coup in Chile." [44]

[37] *Izvestia*, Oct. 24, 1970.

[38] *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1971.

[39] *The New York Times*, Oct. 3, 1970; *Pravda*, Nov. 16, 1970; Jan. 26, 1971, and Jan. 27, 1971; *The Miami Herald*, Feb. 14, 1971.

[40] Radio Moscow, Jan. 8, 1971.

[41] *E.g., ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1971.

[42] Korionov, *loc. cit.*

[43] See *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 19 and 23, 1971; Zorina, "Chili: pobeda narodnovo edinstva," *loc. cit.*, p. 86.

[44] *Latin America* (London), Jan. 8, 1971. In the interview, it should be underscored, Debray asserted that he himself was "more inclined to think that at present the greatest danger would be 'bourgeoisification' [of the Chilean regime] from within."

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The Soviets have implicitly recognized, too, that differing views within the UP about the rate of transformation of Chilean society not only threaten the cohesion of the coalition but also might eventuate in the government's premature adoption of more radical policies which could endanger its survival. Moscow has been exhorting the UP to maintain and strengthen its unity, and it has been trying to expand its own ties with the CPCh's major partner and potential "radicalizer," the Chilean Socialist Party. In January 1971, Sh. R. Rashidov, a candidate member of the Soviet Politburo, attended the Socialists' 23rd Congress and indicated that "recently, ties between the CPSU and the Chilean Socialist Party have been significantly broadened and strengthened." [45] Soviet leaders then invited a Chilean Socialist delegation to the 24th Congress of the CPSU in March-April 1971.[46]

Possible Soviet Aid Burden

By far the most likely way in which Moscow might become more deeply involved in Chile would be as a supplier of economic and perhaps military aid. At present, the Soviet economic role in the nation is minimal. Chile does not trade much with the USSR, and it still has not used the $55 million in credits that the Soviets extended to the Frei administration in 1967. The Allende government, to be sure, now apparently intends to draw upon some of these credits for the purchase of machinery and for the development of the port of Valparaiso. Moreover, it might decide to revive earlier plans for the construction, with Soviet assistance, of a copper-rolling plant, a lubricant plant, and a factory for prefabricated houses.[47] Even so, the importance of the USSR to the Chilean economy would not change dramatically.

At the same time, Moscow plainly realizes that the improvement of Chile's economic situation and the implementation of the UP program will require huge amounts of capital from abroad. For instance, a mid-1970 Soviet survey of the country's economy during 1969 painted a rather bleak picture of the economy's current condition and immediate prospects, and the summary emphasized the need for large foreign investments, including some $767 million to raise copper production.[48] Should Chile's economic problems worsen and the total inflow of Western—not just US—capital decline, Santiago may well turn to Moscow for help.

As far as military aid is concerned, Chile currently receives none whatsoever from the USSR. But as Allende maneuvers to achieve firm control over the armed forces, his government may deem it desirable to obtain some form of military assistance from the Soviets.

That the Allende government will seek major new economic and military aid commitments from the USSR, we must hasten to acknowledge, is by no means a foregone conclusion.[49] Indeed, some factors tend to militate against such a step. Though the participation of the CPCh in the UP regime provides the Allende administration with special claims on Moscow's resources, the other partners in the coalition may hesitate to agree to calling on the Soviet Union for significant assistance since the grant of such assistance could well augment the leverage which the Communists already exercise within the Unity Front thanks to their capability to act as intermediaries with Moscow. Furthermore, Allende—like the Soviets—does not want Chile to burn its bridges to the United States or to preclude investments from other capitalist countries such as France, West Germany, and Japan, and he has to consider the possibility that the solicitation of large amounts of Soviet aid for Chile might have adverse consequences in this regard.

If Allende should request a big increase in Soviet involvement in Chile, however, the Kremlin would find it hard to say "no." It obviously hopes to avoid a repetition of its expensive Cuban experience, but it could hardly refuse material support to a regime which it advertises as a model for other Latin American nations to emulate, and which it hopes will be a cornerstone of the anti-imperialist edifice that Moscow is trying to build in the area. Nor could it easily rebuff requests for help from the CPCh, whose record as one of the oldest and most loyal Communist parties in Latin America gives it far greater leverage on the USSR than Cuba's *Partido Socialista Popular* (Popular Socialist Party) ever enjoyed.

[45] *Pravda*, Jan. 30, 1971.
[46] *Ibid.*, March 31, 1971.
[47] *El Siglo*, Nov. 29, 1967.
[48] "Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie kapitalisticheskikh i razvivaiushchikhsia stran, obzor za 1969 g. i nachalo 1970 g." (The Economic Position of the Capitalist and Developing Countries, Survey for 1969 and the Beginning of 1970), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 157-58.
[49] In an interview on Moscow television on Feb 28, 1971, the Chilean President did indicate that his country needed Soviet aid and technical cooperation, but he did not go beyond a vague, general comment. TASS International, Feb. 28, 1971.

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To sum up, then, the Soviets have not ignored the potential risks and costs that the emergence of a Marxist regime in Chile holds for them, but they appear to have concluded that, on balance, the advantages outweigh the possible disadvantages. They do not, in other words, expect a replay of their misadventures with Cuba and the fickle Fidel Castro. Nevertheless, they recognize that they will have to exploit the opportunities before them with judiciousness and delicacy in order not to endanger the cohesion of the UP or spark a strong internal reaction—and perhaps even US counteraction.

Yet the Soviet leaders have in truth had little choice but to adopt such an optimistic position. Whether they wish it or not, the fact that a "revolutionary" regime has taken power in Chile and claims to be marching on the road to socialism almost unavoidably commits them to its support. This is all the more true because of their frequent reminders to Latin Americans that the "guarantee of successful development of the national liberation movement in Latin America is . . . [its] close ties with the world socialist system." [50]

Communist China's Attitude

Turning now to the other Communist great power, one finds that, as was to be expected, Peking's response to the success of the Popular Unity Front has been more restrained than Moscow's. In fact, the very prospect of the victory of the Allende forces confronted the Chinese with a dilemma. On the one hand, Peking disapproved of the Unity Front for a variety of reasons. The Front proposed to attain power by the "peaceful road" that Moscow endorses, rather than through the armed struggle and "people's war" that Peking advocates; and it did not include any of the pro-Chinese splinter groups of the Left. In addition, the CPCh—one of the mainstays of the Allende coalition—had since 1963 carried on a polemic with the Chinese Communist Party and had accused it of promoting splits within the ranks of the CPCh. On the other hand, the Chinese, who have a substantial history of dealing with regimes of which they do not exactly approve, could see considerable benefits accruing to them from correct relations with the Chileans. They were particularly interested in maintaining and, if possible, expanding trade with Chile. Ever since 1959, they had been importing Chilean copper and nitrates in growing volume, and they had established a commercial mission in Santiago in 1965 in order—among other things—to further mutual trade.

Under the circumstances, then, it is not surprising that the Chinese at first displayed a decided reserve. Until the eve of the vote in the National Congress in late October, the Chinese media paid no attention to the elections. Thereafter, they carefully refrained from characterizing Allende or the Popular Unity Front as either "socialist" or Marxist, and from conceding that Chile had embarked on the road to "socialism." The first comments appeared in Communist newspapers in Hong Kong, and these pointedly employed the phrase "described as a Leftist" in referring to Allende.[51] They further played down the importance of Allende and the Front by noting that the "progressive forces" in Chile were uniting in opposition to the United States and that the elections were "relatively important" for Latin America as a whole. A later article mentioned that US propaganda portrayed Allende as a "Marxist-Leninist leader and his future regime as a Communist regime," whereas in reality "he is only a candidate of the Popular Unity." [52]

By the end of the year, however, the overt condescension had disappeared. On October 28, Chou En-lai sent a congratulatory message to Allende in which he expressed not only Peking's support for the Chilean people's struggle against US domination, but also Communist China's hope for "new development" of the "militant" friendship between the two peoples.[53] A Chinese labor delegation attended Allende's inaugural ceremonies in November at the invitation of the Unified Center of Chilean Workers. Subsequently, the Chinese registered approval of those elements of his program and policies which were directed against the United States and designed to strengthen Chile's "independence," though they ignored other aspects of the proposed domestic reforms.[54] They did not, however, single out Chile for special comment or praise and treated Allende's victory as just one illustration of a general upsurge of nationalism and struggle against the United States in Latin America.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries on January 6, 1971, which was preceded by the visit to China of a Chilean delegation headed by a member of the Socialist Party's Central Committee, led Peking to wax some-

[50] See, for instance, Korionov, *loc. cit.*

[51] *Hsin Wan-pao*, Oct. 23, 1970; *Ta Kung Pao*, Oct. 24, 1970.
[52] *Hsin Wan-pao*, Oct. 30, 1970.
[53] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), Oct. 28, 1970.
[54] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Dec. 1, 1970.

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what more expansive. An editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) on January 7 spoke of the opening of a "new chapter" in Sino-Chilean relations and recalled that Allende had visited China in 1954 and had since then done "a great deal" to promote friendship between the two countries. It likewise asserted that the "struggles of our peoples have always supported each other."

Chinese sources have avoided drawing from the developments in Chile any lessons for revolutionary strategy in Latin America other than to contend that these happenings demonstrate once again that the United States is a "paper tiger." [55] But neither have Chinese commentaries said anything about a need to radicalize the new regime and its policies or about the activities of the extremist groups of the Left and the land seizures that these groups have spurred. Evidently, the Allende government will have Peking's friendly—albeit not very enthusiastic—approval so long as it pursues policies against "US imperialism," supports China's admission to the UN, and remains interested in expanding trade with China.

Problems and Prospects

Although Allende has made a start toward redeeming UP pledges, a number of difficult problems confront him in this task. His administration, to begin with, inherited a growing economic crisis. Chile's output of copper had been falling.[56] Industrial and agricultural productivity had decreased, and unemployment had shot up. There had been a flight of foreign and domestic capital as well as of technicians from the country, particularly after Allende's victory in the balloting of September 1970.

Just maintaining a viable economy under these circumstances presents formidable obstacles. After emphasizing that the main problem confronting the regime is unemployment, Luis Corvalan recently admitted: "Some measures have been taken, but there have been obstacles: some legal, others bureaucratic, and still others—why not say so?—due to a lack of understanding about how to start." [57]

To compound the difficulties, the government must acquire the financing for its ambitious program of internal reforms. In the short term, the likelihood of its doing so solely through the use of internal resources appears small—which suggests considerable foreign funds will probably be necessary. But further nationalization of American properties in Chile and other aspects of the UP program could lead to a heightening of tension with the United States and hence to an attendant loss of potential investments and aid from this source. In that event, Allende might have little recourse but to look to the USSR for major assistance. Such a decision, in turn, could further sharpen conflict with Washington and have an additional deleterious effect on the inflow of investment from the West.

Allende must also cope with conflicting pressures from different sectors of Chilean society with regard to the extent and rate of reform. That society appears even more polarized today than it did under President Frei—a development occasioned in part by the new administration's initial efforts to implement the UP program. Perhaps the greatest danger that such a state of affairs creates for Allende is that the expectations of the less privileged segments of society may run ahead of his government's ability to fulfill them. Recently, for example, Corvalan saw fit to exhort the workers that "the working class should realize that its problem is not just obtaining satisfaction of its immediate demands but the success of the government." [58]

In this connection, the role of the opposition parties assumes great importance. Because Allende is publicly committed to carry out his program within the framework of the existing political system, the composition of Congress has up to now slowed down the tempo of reform.[59] This situation has, it is true, allowed the regime to blame the opposition for the government's failure to move faster. In January 1971, for instance, Carlos Altamirano, the new secretary-general of the Socialist Party, wrote that Allende faced mounting hostility from "traditional reactionary sectors" as well as the Christian Democrats and that this was manifesting itself "at the level of congressional politics in the fact that bills are being obstructed with impunity and on the economic level in an economic boycott." [60] Nevertheless, the deliberate pace of reform may provide the violence-prone extreme Left with further justification for violence, and any trend toward violence

[55] NCNA, Dec. 26, 1970; *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Jan. 23, 1971.

[56] By the first two months of 1971, according to one report, Chile's deliveries of copper were running 20 percent below the level of its commitments. See *The New York Times*, March 12, 1971.

[57] Prensa Latina report, Jan. 26, 1971.

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] Parliamentary elections will not take place until 1973. Therefore, Allende must deal with a Congress in which his supporters are in the minority. While he could force a national plebiscite on a major measure if Congress refused to pass it, he is not likely to risk such a plebiscite, especially since his plurality in the 1970 elections was rather slim.

[60] *Punto Final* (Santiago), Supplement, Jan. 5, 1971, pp. 9-12.

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—whether stemming from the Right or the Left—increases the chance of intervention by the armed forces.

Another crucial problem before Allende is insuring the stability of the Unity Front. Strains have been evident on a number of issues. Conflicts seem to have occurred over the distribution of major and minor posts in the government. Although Allende has reiterated the equality of all parties within the coalition, the Socialists and Communists monopolize the key offices.[61] Both the traditional rivalry between the Socialists and Communists and their competition for a dominant position within the regime remain a source of tension. Leaders of the Socialist Youth, for example, have been critical of the Communist Youth for using peace symbols in their paintings. "This is very dangerous for the ideological fortitude of the workers," the Socialists claim, "since it makes them psychologically fear violence and it introduces an element of deception by teaching that the workers won economic and political power when actually we have only gained the seat of government." [62] Moreover, speaking in January 1971 about the upcoming municipal elections in April, Allende complained that "there was no agreement that wherever we win there will be a UP mayor," and he warned that "we cannot allow ourselves to be guided by certain less important factors that could lead to placing a specific party above the others." [63] As we have mentioned before, there are also disagreements within the UP over the rate at which reforms should proceed. The majority of the coalition at present appears to back Allende's moderate tempo, but significant factions within the Socialist Party and MAPU are pressing for radical change and seem to sympathize with some of the tactics of the MIR and the *Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo* (Organized People's Vanguard), particularly the illegal seizure of land by farmers.[64] And the CPCh's close ties with a major foreign supporter are causing uneasiness among the other parties.

The real test of the Allende government obviously still lies ahead, for it has not yet attempted to implement the more far-reaching elements of the 1970 UP platform. In this respect, the outcome of the 1973 congressional elections will be critical. If the UP succeeds in obtaining control of the National Congress, the coalition will have sufficient leverage to make feasible the acceleration of reforms within the democratic system. However, if the composition of the Congress does not alter noticeably or takes on a more pronounced anti-Allende coloration, the ability of the UP to carry out its promises peacefully will be in serious doubt.

In its efforts to redeem its campaign pledges, the Popular Unity regime can probably count on at least moral support from both the Soviets and Chinese, but since the success of these endeavors would tend to uphold Moscow's, and not Peking's dicta regarding the path to socialism in Latin America, the USSR's backing is likely to be far more enthusiastic than China's. It remains to be seen whether the attitudes of either will affect the path of the Allende government.

Thus, it is too early to judge the probable course of the regime. One thing can safely be said, however. The great challenge confronting the UP is whether it can transform Chilean society and at the same time preserve the country's democratic system.

[61] In the Cabinet, for instance, the Socialists hold the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Housing, and (most important) Interior, and the Communists have those of Labor, Finance, and Public Works. The Radicals control those of Defense, Education, and Mining. Independent Marxist Pedro Vuskovic Bravo is the Minister of Economics, and MAPU's Jacques Cholchol is Minister of Agriculture. The Social Democrats hold the portfolios of Health and of Land Reform, while the API has that of Justice.

The need of all parties to provide their respective supporters with jobs, incidentally, has had the effect of expanding the already large Chilean bureaucracy and accelerating nationalization schemes.

[62] *Punto Final*, Jan. 5, 1971, pp. 12-13.

[63] Chile Domestic Radio, Jan. 9, 1971.

[64] The VOP is a violence-prone group made up primarily of workers. More intellectual in complexion, the "Miristas" have constituted themselves the "conscience of the revolution" and, through their activities, are pressuring the government to step up its undertakings in the realm of agrarian reform.

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Political Traditions and Perspectives

By Luis E. Aguilar

In September 1970, after a heated campaign which attracted considerable world attention, Socialist Salvador Allende, backed by a leftist Popular Unity coalition including the Communist Party, won a plurality in the national presidential election in Chile. The ensuing month, the Chilean Congress upheld his victory at the polls, and in November, he became the first elected Marxist head of state in the Western hemisphere.

Since his installation in office, his Popular Unity government has effected a number of major changes in official Chilean policies. It has established diplomatic relations with Communist China and Cuba. It has assumed control of several business and industrial firms, and it has taken initial steps to nationalize the copper industry. Although it has not yet succeeded in persuading the Chilean National Congress to approve a complete nationalization of the banking system, it has been purchasing shares in private banks in an attempt to acquire dominance over them. It has pushed hard for the creation of neighborhood "people's" courts, and it has heralded a vast program of other internal reforms.

Nevertheless, the new administration has thus far behaved in fairly moderate fashion. Despite some harsh declarations in the Popular Unity electoral platform,[1] the regime has not repudiated Chile's hemispheric commitments, which among other things tie the country to the inter-American defense system created by Washington. Nor has it translated its general anti-imperialist rhetoric into a direct attack on the United States. Allende himself has emphatically insisted that Chile is not copying any foreign model but only blazing its own independent road to socialism.[2] To underscore his nationalistic stand, he has given public assurances that his government "will never provide a military base that might be used against the United States. Chile will never permit her territory to be used for a military base by any foreign power—by anybody." [3] At home the regime has imposed no restrictions on the freedom of its political opponents to speak and act, and it has sought to discourage rash popular conduct, such as illegal land seizures.

Whether this state of affairs will continue, however, remains a moot question, and the great cloudiness of the immediate outlook has given rise to much speculation about Chile's future. No one, of course, can foresee with certainty what the political results of this dramatic period in Chilean history will be, but in order to grasp the real possibilities that exist, it is essential to understand several factors, both historical and contemporary, which enter into the picture.

The Democratic Tradition

To begin with, Chile has a strong tradition of constitutionalism and democratic procedure. It boasts political institutions which, though by no means unchanging or entirely immune to temporary eclipses over the decades, have existed for nearly 150 years and have weathered heavy storms along the way. Moreover, its political processes have adhered to

[1] The platform stated: "The position of active defense of Chile's independence implies the denunciation of the OAS in its present form, as an agency and instrument of North American imperialism, . . . and the rejection of every treaty which limits our sovereignty, especially the mutual assistance treaties with the US." *Programa Basico de gobierno de la Unidad Popular*, 4th ed., Santiago de Chile, 1970, pp. 23-24.

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[2] In particular, he has repeatedly rejected parallels between Chile and Cuba. See, for example, the interview published in *Indice* (Madrid), No. 280-81, Dec. 15, 1970, p. 14.

[3] *The New York Times*, March 28, 1971.

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the democratic principle despite a few passing aberrations.

Because of its small, peculiar territory and relatively homogeneous population,[4] Chile, unlike most Latin American republics, was spared a long period of turmoil following its attainment of independence in 1829. After four years of instability, the young nation, under the influence of a conservative but pragmatic leader, Diego Portales (1793-1837), proclaimed a constitution which regularized political life. Hewing to the spirit of the Spanish colonial model, this document made the executive almost omnipotent; however, it also provided for an elected President and an elected Congress.

No changes of government in violation of constitutional provisions occurred until 1891, and even then, the overthrow of Juan Balmaceda's administration took place in the name of constitutionalism. When Balmaceda promulgated certain measures designed to curb the power of the oligarchy who then ran the country and controlled the Congress, his actions brought charges that he had exceeded his legal authority and touched off an insurrection. After a short civil war, he was ousted, and the nation reverted to its democratic habits. The episode nonetheless brought about a dramatic shift in the constitutional balance, for it ushered in a period of congressional supremacy over the executive, known in Chile as the period of the "parliamentary republic" or, perhaps more accurately, of "the aristocratic fronde." [5] And this reversal helped to set the stage for the only major departure from constitutionalism in Chilean history.

From 1891 on, factional conflict in Congress virtually paralyzed governmental and legislative activity, and with the onset of an economic crisis after World War I, popular discontent with the parliamentary system soared. In 1920, Arturo Alessandri was elected president on a platform of reform; yet, once in office, he could not cope with an unyielding Congress. The result of the deadlock was military intervention. Alessandri managed to regain his position briefly in 1925 and introduced a new constitution (fundamentally still operative today) which greatly strengthened the powers of the executive, but the next year he lost his authority to the lone dictator in Chilean history, General Carlos Ibanez.

At that, the Ibanez regime did not survive for long. The economic crisis of 1929-31 hit Chile with unusual severity,[6] and inflation, unemployment, and growing political unrest thoroughly discredited military rule and eventually toppled the general from power in 1931. After a year of anarchy which witnessed the proclamation of an ephemeral "socialist republic," [7] the country returned to the constitutional path in late 1932 with the election of Arturo Alessandri as president once again. It has not forsaken that road since—even though ex-dictator Ibanez managed to capture the presidency in the 1952 balloting. Not only did he honor the constitution throughout his administration, but he also made no effort to hang on to his office at the expiration of his term in 1958.

Over the years since 1833, the Chilean political system has also shown a considerable capacity to adjust to the emergence of new social and political forces. The restricted franchise of the nation's original constitution placed political power in the hands of the landed aristocrats who had controlled the economy since colonial times, and throughout the remainder of the 19th century the aristocratic landowning, mining, and banking interests—the so-called oligarchy—and their political instruments, the Conservative and Liberal parties, dominated the political scene. During the latter part of the century, however, the political elite began to expand to include a growing and ambitious group—the urban bourgeoisie. Pressure from this group was in no small measure responsible for the reforms that enhanced

[4] The country is only a narrow strip of land between the Andes and the sea. This geographical feature tended to facilitate centralized rule and discourage challenges to the ruling authority. Communications were good enough to enable the central authority to concentrate troops swiftly to deal with a budding insurrection, and rebels had no remote sanctuaries to which they could retreat if defeated.

Spanish invaders had pushed the fiery Araucan Indians to the south quite early, and the great bulk of the Chilean population in the populated heartland was of fairly uniform *mestizo* stock.

[5] This phrase, which harks back to the parliamentary and aristocratic rebellion in France during the days of Cardinal Jules Mazarin in the 17th century, was popularized by Alberto Edwards in his book, *La fronda aristocratica*, Santiago, Editorial del Pacifico, 1962. The first edition of the work appeared in 1924.

[6] There are economists who maintain that Chile has never fully recovered from that crisis. See, for instance, Anibal Pinto Santa Cruz, *Chile un caso de desarrollo frustrado*, Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1962, pp. 107-09.

[7] On June 4, 1932, during the turbulent period that followed Ibanez's departure, a group of military men and civilians led by Colonel Marmaduke Grove, Carlos Davila, and Eugenio Matte executed a coup d'etat against President Estaban Montero (Ibanez's successor) and announced the creation of a "socialist republic," but general chaos, widespread opposition, and the regime's own internal division quickly brought about its collapse. Twelve days after its establishment, Davila displaced the junta and set up a new, more conservative government. Nonetheless, the latter, according to Federico Gil, did not rescind all the decrees of its "socialist" predecessor. See Gil's *The Political System of Chile*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966, p. 61.

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PLAYING BY THE RULES

We Chileans are proud of having managed to choose the political path instead of violence. . . . We have always preferred to solve social conflicts with the resources of persuasion, with political action. We Chileans reject in the deepest part of our conscience fratricidal struggles, but without ever renouncing the duty to secure the rights of the people. . . .

My government will respond to this confidence [the popular will] by keeping the democratic tradition of our people true and solid. . . .

—Salvador Allende's inaugural address, broadcast from Santiago, Nov. 5, 1970.

the stature of the legislature within the constitutional structure after 1871.

By the close of World War I, other elements as well had commenced to articulate vigorous political demands. As early as 1912, for example, a proletarian party had come into being with the formation of the Socialist Workers' Party (to be reconstituted as the Communist Party in 1921), and at the war's end it already enjoyed substantial support among members of the working class. Far from oblivious to the mounting discontent of the proletariat and peasantry, Arturo Alessandri courted these disadvantaged lower classes—the "beloved rabble," as he called them—with an anti-oligarchic program in the 1920 presidential campaign. Their backing played a major part in his victory.

The advent of the Ibanez dictatorship stifled normal political expression for a time, but the restoration of constitutional rule in the early 1930's soon produced a dramatic demonstration of the political clout that non-oligarchical forces had acquired. In 1938, Radical candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda, backed by a Popular Front coalition of the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties, won the presidential election.

Fundamentally, this development marked the full-fledged blossoming of middle-class rule in Chile. The Communists chose on principle not to participate directly in the government, and while the Socialists obtained a few minor cabinet posts, the Radicals reserved patronage almost exclusively for themselves. Originally founded by militantly anti-clerical intellectuals and oligarchs in 1863, the Radical Party had by the 1930's evolved into a party of white-collar workers, schoolteachers, small industrialists, and farmers.[8] Moreover, the administrations of Aguirre Cerda and his Radical successor, Ivan Antonio Rios (also elected with Popular Front support) responded essentially to the middle class. They helped to foster industrialization and undertook to improve and enlarge the school system, but they did not institute the sweeping social reforms for which the lower classes were agitating.[9]

After World War II, however, the most disadvantaged sectors of Chilean society exerted a growing impact in the Chilean political arena. By 1964, urban workers and shantytown dwellers recently arrived from the countryside were able to play a crucial role in the victory of Eduardo Frei, a reformist Christian Democrat, in the balloting for president.[10] And in the 1970 presidential election, the lower classes constituted Allende's main source of popular strength.[11]

To sum up, then, a commitment to legalism and democratic norms runs deep in the Chilean political culture, and whatever the deficiencies of the established political system, it has not discredited itself by wholesale inefficiency or corruption. Indeed, groups dissatisfied with various conditions in the country have enjoyed substantial leeway to voice their discontent and to press for redress of their grievances. These things together create a pattern of anticipations which acts as a powerful constraint upon Allende's new Popular Unity government.

The Socialist Tradition

For another thing, the Chilean Left can be said to have exhibited in the course of its development two striking characteristics of importance in the present context. One is a distinctly pragmatic bent which has its roots in the way in which Marxism sprouted in Chile.

While, in other Latin American nations such as Argentina, radical members of the bourgeoisie or the intellectual community first embraced Marxism and then called upon the workers to fight under their direction, in Chile Marxism gained its initial converts in labor circles struggling to find doctrines

[8] Ernst Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile,* Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1965, pp. 36, 48; Sergio Guilisati Tagle, *Partidos politicos Chilenos,* Santiago, Editorial Nassimiento, 1964, pp. 129-81.

[9] Halperin, *op. cit.,* p. 32.

[10] For a discussion of breakdowns of the 1964 vote, see Federico Gil and Charles J. Parrish, *The Chilean Presidential Election of Sept. 4, 1964,* Washington, D.C., Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1965.

[11] For a brief analysis of the 1970 election in regional and social terms, see Luis Vitale, *Y despues del 4, que?,* Santiago, Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1970, pp. 41-44.

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which defended their cause.[12] Among these people, commitment to the interests of labor preceded their commitment to Marxism. The life of Luis Emilion Recabarren (1876-1924) affords a good illustration. Achieving prominence as a labor organizer and leader in the north, he first joined the Democratic Party. Then, in 1912, he broke away from that organization to form the Socialist Workers' Party. Finally, in 1921, he was instrumental in bringing about the Socialist Workers' Party's decision to join the Comintern and transform itself into a Communist party.[13] Thus, he passed by stages from labor leader to Marxist politician.

On the whole, the chief preoccupation of the founders of Chilean Marxism was with practical concerns, such as mobilizing the workers, rather than with the theoretical analysis of Chilean conditions and reflection on their own experience. During subsequent years, furthermore, none of the segments of the Marxist Left has generated a body of doctrine adapting Marxism to the concrete realities of the country. On specific issues, it is true, there has been widespread ideological discussion. For instance, much debate about the possibility and merits of a peaceful path to power took place in Chile throughout the 1960's. Yet such verbalizing has essentially grown out of and mirrored controversies of a global or broad international nature like the Sino-Soviet conflict, and in any event it does not add up to a coherent theory of revolution specifically tailored to Chile. Hence, in spite of some isolated efforts at theoretical analysis, emphasis has remained on the advocacy of concrete programs.

As a result, the Chilean Left has displayed great flexibility and a tendency to improvise in its political behavior. The history of the present Socialist Party provides the most striking examples. Founded in 1933 by individuals who had never belonged to the Communist Party but were nonetheless displeased with the Communists' leadership of the working class, the Socialist Party at the outset took a strong anti-Communist line, and within a year or so after its birth, it had established itself as the principal party of the Chilean working class on this basis. Yet, in 1938, the Socialists entered into a Popular Front promoted by the Communists. After collaborating with the left-of-center, democratic Radicals from 1938 to 1946, the bulk of the Socialists threw their weight behind the candidacy of Carlos Ibanez, the former Chilean dictator and a personal friend of Argentinian dictator Juan Peron, in the 1952 presidential election. However, soon disillusioned with Ibanez and Latin American "fascism" in general, the Socialists then embraced Titoism and in 1958 looked once again to the Communists as allies. Though the renewed Soviet-Yugoslav break in June 1958 occasioned a sharp dialogue between the Socialist and Communist parties over Titoism, the two remained allied. Nor did the Socialists' waning interest in Titoism and fascination with Castroism after 1960—a drift which shifted their position from the right of the Communist Party to its left—cause them to pull out of the coalition.[14]

The record of the Communist Party yields similar illustrations even though the Communists have not demonstrated the independence of foreign pressures that the Socialists have. For instance, while the Communist Party did not abandon its post-1924 tactics of isolated struggle and condemnation of all other leftist political groups until after the 1935 Comintern Congress adopted a Popular Front line, the party showed a good deal of pragmatism in pursuing its new course. In 1938, when the Communists were urging a professedly "anti-fascist" Popular Front, they gave serious consideration to ex-dictator Ibanez as a possible presidential candidate for the Front, and although someone else was finally chosen as the Front's standard-bearer, the latter—with the full knowledge of the Communists—solicited the endorsement of Ibanez and the Chilean Nazi Party, whose support eventually proved vital because of the close vote.[15] Communist actions during the presidential campaign of 1952 provide another good example. Although officially proscribed in 1948, the Communist Party was permitted to function again as a political body after 1949 but still was denied the legal right to take part in elections. In 1952, the Communists at first toyed with the idea of backing the candidacy of Ibanez, who had promised to lift the official ban if elected, but they then decided to join with a Socialist splinter group, which had originally supported the ban, in endorsing Salvador Allende.[16]

[12] During the mid-19th century, some romantic Chilean revolutionaries such as Francisco Bilbao (1823-65) expounded vague socialist ideas, but it was only at the end of the century, after the expansion of the mining industry in the north had given rise to a sizable proletariat, that Marxist agitation appeared in the country.

[13] For a brief and sympathetic account of Recabarren's activities and influence, see Julio Cesar Jobet, *Recabarren: Los origenes del movimiento obrero y del socialismo chilenos*, Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1955.

[14] For a short summary of these twists and turns, see Halperin, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-44.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-46.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

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The other significant characteristic of the Chilean Left is its fragmentation and the stiff and often acrimonious rivalry between its various components for leadership of the working class. As I have mentioned, the Socialist Party came into being because its founders heartily disapproved of Communist policies. Their disapproval grew out of the fact that, after the initial guiding light of the Communist Party, Luis Recabarren, committed suicide in 1924, young hotheads had seized control,[17] and the party had adopted ultra-radical tactics which resulted in its isolation from the main currents of Chilean politics. Holding that the Chilean proletariat was ready for revolutionary battle and that the party was capable of directing the masses in the struggle, the party leadership rejected all alliances with other political groups and even downgraded propaganda and proselytizing activities. According to one account, this attitude went so far that in 1926 the party hierarchy boasted that "we no longer need a mass party, we only need an organization to guide the masses." [18]

Not only did the newly-organized Socialists roundly condemn the Comintern for "its dogmatic position in defending exclusively the interests of the USSR," [19] but they also set about entrenching themselves in Chile's labor unions. Within a couple of years, they succeeded in bringing the majority of the unions under their domination and thus emerged as the chief spokesman for the proletariat.

Ever since, the Socialists and Communists have clashed frequently and bitterly—even when allied. In 1946, for example, they disagreed about the desirability of maintaining the Popular Front, with the Communists in favor and the Socialists opposed. After the Radical candidate won the presidential election that year with Communist (but not Socialist) support, the Communists obtained his approval of a campaign to wrest control of the labor movement from the Socialists, and nearly a year of street warfare between the two parties ensued.[20] Once again reconciled in 1958, they nonetheless engaged in vitriolic exchanges in 1958-59 over Titoism and in 1962-63 over the Chilean Communists' subservience to Moscow and its line.[21]

During the 1960's, still other groups joined the fray. These groups, such as the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, or MIR), attacked the Communist and Socialist parties alike for adherence to parliamentary methods, and they themselves perpetrated sporadic acts of violence.

The Chilean Left, in short, possesses a basically political rather than a revolutionary background and orientation, and it suffers from a certain degree of internal division. These considerations also operate, whether consciously or unconsciously, as restraining factors on the present Popular Unity government.

Other Salient Circumstances

In addition to these well-developed democratic and socialist traditions, there are also a number of specific short-term considerations that have a bearing on the options available to the new regime. In the first place, Allende barely eked out a plurality in the three-cornered presidential race of 1970, and he entered office with the demonstrated support of only 34 percent of the electorate. This backing, moreover, had fairly narrow social limits. He drew his strength from some segments of the miners in the northern provinces, certain rural areas in the center, and some lower-middle-class groups in the cities.[22] To date, his government seems to have focused its propaganda on building up further support among the peasants, the workers, and—if possible—the middle class; and there is some evidence that this effort may be having the desired effect.[23] Nevertheless, the government still lacks a sufficiently strong mandate to launch headlong into a thorough reorganization of society without risking an adverse popular reaction and perhaps endangering its continued existence.

Indeed, mobilizing a majority of the population behind a vast program of social reforms poses manifold problems for the Popular Unity regime, for Allende finds himself the socialist president of a nation already heavily "socialized." In Latin American countries like Peru, a "revolutionary" govern-

[17] During the last two years of Recabarren's life, the young radicals criticized him severely, and as late as 1933, the party still proclaimed "the heritage of Recabarren's ideology is what the party must quickly overcome." Jobet, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[18] Hernan Ramirez Necochea, *Origen y formacion del Partido Comunista de Chile*, Santiago, Editora Austral, 1965, p. 212.

[19] Julio Cesar Jobet, *El Socialismo Chileno a traves de sus congresos*, Santiago, Coleccion Arauco, 1965, p. 29.

[20] Halperin, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-28.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 137-39, 145-55.

[22] Vitale, *loc. cit.*

[23] The impressive gains of the government in the municipal elections of April 4, 1971, in which the Popular Unity forces captured nearly 50 percent of the total vote, have to be viewed with a degree of caution. It is traditional for a recently elected administration to improve its political position in the first election after its comes to power. Frei and the Christian Democrats won the same sort of victory in April 1965.

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ment can seek popular backing for measures to reorder economic and social life merely by pointing to the wretched lot of the masses and the absence of nationalistic legislation, but the same is not true in Chile. The country's social laws are quite advanced, and many of its economic enterprises had already come under partial or total state ownership prior to 1970.[24]

For example, Chile promulgated a Labor Code in 1931, and thereafter laws for the protection of workers multiplied. By the years following World War II, the government was running hospitals and food and clothing stores as part of the social security system, and during the 1950's it made investments to win control of both the largest producer of vaccines and the largest medicinal manufacturer in the country. In 1962, the National Congress passed an agrarian reform law. After the installation of Eduardo Frei as president in 1964, the implementation of reform gathered momentum, and by the expiration of his term of office, the government had settled roughly 30,000 peasant families on expropriated lands.

State involvement in the economy dates as far back as the Ibanez dictatorship, but 1939 witnessed a major increase in the government's role with the creation of the *Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion* (Chilean Development Corporation) or CORFO. As the key mechanism for the planning and promotion of economic development in the country, it enjoyed wide authority, and it was soon intervening in many aspects of the nation's economic affairs. In 1950, a National Petroleum Enterprise, with a monopoly of exploration, development, and refining of petroleum in Chile, also came into being. Then, in 1965, President Frei inaugurated a program for the "Chileanization" of the copper industry (that is, state acquisition of 51 percent of the shares of all copper companies operating in Chile), and by the end of 1969 his undertakings had produced significant results.[25]

It is highly unlikely, therefore, that emotional appeals for complete socialization or for a "national crusade of economic liberation" can alone enable the Allende regime to fashion the popular base that it needs to embark on a total overhaul of Chilean society. The Popular Unity forces must rely in large measure on rational argument and performance in office.

Of consequence, too, is the fact that Allende presides over Chile as the head of an elected government rather than as the leader of a victorious revolution. Hence, not only all the old institutions but also all the non-socialist forces in Chile remain intact. In addition to the oligarchical instruments like the National Party, which represent roughly 20 percent of the electorate, the political opposition includes the Christian Democrats, who still enjoy great popular support. It is possible that some Christian Democratic elements may break ranks and cast their lot with the Popular Unity government (there have been rumors, for example, that Radomiro Tomic, the 1970 Christian Democratic presidential nominee, is willing to cooperate with the regime), but Frei, who has resumed direction of the party, will in all likelihood manage to keep the bulk of the Christian Democrats in opposition.[26] And then there are the armed forces, politically neutral but concerned and watchful at the moment.

Last but not least, the Popular Unity government is a heterogeneous coalition, and the programs of

[24] For a treatment of Chile's social and economic laws and its trend toward a welfare state, see William P. Glade, *The Latin American Economies*, New York, Van Nostrand, 1969, pp. 430-45.

[25] *The New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1969.

[26] Two days before the municipal elections in April 1971, Frei made his first openly political appearance after turning over the presidency to Allende. The Christian Democratic leader harshly criticized the policies of the new administration, and he vowed that he and his party would resist "any form of totalitarianism which anyone attempts to establish in our country." Reuters in Spanish, April 2, 1971.

IN THE LATIN CONTEXT

We very definitely maintain that *each country has its own particular circumstances*, and the tactics that its leaders must employ in order to achieve a popular [people's] victory must, as I have already said, be chosen accordingly. We do not export Popular Unity, but if such a movement springs up in other Latin American countries or on other continents . . ., it will be the responsibility of those peoples and those countries. (Emphasis added.)

—Salvador Allende's address to the 23th Congress of the Socialist Party, Prensa Latina broadcast from Santiago, Jan. 29, 1971.

Our struggle has been not only for Cuba's liberty yesterday and for the building of socialism in Chile today, but . . . also for the continental revolution, the Latin American revolution, which must bring liberty, economic independence, and social peace and progress to the 20 Latin American nations.

—Speech by Carlos Altamirano, Secretary-General of the Chilean Socialist Party, in *Ultima Hora* (Santiago), Jan. 4, 1971, p. 5.

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its component elements do not wholly coincide.[27] It is by no means certain, for instance, that the Radicals—who are considered "reformist" elements by the Marxists—will accede to full "socialization." Moreover, as I have indicated, the Socialists and Communists have engaged in bitter public polemics over policy several times since they entered into alliance with one another in 1958, so a major falling-out between them is not inconceivable. To further complicate the situation, some extreme Left groups such as the MIR remain outside the coalition, and they have been pressing the government to adopt revolutionary measures regardless of existing laws.

These short-run circumstances have the same effect as the nation's democratic and socialist traditions. All, that is, impose severe limitations on Allende's freedom of action.

Possible Paths

In light of the foregoing analysis, it seems reasonable to conclude that the course of Chile's political evolution in the years ahead remains uncertain at this juncture. Essentially, four different possibilities seem to lie open.

1) *The existing democratic order could subsist.* Allende may exploit his legal powers to the maximum to advance the cause of socialism but at the same time carefully avoid provoking a civil war or a military coup by violating the country's established democratic procedures. If this proves to be the case, the Chilean people would have an opportunity, at the end of his presidential term, to decide whether, on the basis of the achievements of his government, they wanted a continuation of his socialist policies. A big victory for the Left in the 1976 presidential election would unquestionably assure Allende a prominent place in Chilean history and give his successor a much wider latitude for action. On the other hand, the holding of a free election in 1976 would entail obvious hazards for the future of socialism in Chile, and Marxists in other parts of the world have normally tried at all costs to forestall the loss of power through electoral defeat. Whether the Chilean Marxists will follow or ignore such precedents no one can say for sure.

2) *"Peaceful" and "legal" socialization could take place.* By broadening and organizing its popular support, by moving cautiously from one obstacle to the next and defending each new step as a necessity born of circumstances (or imposed by the menace of "counterrevolutionary forces" and "imperialism"), the Popular Unity government may gradually obtain control of the labor movement, the press, and all economic resources. With these advantages, it would not have great difficulty in emasculating and silencing the present political opposition. Then it would be well-situated to deal with the Chilean armed forces and eliminate their autonomy. Afterward, it would need merely to proclaim the end of "bourgeois democracy" and the beginning of true "socialist democracy." In all likelihood, however, this general process would impart uniquely Chilean attributes to the polity and society that would finally emerge. Such a course appears to be what the "moderate" elements of the Left (including, perhaps, Allende himself) have in mind.

3) *There could be a turn to "revolutionary socialism."* Forces within and without the Popular Unity coalition have been pushing the regime to adopt drastic measures, and Allende, confronted with strong political opposition, formidable economic problems, and urgent popular demands, might eventually feel compelled to hasten the tempo of reform and disregard his pledges to observe democratic modes. The pressure from inside the coalition stems from elements of the Socialist Party and from the MAPU, the latter composed of ex-Christian Democrats who left the party because of disenchantment with Frei's moderation. However, the pressure from groups which stand apart from the coalition—notably the MIR—poses the graver threat to Allende's current policies. Under the guidance of uncompromising leaders like Luciano Cruz, the "Miristas" have been exhorting the masses, especially the peasants, to take various forms of direct action in violation of existing law, and their agitation has evoked some positive response from the disadvantaged sectors of society. Thus far, the Allende government has denounced illegal undertakings, such as land seizures, without attacking the MIR, but it may not be able to walk this tightrope for long. The "Miristas" may put it on the spot by continuing and even stepping up their activities. While Allende has shown no inhibitions about assailing the Right for resorting to violence, he might decide to switch to a revolutonary approach rather than upbraid the "Miristas" and risk an open break with them, for they could

[27] The government coalition consists of two small political groups, the *Accion Popular Independiente* (Independent Popular Action) or API, and the *Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitaria* (Movement of United Popular Action) or MAPU; a faction of the Radical Party; the Socialist Party; and the Communist Party.

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wind up robbing him of a good deal of his constituency if they instituted outright rebellion against his government.

Whether a "revolutionary socialist" regime could survive the furor of opposition it would almost assuredly unleash is a moot question, but if it did manage to endure, its shape would probably differ considerably from that of a "socialist" regime arrived at through constitutional processes. One likely area of divergence, for example, would be respect for individual rights.

4) *The Chilean military could attempt to seize power by a coup d'état.* Chile's armed forces still have the means to oust the Allende government if they choose to do so, and the regime might trigger such a decision at any time by employing unconstitutional means in an effort to achieve its ends. In a situation where the constitution had been violated, military intervention would not carry the stigma of an anti-democratic "putsch." Once in power, the armed forces could follow either of two lines of action. They could rapidly restore the democratic system, or they could succumb, as their Peruvian comrades-in-arms have, to the temptation of becoming "the instrument of reforms"—reforms carried out with discipline, authority, and order. In view of the Chilean military's record, the first alternative seems the more probable, but one cannot rule out the second.

Both of the first two possibilities, it should be underscored, presume no significant further radicalization of the Left's mainstream. Should this presumption prove incorrect, then one of the latter two possibilities will obtain. On balance, the chances appear substantial that the presumption will prove wrong, for further radicalization of the Left appears likely in view of the intensity of popular hopes and fears and the generally passionate atmosphere that prevails in Chile today. If the radicalization reaches major proportions, the country will venture into exceedingly treacherous waters.

One prediction can be made with reasonable certainty. What the Marxists call the "dialectic of circumstances" will rapidly unveil the profile of the future. Expectations are too high, the political balance too precarious, and the problems too many for ambiguity to persist long.

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Books

The Guerrilleros

By Paul E. Sigmund

RICHARD GOTT: *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America.* London, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1970; and New York, Doubleday, 1971.

THIS IS A LARGE, expensive, handsomely printed and illustrated account of the unsuccessful guerrilla movements in Latin America over the decade that followed the victory of Fidel Castro in 1959. It concentrates primarily on five countries: Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; and it begins and ends with a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the death of Ernesto (Che) Guevara in October 1967. It is the result of several years of research by the author, an English journalist who spent 1967–69 working on the book at the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile.

From the opening discussion of the sinister role of a CIA agent "with sunken piggy eyes and little hair" in Bolivia to the assertion on the last page that the 1968 student rebellions in Paris and Mexico City were the result of a "chain reaction" from the Latin American guerrilla movements, it is clear where the author's sympathies lie. Yet unlike many writers of similar persuasion, Mr. Gott is not optimistic about the future of these movements in Latin America. A central purpose of the book is to explain why they have had so little success.

Mr. Gott advances two principal reasons. (1) The United States, which "controls Latin America as absolutely as any metropolitan power in its relations with its empire" (in Peru?, in Chile?), has employed its vast resources, principally through the CIA and the military aid program, to destroy the guerrilla movements. (2) The US effort would not have been as successful as it was if it had not been for the divisions in the Marxist Left of Latin America, especially the increasing friction between the (mostly Castroite) revolutionaries and the orthodox (Moscow-oriented) Communist parties. In developing these theses, particularly the latter, the author presents detailed accounts of ideological and military developments in the five countries he has chosen and includes extensive documentary material and many photographs which have not hitherto appeared.

He does not, however, really prove his theses—not even with respect to Bolivia, where United States military advisers established a special camp to train Bolivian Rangers in anti-guerrilla tactics, and where we have evidence from Guevara's diary of the lack of support from the Bolivian Communist parties (one oriented toward Moscow, the other toward Peking). For, as Mr. Gott's narrative itself reveals, a crucial factor in Che's defeat was the fact that the peasantry and local residents quickly informed the Bolivian military of the movements of the guerrillas; thus the military was able to encircle the Guevara group in short order and effectively cut it off from possible outside help. Moreover, the guerrilla movement was already isolated and close to defeat by the time the US-trained Bolivian Rangers entered the combat just two weeks prior to Guevara's capture and death.

Mr. Gott's account of Guevara's failure demonstrates that guerrilla efforts against governments considered legitimate by the general population (as distinct from the intellectuals and students) are likely to fail. The defeat of the guerrillas and Castro's victory both really prove what Guevara once called Cuba's "exceptionalism." Batista's nearly total loss of legitimacy in Cuba was not replicated in the cases that the author explores, where, as he admits, neither the peasants nor the urban masses supported the revolutionaries. As events in Southeast Asia have demonstrated, military power is impotent against a well-organized guerrilla movement

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which has a popular following, but in the cases examined in this volume, such support was almost completely lacking. In Bolivia, René Barrientos Ortuno had proclaimed himself successor to the ideals of the 1952 revolution and had built up a genuine peasant following—a fact of which Guevara was apparently unaware. In Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela, the governments possessed the legitimacy born of constitutional democracy—in Venezuela's case, Romulo Betancourt succeeded in establishing a lasting framework of constitutionalism where no other elected president in the history of the country had ever lasted out his term in office.

Yet in Mr. Gott's view, President Betancourt was guilty of "betrayal of the popular movement"; President Barrientos "tried to bring back the pre-1952 men"; and the Peruvian Apristas, who had once "enjoyed the support of the working classes" because they were anti-imperialist and anti-American, later "ran out of revolutionary steam . . . [and] began to think that the United States provided most of the answers to the problems of the country." The last statement is of course the tip-off on the author's attitude toward the democratic reformers. Because they were willing to work with the United States, they could not, by definition, be true supporters of "the popular movement." It is ironical that Mr. Gott's account reveals just how little popular support his revolutionaries received from the people they claimed to represent.

The same kind of anti-American doublethink operates in reverse in Mr. Gott's comments on the case of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia. Because the *Alianza Nacional Popular* (ANAPO), Rojas' political movement in Colombia today, attacks United States domination, Mr. Gott imputes "distinct leftist leanings" (unspecified) to Rojas' rightwing dictatorship of the 1950's and attributes his overthrow by the Liberals and Conservatives to his leftism. This interpretation will come as a surprise to students, workers, and intellectuals whom Rojas persecuted and imprisoned between 1953 and 1957 and who participated in his overthrow.

Yet if its fanatical anti-Americanism is discounted, this book is useful for students of the Latin American Left. It documents—in detail that is not available elsewhere—the internecine struggles among the various Marxist groups in the countries analyzed. Castro's polemic with the Venezuelan Communist Party is treated thoroughly (although his subsequent falling-out with the guerrilla leader, Douglas Bravo, who was the occasion of the controversy, is not mentioned), and so is the often-confusing ideological evolution of the Guatemalan revolutionary movement. The difficulties in luring the urban intellectuals and students into actual combat, and their notorious lack of success when they became involved, are covered in depth. And the attention paid to ideological and organizational divergences between Trotskyites, Maoists, Castroites, and orthodox Communists makes the volume a highly worthwhile source book for scholars—particularly since it gives lengthy extracts from the documents and declarations that the various revolutionary movements have issued and draws on Latin American secondary accounts which are not generally available outside their countries of publication.

The book also shows how far the Latin American revolutionaries have moved away, both in theory and in practice, from the theses propounded by Régis Debray in his *Revolution in the Revolution?*. Since the death of Guevara, we have not seen any new guerrilla *focos* established in the Latin American countryside, while the city has become the center of sporadic terrorist outbursts, pioneered by the Uruguayan Tupamaros. However, the author only alludes to this development in his epilogue, and his book is essentially an historical examination of the failure of an earlier stage in the Latin American revolutionary movement.

While Mr. Gott makes no predictions about the future, his conclusions are predominantly pessimistic. In his opinion, the only lasting result of the Latin American guerrilla movements of the 1960's has been to create in the person of Che Guevara "a political symbol with a worldwide application." Thus far, that symbol has served principally to provide, in the words of another pro-Guevara writer, "a big-brotherly sponsor of shoplifting, smoking pot, passing bad checks, and breaking windows" [1] and to line the pockets of the manufacturers of Guevara posters and banners. It has done little to relieve the human misery or promote social justice in Latin America, and recent events in Peru and Chile seem to have demonstrated that there are more effective ways of achieving those goals than taking to the hills in imitation of Che. For the story of those who did so and an account of their failure, this book is a prime source.

[1] John Womack, Jr., "'El Che' Guevara," *New York Review of Books*, Jan. 28, 1971, p. 8.

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Moscow and Peking in Latin America

By Yale H. Ferguson

J. GREGORY OSWALD and ANTHONY J. STROVER, Eds.: *The Soviet Union and Latin America.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970.

STEPHEN CLISSOLD, Ed.: *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918–68: A Documentary Survey.* London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1970.

ROBERT G. CARLTON, Ed.: *Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History, 1960–1968.* Austin, University of Texas Press, 1970.

CECIL JOHNSON: *Communist China and Latin America, 1959-1967.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.

THESE FOUR VOLUMES, all published in 1970, are useful additions to the scholarly literature on Soviet and Chinese Communist involvement in Latin America. Happily, they complement one another nicely. The first is an anthology of papers presented in Munich in May 1968 at an international symposium sponsored by the Institute for the Study of the USSR. The second is a collection of some 200 speeches, communiques, press reports, etc.—about one-fourth dated prior to World War II—which the editor, Stephen Clissold, has gleaned from numerous Soviet and Latin American sources and put into perspective with a comprehensive introduction. The third, issued under the auspices of the Conference on Latin American History, offers a cross-section of recent writings by Soviet specialists on various aspects of Latin American affairs. The fourth analyzes Maoist ideology as a framework for Chinese activities in the Western hemisphere and also examines in detail Sino-Cuban relations and the evolution of pro-Chinese parties throughout Latin America.

The Oswald-Strover, Clissold, and Johnson volumes will be of interest both to students of the USSR and Communist China and to Latin Americanists, not least because of their in-depth treatment of Cuban policy as a largely independent phenomenon. Indeed, in view of the amount of attention that they devote to the Castro regime, they might better have been titled something like "The Soviet Union (or Communist China), Cuba, and Latin America." The Carlton collection, however, will be of utility primarily to specialists in Soviet affairs. Regrettably, his skimpy editorial commentary fails to identify clearly the Soviet writers to whom he refers or to establish the exact relationship between their views and those of the USSR's political leadership; hence, the book will be of most value to readers knowledgeable enough to do so for themselves.

Clissold's introduction to his own collection and his essay in Oswald and Strover (hereafter referred to as O & S) do not contain any startling new insights, but they do provide a helpful historical survey of Soviet policies. Soviet leaders, he maintains, have generally regarded Latin America as firmly within the United States' sphere of influence and therefore as a region of relatively low priority for the USSR. Nevertheless, recognizing that "even a limited extension of [Soviet] influence in this sensitive area—the proverbial 'backyard' of the United States—might have telling effects," they have not been prepared to write Latin America off entirely.

Clissold reminds us that efforts to extend Soviet influence in Latin America began as early as 1919 and over the years have involved: (a) attempts to establish a pattern of friendly relations—including formal diplomatic ties, cultural exchanges, and trade—with at least some existing governments; and (b) moral and material support for—and ideological dictation to — Moscow-oriented Communist parties. As he points out, the Kremlin's efforts on these two essentially different levels proved incompatible during the interwar period, when (except for a brief "popular front" interlude in the late 1930's, which ended with the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact) Latin American Communists were directed to promote violent revolution in strict isolation from nationalist and reformist groups.

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Because of prevailing domestic conditions, such a posture practically guaranteed political failure for the parties; even more important, it clearly identified the Soviets with the forces of internal subversion and resulted in the rupture of the USSR's newly-established diplomatic links with Mexico and Uruguay. In contrast, Soviet participation in the Allied cause and the abolition of the Comintern during World War II paved the way for diplomatic relations not only with the major Latin American governments (except Argentina) but with lesser ones as well, even the conservative dictatorships in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. Concurrently, many Latin American Communist parties achieved legal status and made more converts by pursuing "popular front" tactics.

Clissold notes that most of the Soviet Union's wartime gains were wiped out after 1945, when Stalin returned to the "hard line" in the context of the Cold War. Nearly everywhere, local Communist parties were again plunged into isolation, and only Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina (post-1946) retained their diplomatic ties with the USSR. Although Moscow gave strong moral support to the Communist-infiltrated Arbenz government in Guatemala during the early 1950's, that regime fell in the face of a US-aided exile invasion in 1954.

THE LATEST ERA in Soviet-Latin American relations opened in the late 1950's with Bulganin and Khrushchev's formulation of the policy of "peaceful coexistence." As the selections in the Carlton collection and essays in O & S by Alberto Faleroni, V. V. Volsky, and Oswald make clear, the application of this policy to Latin America has been grounded in part on a less ideologically-constrained assessment of political and socio-economic realities in the area. Recognizing the prominent position of the "national bourgeoisie" in the structure of Latin American societies, the Russians have demonstrated a willingness to come to terms with "bourgeois nationalist" governments and, in this connection, have urged the *via pacifica* upon Latin American Communists. As Wolfgang W. Berner puts it (in O & S, summarizing an earlier study by Herbert Dinerstein), Soviet efforts "seem now to be concentrated more on intermediate objectives (*e.g.*, on encouraging existing Latin American governments to counteract US economic influence, and to oppose US policies in general) than on ultimate goals." The Russians apparently hope that a gradual lessening of US influence will eventually lead (in Oswald's words) to "socialist industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, and direct financial, technical, and trade relations with the USSR and Soviet socialist bloc nations."

To date, a more conciliatory Soviet approach to Latin America has resulted in the addition (besides Cuba) of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Venezuela to the list of countries with which the USSR maintains formal diplomatic links. Commenting that these links have become a status symbol for Latin American governments, Oswald advances the "impression that the recent Soviet diplomatic inroads . . . have been prompted by a deliberate and enthusiastic decision . . . to seek out and hug the Russian bear, rather than vice versa." On the other hand, he observes, trade initiatives have usually come from the Soviet Union and involved credit grants for purchases of Soviet goods. Most of these credits have gone unused, generally because the items available in the USSR have not been of the type required or have been difficult to service. Nor have the Soviet Union or the East European countries developed significant markets for Latin American goods. For example, José Oswaldo de Meira Penna concludes (in O & S) that Brazil's favorable credit balance vis-a-vis Eastern Europe owes less to the magnitude of the latter's imports of Brazilian commodities than to the barter system, which confines Brazil's purchases to a relatively few useful East European exports. It should also be noted that the Soviet bloc has furnished Latin American governments—outside of Cuba—negligible aid unrelated to trade.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE Castro regime, through what Clissold describes as "a stroke of fortune, rather than design," confronted Soviet leaders early in the the "peaceful-coexistence" period with the two related problems of how much support to give the Cuban revolution and how to rationalize this support in ideological terms. Clissold stresses that Moscow's response was "cautious," but he details the rapid extension of political, economic, and military commitments to Cuba through 1962. Robert K. Furtak points out (in O & S) that the Soviets initially labeled Fidel Castro's government as a "national democratic state" or "revolutionary democracy"—to indicate that it had "liberated" itself from "American imperialism" to a greater degree than bourgeois nationalist regimes—

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and that they later publicly accepted Castro's characterization of himself and his revolutionary party as "Marxist-Leninist," despite a series of purges of "old Communist" PSP functionaries. However, relations between the USSR and Cuba began to cool in 1962 over the purges, the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis, Cuba's poor economic performance, and Castro's subscription to Ernesto (Che) Guevara's "armed-struggle" line. In the last regard, Cuban and Chinese challenges forced the Soviets to concede that armed struggle might be admissible when all other roads to power are closed —although, as we have noted, Moscow has consistently and vigorously lobbied throughout Latin America for a much less ambitious strategy.

A key theme made explicit in the present works is that Moscow's experience with Castro buttressed the "peaceful-coexistence" policy that had begun to evolve *before* the Cuban revolution, precisely by demonstrating that a Latin American regime's outright conversion to Marxism-Leninism might not be in the best interests of the Soviet Union. Such a development could necessitate the massive diversion of scarce Soviet resources and possibly involve military risks, without, at the same time, guaranteeing either unwavering political-ideological support or the establishment of a "showcase" for the USSR. Berner remarks:

. . . Soviet leaders are likely to be haunted by the almost nightmarish thought that other victorious revolutionary Third World regimes may copy Castro's example and call for Soviet protection.

Likewise, Tad Szulc observes (in O & S):

It may be argued that the Cuban lesson has taught the Soviet Union not only the dangers of geographic over-extension . . . but the economic impossibility of financing every Latin American revolution that may succeed. If Cuba does cost Moscow a million dollars a day, what would be the cost if Brazil had gone the socialist or communist revolutionary way under Joao Goulart in 1964? . . . is it not justified to suppose that the Soviets may have secretly welcomed the fall of Goulart?

THE JOHNSON VOLUME offers a well-documented analysis of Chinese Communist involvement in Latin America. Johnson explains that the Chinese have long been interested in the area as part of the Third World, where they expect protracted conflict against "capitalist imperialism" to be waged. Since China and the Latin American countries are far from natural trading partners and the Chinese have had fewer material resources at their disposal than the Soviets, the Chinese campaign has been primarily one of propaganda. According to Johnson, Peking experienced a surge of optimism and vastly accelerated its efforts in Latin America at the outset of the Cuban revolution, and it profited initially from the possession of an ideology which approximated the armed-struggle line that Guevara propounded. However, as Johnson indicates, Mao's ideological inflexibility and his pretensions to leadership of world communism soon led to a clash with Castro and Régis Debray, the latter arguing vehemently (in *Revolution in the Revolution?*) against Chinese notions of "fixed bases" and the subordination of guerrillas to a "patriotic front" or party. Elsewhere in Latin America, pro-Chinese parties have dissipated their energies in squabbles with pro-Soviet groups and among themselves—thereby neglecting opportunities to establish working relationships with guerrilla bands operating in the countryside. Johnson finds part of the explanation in the Maoist "theory of contradictions," which implies that "compromise with one's rivals is impossible." He states:

. . . the Chinese struggle so intensely against revisionists precisely because they consider the latter as obstacles to be removed so that they can then address themselves to the main task at hand, the elimination of "imperialism" from the world. Admittedly the Chinese may be devoting so much of their time and energy to combatting the "deviationists" in the "short run" that they may never have an opportunity for destroying the "imperialists" in the "long run"!

NEARLY HALF THE ESSAYS in the Oswald and Strover anthology —those by Wolfgang W. Berner, Robert K. Furtak, Boris Goldenberg, Peter Schenkel, Kevin Devlin, and Florence Mamegalos —devote considerable attention to establishing Castro's substantial ideological independence from both parties in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the realm of foreign policy, Castro from 1962 to 1968 periodically reasserted his claim to leadership of revolutionary forces in Latin America with well-timed appeals for armed struggle. This pattern was punctuated by expediential shifts toward the Soviet position, most notably at a Havana conference of Latin American Communist parties in late 1964. On that occasion, the Cubans accepted a communique which recognized the right of each national Communist party to select its own strategy and tactics and condemned "all factionalist activity." Nevertheless, Castro returned to the revolutionary theme with unprecedented enthusiasm in the context of the Tricontinental Conference and the

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First Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference, convened at Havana in January 1966 and July-August 1967, respectively.

Shortly before the Tricontinental gathering, the Cubans for the first time broke openly with the Chinese Communists over China's decision to reduce rice shipments. A month later, Castro accused Peking of attempted "blackmail" and overt propagandizing in Cuba. The second conference coincided with the publication of Debray's book and Guevara's Bolivian venture.

So much for the record to 1968, the last year covered by any of the works at hand. Developments since that time have put a new light on this record, for major alterations in the relationship between Soviet and Cuban policies and in general conditions in Latin America have occurred.

Clissold caught the entering wedge of still another shift in Cuban foreign policy by including as the last document in his collection Castro's speech of Aug. 22, 1968, which expressed support for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Thereafter, Castro appeared to draw closer both to the Soviet Union and to Latin America as he muted the armed-struggle line, commented favorably upon the expropriations and reforms instituted by the Peruvian and Bolivian militaries, and lauded Salvador Allende's victory at the polls in Chile. One can only speculate that Guevara's defeat in Bolivia may have been the final factor in convincing Castro of the inefficacy of additional exhortations to revolutionary violence and that the Cuban regime is currently preoccupied with domestic problems, typified by the disappointing sugar harvest of 1970.

Meanwhile, for all they differ from one another, governments in Peru, Bolivia, and Chile have given anti-capitalist (particularly *foreign* capitalist), radical nationalism a new respectability in Latin America. Schenkel writes: "Castro communism . . . highlights the proliferation of Marxism in a growing variety of shades and brands." A similar statement might be made about the variants of "Marxism" or "socialism" advanced by Juan Velasco Alvarado, Juan José Torres, and Allende. However, "statism" is a better word than either "Marxism" or "socialism" (let alone "communism"!) to describe the new potential models that have arisen on the South American continent —if only to bury forever any suggestion that they are part of some amorphous international conspiracy. More important than the labels attached to these regimes, of course, is the fact that they have created perhaps irreversible warps in what Claudio Véliz has called the "politics of conformity" in Latin America.[1]

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS for future Soviet, Chinese Communist, and Cuban influence? Chinese doctrine seems to have little relevance to the present balance of political forces in Latin America. Moreover, although Mao's thought will undoubtedly continue to hold some appeal for those Latins who remain committed to guerrilla action, Peking has not demonstrated a capacity to capitalize on this appeal. What will follow after Mao's death is anybody's guess. But *if* at least part of Latin America is entering upon a new period of radical nationalism and rapid socio-economic transformation—in most cases short of revolution from below—the Soviets and Cubans may well find the hemisphere environment an increasingly receptive one. Stripped of subversive overtones, their ideological stress on the desirability of structural change and an end to foreign domination will stand them in good stead. Szulc observes:

The impact of the Soviet Union as a national entity has become much more pronounced in recent years as the East-West "Cold War" has diminished in intensity. In other words, the decline of the Communist revolutionary pressure once emanating from Moscow as its foremost source . . . has opened doors to the Soviet Union that hitherto have been almost hermetically closed.

The same may yet prove to be true of Cuba, especially if Castro ultimately succeeds in putting his own house in order.

Enrique E. Rivarola (in O & S) summarizes the current outlook

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[1] Veliz's phrase refers to the general failure of middle-sector groups to implement the "structural" reforms that they had promised before winning power. As he comments, "it became evident that even when these groups attained political power, they did not implement these reforms but rather tried to become integrated into the existing social structure: what looked to some like massive social mobility turned out to be more like institutionalized social climbing." Veliz, Ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 3. According to Veliz, analysts have often overlooked the role of the "centralist state" in the Latin American tradition. This role, paradoxically, both helps to explain why so few reforms have been accomplished (governmental paternalism has discouraged the independent generation and pursuit of demands by deprived social groups) and points to a potential instrument for the achievement of fundamental change (the state in the hands of nonconformist political leaders genuinely committed to reform). Veliz argues that "the time may now be ripe for the centralist state to come into its own [as a reformist instrument], fired with a new nationalism." "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. XLVII, No. 1, October 1968, p. 80.

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with respect to the Soviet Union fairly well:

In the years immediately ahead, the division of the world into ideological blocs will pale in importance beside a far more real and dangerous gulf: that existing between the highly-industrialized countries and the underdeveloped countries with stagnating agrarian economies. . . . If efforts by leading Western countries to combat underdevelopment are not undertaken, or are inadequate, then the role that the West should, by reason of historical affinity, play in Latin America might be partially filled by the Soviet Union, which would thereby act to the benefit of its prestige and of its own economic interests.

In view of what we have said above about the constraints on trade with the Communist world and Soviet aid, one might quarrel with Rivarola's reference to the USSR's "economic interests." But he is altogether correct in linking consideration of "historical affinity" and growing Soviet "prestige."

The central point is not that Latin American governments are likely to embrace much of Stalinist or Cuban economic doctrine (which is not probable) or that the Soviets and Cubans will enter into diplomatic relations with more Latin American countries and attract greater sympathy for some of their own positions on international matters (though they quite probably will). It is that Soviet diplomatic inroads appear to be symptomatic of gradual, deep-seated changes in historic relationships, in particular that between the United States and Latin America. The "Western hemisphere idea" seems to be on the decline again, possibly into near-oblivion this time, as Latin Americans in their drive for development increasingly look elsewhere for—if little else—moral support.

There is a great deal of room for debate whether this trend will inevitably continue and whether it is in the long-range interest of Latin American governments, the United States, or the Soviet Union. However, the trend itself is obviously a matter of the utmost significance.

Power in the Provinces

By Philip D. Stewart

JERRY HOUGH: *The Soviet Prefects.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

JERRY HOUGH'S BOOK on the complex interrelationships of the intermediate echelons of the Soviet party and state hierarchies is one of the most important works on Soviet politics published in the past decade. Although the methodology employed by the author poses some serious problems, *The Soviet Prefects* represents a major advance at both the theoretical and substantive levels.

Hough's contribution to the theory of Soviet politics is twofold. He reveals the inadequacies and oversimplifications contained in the descriptions of Soviet political reality by the "rational-technical" model of Barrington Moore and by the monistic or Weberian model, and he offers a more satisfactory alternative to these models. As developed by Moore, the rational-technical model suggests that ongoing industrialization in the USSR will result in a political system characterized by wide participation of the technical intelligentsia in decision-making, with technical (and, presumably, rational) criteria supplanting political criteria in the resolution of major policy issues. The monistic model, based on Max Weber's "ideal type" of a unified, single, hierarchic command structure with clear lines of command and responsibility, has fostered the assumption by some analysts that the existence of alternative or parallel administrative structures within a single society is necessarily irrational and dysfunctional. Hough argues persuasively that both models oversimplify matters and blind us to the essential functionality of the Soviet system of "dual supervision"—*i.e.*, a system which features two parallel control hierarchies, the party and state apparatuses.

Far from constituting an unnecessary and irrational duplication of the lines of command of the state apparatus, in Hough's model the party apparatus—as exemplified by the regional (*oblast*) party leaders—is the essential ingredi-

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ent in the effective management of the Soviet industrial system. This thesis frontally challenges the widely-held views that the CPSU is essentially parasitic and that the party apparatus is primarily an instrument for establishing and maintaining the political dictatorship of the party leadership.

Hough identifies five major features of his model of "effective developmental administration" in the Soviet Union: 1) broad flexibility in the application of rules throughout the state and party apparatuses, with creativity, initiative and decisiveness highly valued and rewarded; 2) a bureaucracy which is committed to the political objectives of the party leadership; 3) the combination of incentive remuneration and insecurity of office tenure; 4) the "dual supervision" system, which seeks to integrate technical expertise and political leadership; and 5) the "prefect" style of administrative coordination performed by regional first secretaries of the party. Although similar in some respects to other models which depict the Soviet polity as "bureaucratic," Hough's model possesses several distinct strengths. First, it appears to account far more adequately than other models for the role of the party in administration. Second, it is well grounded in Western theoretical writings on bureaucracies. Finally, the model is sufficiently specific to permit further testing and elaboration by other scholars, and it should become a basic component in classroom work and in future textbooks and monographic research.

The substantive contribution which *The Soviet Prefects* makes to the literature on Soviet local politics is also impressive. Based on a careful analysis of thousands of items printed in the Soviet press over three decades (approximately 1938–68) and from scores of personal interviews with Soviet administrators, Hough posits, in addition to the commonly recognized functions of regional party officials (*e.g.*, maintaining political stability, mobilizing the masses, and selecting personnel for responsible posts), two more basic roles of these cadres: 1) verifying the performance of and providing policy guidance to the leaders of all major institutions in the given region, particularly the industrial enterprises; and 2) providing overall horizontal coordination of activities within the region, cutting across the boundaries of various competing vertical hierarchies. Hough claims that the political success of the regional first secretary depends quite directly upon his ability to resolve conflicts and coordinate the economic activities of the given region so as to achieve the major objectives of the state economic plan. It is on this perception that the author bases his analogy between the regional first secretary and the French provincial prefect.[1]

This analogy raises an interesting question: Does the regional first secretary actually have the powers and capabilities to play the "prefect" role Hough ascribes to him? Frankly, the author's findings, which bear directly on the validity of his thesis, are contradictory. What Hough *does* prove is that the Soviet "prefect" can exercise considerable power on some issues, but that this power is far from all-encompassing. The book documents the unending political tension between the economic managers, who see the party's function as expediting the movement of critical supplies and as providing political support to the managers' lobbying for appropriations from the center, and the regional party officials, who resent having to act as *tolkachi* (expediters) and who prefer to restrict their involvement in management to broad policy deliberations concerning technological innovation and overall coordination and planning of appropriations. To support his characterization of the regional first secretary as "prefect," Hough must prove that this party official can be influential in resolving the latter set of policy issues. Yet the author's evidence often shows the regional secretaries at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the economic managers in precisely these matters.

The author states (p. 78) that the economic administrators, as a result of greater technical expertise and more direct access to officials of central ministries and to national leaders, wield formidable power in debates over economic and technological planning. Hough admits (p. 105) that even during the "*sovnarkhoz* period" (the years 1957–64, when industry was administered by numerous regional economic councils—or *sovnarkhozy*—and when, Hough claims, local party organs were better able to influence the decisions of economic managers), party officials "frequently had status and power inferior to those in the industrial organs." Directors of the most prestigious industrial enterprises were more frequently promoted to key positions in the *sovnarkhozy* than to posts in the party appara-

[1] The French prefect is the principal regional representative of the central government. He is responsible for the strict implementation and coordination of national policies in his region or department. The prefect possesses a wide array of powers and is clearly the dominant figure in regional and provisional politics.

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tus. Those managers who were coopted into the party apparatus, on the other hand, usually came from smaller, less prestigious industrial plants. This gave the top industrial administrators of the regions a personal authority which the party secretaries often could not match (p. 69).

Even in the area of promoting technological innovation, Hough admits, the party "prefect" has only limited room for initiative, since any policies requiring allocation of capital funds must have the approval of higher economic bodies (p. 106). In effect, the only major opportunity for the regional secretary to influence policy arises when two or more economic establishments in the given region are vying for the same funds. Hough's sophisticated and detailed analysis of the interrelationship between economic managers and party officials at the regional level goes far toward correcting simplistic conceptions of the party-state relationship. At the same time, it also undermines his image of the regional first secretary as a powerful "prefect."

Turning to the author's methodology, I cannot contest his basic assumption that there is likely to be some correlation between the backgrounds of managers and party officials and their political behavior. But it is another matter altogether to attempt to infer attitudes and rather specific patterns of behavior from biographic data, however comprehensive. Two examples should suffice to illustrate the dangers inherent in such an approach. After surveying the many similarities in educational background and early careers of managers and party officials, Hough concludes (pp. 45–46) that "the reader should be warned against the assumption that the party officials were chosen from among the dynamic, ideologically committed, politically active engineers and that the top industrial managers came from among the more conservative elements, the less dynamic, and less committed." Now, biographic data can shed virtually no light on such a question. Such a conclusion is warranted only on the basis of attitudinal and behavioral data. With equal glibness the author states (pp. 46–47) that the main differences between the capabilities of managers and of party officials is that the former incline to technical expertise while the latter feature skills of the "broker and troubleshooter." Although the point may be valid, there is no evidence in the biographic data to sustain it.

How significant are these substantive and methodological weaknesses to the validity of Hough's thesis? While they unquestionably mar the elegance of his argument, the sheer weight of detailed evidence covering a 30-year time span is sufficient in itself, if not to "prove" conclusively the validity of Hough's model, at least to mark this work as a major achievement in the study of Soviet politics.

The Force of Ideas

By Paul A. Smith, Jr.

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG, Ed.: *In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today.* New York: F. A. Praeger, 1970.

MR. BRUMBERG HAS COMPILED a bible of modern Soviet dissent. It draws upon material initially published in two special issues of *Problems of Communism* in 1968, when he was editor-in-chief of this journal; but he has pruned the items in the issues and added a good deal of new material.

Like all good compilers, Mr. Brumberg is acutely aware—as he confesses in an editorial note—of the dangers involved in admitting some witnesses and refusing others. Fortunately, his long familiarity with the field, his own high editorial standards, and the assistance of a skilled and devoted group of collaborators have served him, and the academic community, well. This is a book—or rather a number of books in one volume—which will render honest service to scholars in several disciplines.

Part I is commentary. In a brief introductory essay, Mr. Brumberg discusses the rise of dissent in the USSR; examines the origins and characteristics of the movement,

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which he indicates has progressed from concern with purely literary questions to involvement in issues of an explicitly political character; defines its grievances, ranging from literary censorship and the lack of freedom of conscience to events such as the occupation of Prague; and speculates on its significance, offering the view that while it poses no real threat to Communist power, it nonetheless represents the most serious moral and ideological challenge that has confronted the Soviet regime to date. Other contributors from the Western academic community provide a dissertation on dissent and the Soviet intelligentsia (Sidney Monas), a critique of socialist legality (Stephen Weiner), a review of dissent in the Ukraine and among other national minorities (George Luckyj), and a look at selected forms of religious dissent, mostly among the Baptists and Russian Orthodox believers (Peter Reddaway).

Part II is documentary. Mr. Brumberg gives us 90 texts with annotations. He has omitted items concerning the Siniavsky-Daniel trial of 1966 since they have been well publicized elsewhere (though their significance is duly noted). The documents included relate to the various Moscow trials of 1967, the Ginzburg-Galanskov trials of 1968, the nationalities problem, religion, writers and censors, Czechoslovakia, Stalinism, and reprisals.

Part III consists of literature from the underground: translations of historical and political essays, literary criticism, short stories, and poetry. The selection is limited but appropriate to the content of the more directly political documentation.

In an appendix entitled "Dissent and Opposition: A New Phase," Mr. Brumberg points to the surfacing, as his work went to press, of additional documents—in particular an appeal to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations; he also calls attention to the continued vitality of an underground journal devoted to civil liberties. Both factors, he feels, indicate that the protest movement may be taking on a more programmatic and organizational form.

The volume concludes with a selection of brief but reliable biographic notes on the dissenters and an identification of the Western contributors. There is no index to the collection as a whole, but its structuring and the generally clean job of editing make the need minimal.

Like the Bible, this is a book primarily created by participants; its massive collection of documents have been written and circulated in the shadow of a secular empire by a determined minority of inspired and stiff-necked nonconformists. Roughly three-quarters of the documents represent the personal testimony of individuals to events and circumstances in their society which they consider incompatible with absolute moral standards. The other quarter consists of works of a literary nature—some primitive and some of considerable power—expressing or commenting on fundamental propositions about the human condition in terms which are clearly at odds with the practices of the existing authorities.

Not all the dissidents are capable of expressing themselves in elegant prose. But neither were the early Christians, whose literary shortcomings did not impair the moral force and ultimate political consequences of their writings. Thus, we would be ill-advised if we were to assume that the impact of modern Soviet dissent would be significantly affected by considerations of style. These are matters in which the message *is* the message—the medium and style are secondary. A compelling parallel is suggested by the magnitude of the Roman and Soviet empires, the pretensions of both to universality, and the demonstrated willingness of Soviet and Christian martyrs to suffer and die in pursuit of ideals incompatible with such pretensions.

The missing element is the messiah. The testimony of religious dissenters in the Brumberg compilation—supported by the commentary of Mr. Reddaway—indicates a more extensive adherence to the fundamentals of Christian revelation than many Western observers have been prepared to concede. But to say that religious faith is still alive in the Soviet Union is not the same as saying that the dissent manifested in support of it, or of secular principles contrary to the regime's ideology, constitutes a force with a potential for disruption comparable to that of Christianity in first-century Rome.

The bulk of Soviet dissent, as reflected in the documents at hand, appears to be directed *against* abuses whose origin lies in the nature of Marxism-Leninism. It is not a vigorous statement *for* any radical, new set of beliefs. Soviet dissenters are either protesting the failure of the modern guardians of the Marxist-Leninist heritage to live up to its ideals, or they are raising issues which cast doubt on its claim to universal validity and absolute infallibility. The dissenters tend, in the main, to appeal in their criticism to the ethical principles derived from the body of Judeo-Christian thought common to both Western and Soviet society. They do not

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assert any radically new perception of ultimate reality and of man's relationship to it. Thus, the evidence we have from the present documents reveals the declining force of an old faith; it does not adumbrate the emergence of a new faith. Those who study the volume for insights into the future of Soviet society and of man's hope for salvation will find the difference significant. If Soviet power is to be challenged successfully, it will be from the base of a new faith or at least from a significant reinterpretation of one of the old faiths. Minor revisions will not suffice.

A critique in such terms of the emerging body of Soviet dissent and nonconformist thought is needed. Mr. Brumberg and his collaborators were probably wise in refraining from this undertaking at the time they went to press. The documents then in hand offered a large body of evidence, but there was obviously much more to come—and it has come. Today, only a year after the present volume went to press, there is at least double the amount of significant new material available in the West, and there is good reason to assume that still more will appear in the years ahead. Hence, an ongoing effort to chart its larger significance is certainly needed.

The Russian people and their Muslim subjects have followed a variety of prophets and messiahs in stages of their history. But neither group has gone for long without following *some* prophet. If Marx and Lenin are dead—and there is now good reason to believe that they are—then the question arises: Who will take their place? One wonders whether the philosophical pragmatism and political practicality of the Anglo-Saxon tradition might have a chance. Many of the dissenters assembled in Mr. Brumberg's volume seem to speak in such terms. If they have a common program, it appears to be constitutionalism. Therefore, one would not want to discount this possibility completely. But on past form, constitutionalism has never endured in Russian history. In 1917–20, it was Marx and Lenin, not Miliukov and Kerensky, whose ideas and programs won the day.

Under conditions of mutual deterrence, an accurate assessment of the operational values and mind-set of Soviet elites acquires a special urgency. We may not have liked Marxism-Leninism as practiced by Stalin, but at least we knew where we stood. Khrushchev, despite his gambler instincts, displayed a certain hardheaded practicality which American statesmen found reassuring. But what is Brezhnev's value system? Is it shared by the military? What of the scientific establishment? In Stalin's day, the preeminence of American strategic power afforded a margin for miscalculation. This situation, however, no longer obtains. We are once again living—perhaps for the first time since the 1930's—in a world where comprehending the interaction of ideas is vitally important to our survival.

This is not to say that we should base our estimates of Soviet intentions solely on analysis of the country's dissident poets or disaffected scientists. Yet neither should we ignore them. Stalin would not have read either Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov, simply because he did not read books at all. Like the typical dictator, he watched movies and talked to his immediate subordinates—and that was that. Khrushchev liked, or at least found useful, what Solzhenitsyn wrote, and he apparently tolerated what Sakharov said, although he was probably grateful not to have to see it in print. Brezhnev, we know, likes neither Solzhenitsyn nor Sakharov. But Brezhnev is not Stalin. He is not even Khrushchev. Brezhnev, there is good reason to believe, survives because he can maneuver—balancing one interest group against another, appeasing first this hierarchy in the power structure and then that. And who are the hierarchs? What do they believe in? Do they believe in anything? Even the limited selection of documents available to Mr. Brumberg indicates that some of them do have beliefs and that those beliefs are by no means uniformly shared within hierarchies. Sakharov is a nuclear physicist, father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, and obviously politically engaged. Solzhenitsyn is a Nobel Prize-winning author and a man of genuine moral stature. Grigorenko is—or rather was—a general officer in the career military service and a former instructor at the Soviet Union's leading military school. They have chosen to speak out. But how many of their colleagues who have not spoken share their views? The situation, as the French say, "gives one to think."

Mr. Brumberg has produced a useful and timely book. But it is not a definitive work, and it would be a pity if the competence displayed by him and his collaborators created the impression that this complex and obscure subject has now received all the attention that it deserves. It has not. There is more to be said, and there is more evidence to be weighed. Let us hope that those qualified to undertake the job will be encouraged rather than deterred by the imposing scholarship already manifested in the field.

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Soviet Americana

By Richard M. Mills

NIKOLAI N. SMELIAKOV: *Delovaia Amerika: Zapiski inzhenera* (Efficient America: An Engineer's Notes), 2nd ed., enlarged. Moscow, Politizdat, 1969.

GALINA G. BOICHENKO: *Politicheskaia organizatsiia SShA: Obshchestvennye instituty i ikh vzaimodeistvie s gosudarstvom* (The Political Organization of the USA: Social Institutions and Their Interaction with the State), Minsk, V. I. Lenin Belorussian State University Press, 1970.

NIKOLAI D. GAUZNER: *Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress i rabochii klass SShA* (Scientific and Technical Progress and the Working Class of the USA), Moscow, Nauka, 1968.

SOVIET BOOKS ON US domestic affairs have tended to fall into two rough categories. One comprises the generally impressionistic reports of Soviet citizens who have travelled in the USA; the other consists of monographs by academic writers on a multitude of narrow, specialized topics. Not surprisingly, there have been serious gaps in both bodies of literature. However, in recent years some interesting attempts have been made to fill the lacunae, a trend illustrated by the books under review.

Nikolai Smeliakov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade at the time when he wrote his book, visited the USA a number of times in his official capacity. His informed observations, which are indeed the "notes" of the book's subtitle, provide the Soviet reader with a wealth of loosely connected details which are part and parcel of the American way of doing things. Where else between two covers could the Soviet reader encounter such a variety of information on the operations of US farms, factories and warehouses, superhighways and transportation, construction, laboratories, the media, restaurants and cafeterias, ladies' fashions, department store "sales" and their wily capitalist psychology (where $9.98 seems to mean $9.00 to the customer rather than $10.00), and much more?

Running through all the prosaic detail, however, is the unifying theme of a pervasive "industrial culture," a term by which Smeliakov describes the preoccupation with efficiency so characteristic of many aspects of American endeavor. The end result of this culture is, of course, a generally high level of practicality and utility which the author obviously wishes the Soviet economy possessed. In fact, there is a good deal that the American reader can learn about the state of the Soviet economy from Smeliakov's stated or implied comparisons. Needless to say, the author has numerous reservations and complaints regarding economic and social life in the United States. On the other hand, nobody has yet produced such a good rationale for abandoning the time-honored Soviet slogan: "Catch Up With and Surpass America!", with its simplistic emphasis on quantitative comparisons. The materials in this book show the Soviet reader what has been clear to others for a long time: competition between the two giants must be measured not only (or perhaps even not mainly) in terms of the output of tons of steel or kilowatts of electricity but also in terms of the relative efficiency of economic operations of all kinds.

Particularly noteworthy about the book is the unusually large press run—200,000 copies for this second edition. Certainly for the Soviet general reader this is the most accessible, attractive and informative book ever published in the USSR on the United States. It goes farther than any other Soviet book toward answering the kinds of questions about the USA that are constantly rained upon American tourists by the curious but ill-informed Soviet citizenry.

GALINA BOICHENKO'S VOLUME makes a start at filling another gap in Soviet perceptions of America, one that has existed despite the publication over the decades of more than 150 scholarly or quasi-scholarly books of

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markedly varying quality on US domestic politics. Such literature has treated separate aspects of American politics in great detail but, until now, nobody has attempted to combine its insights into a systematic analysis. To be sure, there has always been a kind of residual Marxist-Leninist theory of politics applicable to any capitalist nation, which describes the inevitable struggle between oppressors and oppressed. That system of thought is deficient, however, in that it was specifically constructed to analyze the conditions of the 19th and early 20th centuries, and because, by focusing on broad generalizations, it often leaves as many questions unanswered as it claims to answer. Although Boichenko has built upon that Marxist-Leninist foundation, she has added some new materials by way of updating and, more significantly, has tied everything together in a method of analysis only recently developed in Soviet academic life—the "political-organization-of-society" approach to the study of politics. This method purports to be a latter-day Marxist-Leninist alternative to the variety of Western political science methodologies for analyzing the operation of political systems under socialism and capitalism.[1]

Boichenko utilizes the new methodological framework to analyze US politics in a two-step process. First, she constructs a model in which all political institutions are subsumed under three categories. Those belonging to the "mechanism of the dictatorship of the exploiting classes" are the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the two major political parties, the churches, the ultra-Right, and the media. The counterforce to this is "the resistance mechanism of the exploited classes," composed of the Communist Party of the USA, the unions and "the progressives" (protest groups). While these two mechanisms are declared to be irreconcilable, there is a third category of institutions that are "intermediary components" belonging to neither of the first two groups but sometimes attracted toward one or the other. The third category includes medical, legal and educational associations, third parties, and farmers' and cooperative organizations.

It is fairly obvious that this is substantially a repetition of the traditional Marxist-Leninist theory with the addition of some new terminology. Boichenko's real contribution comes in the second phase provided for by the "political-organization-of-society" framework, where she analyzes in some depth the complex and changing interaction among the specific institutions, formal and informal, that make up the three major categories. In her description of the activity of each institution it becomes quite plain that almost none fits neatly into one single category. Like other analysts before her, Boichenko has found that US politics are shot through with inconsistent behavior on the part of individuals, groups and institutions. Unfortunately for her, there is no theoretical tool in the "political-organization-of-society" armory that can explain that very important phenomenon.

Nevertheless, her attempt at systematization does raise new possibilities for Soviet analysts of US politics. Once one looks, as does Boichenko, beyond ideological prescriptions and definitions and focuses on the actual interaction of the institutions and groups enumerated above, there is precious little that is as neat and clear as her model would have it. Thus the new system itself generates a need to explain the incongruities of US politics—a need which was not felt by the authors of earlier, less systematic Soviet writings on US politics.

The problem is best illustrated in Boichenko's discussion of the role of the state, which makes it clear that the capitalist state is not as total a master as the Soviet analyst has been trained to expect; rather, it sometimes succumbs to pressures emanating from the resistance mechanism. While Boichenko recognizes the fact of this periodic capitulation, she stops short of analyzing the *process* through which it takes place. She has explained *what* happens and, partially, *why* it happens—but an entire book remains to be written by somebody in the Soviet Union on *how* it happens. There is, after all, a fundamental question at stake here—control of the major instrument of political power. The fact that no one set of institutions exclusively controls the state signifies that Boichenko's basic model is in need of readjustment.

Galina Boichenko is very conservative in her choice of sources. While she makes good use of some American "bourgeois" scholarly publications in order to describe the organization and role of the institutions she discusses, it is rare to find a recent Soviet book on US politics that is so replete with quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin. She also draws heavily on US Communist Party publications—to such a degree, in fact, that her later

[1] See V. M. Chkhikvadze, Ed., *Politicheskaia organizatsiia sovetskovo obshchestva* (*The Political Organization of Soviet Society*), Moscow, Nauka, 1967, for application of the theory to the Soviet Union.

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chapters constitute both a history and a detailed analysis of the policy stands of that party in the 1950's and 1960's.

LIKE THE FIRST TWO volumes discussed here, the Gauzner book also breaks new ground, expanding in considerable detail on some themes adumbrated by Adolf I. Kats in his massive 1962 study *Polozhenie proletariata SShA pri imperializme* (The Condition of the Proletariat of the USA Under Imperialism).[2] Gauzner's monograph merits attention on a number of grounds, for it is at once a study of the US work force, of the manpower policies of recent US administrations, of the increasingly complex relationship between education and employment, and, particularly, of the effects—past and projected—of automation upon these factors. Of particular interest is the chapter devoted to unemployment, the most comprehensive and sophisticated treatment of that problem to appear in a Soviet source. The book contains a wealth of information gathered together for the first time in one publication by a Soviet author: selected data on wages, job training and retraining programs, and the system of secondary vocational education; plus discussion of the extent of the government's role in the economy and of the dim prospects for the growth of trade union membership. Gauzner makes extensive use of the *Economic Report of the President*, census reports, the *Manpower Report of the President*, a wide range of American monographs, Congressional hearings, and various editions of the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* —the latter to trace the disappearance of obsolete occupations and record the appearance of new ones.

Not so new are the major conclusions of the book: that automation will produce very high unemployment, with scant chance that the US capitalist economy will be able to provide new jobs for the rapidly expanding work force; that there is a secular tendency for a disproportion to arise and grow between the increase in real wages (an increase which Gauzner saw materializing at the time he wrote the volume in 1968) and the even more rapid increase in labor productivity; and that outdated capitalist production relations are at the bottom of all the woes of the proletariat in the United States.

Yet in his final chapter— a good summary of the entire book—he maintains that, although the socialist economic system has eliminated unemployment, the progress of the scientific and technical revolution renders the problem of employment no less topical and troublesome in a socialist economy. He warns that such economies must also take steps to develop job retraining programs when new technology is introduced, work out the problem of redistributing the labor force, and improve the operations of government employment agencies.

In discussing the US proletariat, Gauzner makes an interesting attempt to cope with the thorny problem of defining and quantifying that group, an area notoriously avoided by most Soviet Americanists. According to his calculations, there were 47.8 million proletarians in the nation in 1960, or 68 percent of the gainfully employed population. This conclusion flows from Gauzner's complicated definition of the term "proletarian," [3] according to which he includes in the US proletariat 78.5 percent of those whose labor and services are for hire (the crucial element in his definition), irrespective of whether they work in industry, agriculture, commerce, finance, government, or the service sector of the economy.

It is genuinely unfortunate that this book, like the Boichenko volume, will not have a wide readership due to the small printing (the press runs of the two studies were 3,400 and 2,000 copies, respectively). Those who do get the opportunity to read it will be treated to some rare information assembled with patience and competence. Even though the book's conclusions are generally pessimistic about the future of American society, the new data collected by Gauzner do not point exclusively in that direction—a fact which the author himself periodically notes.

Gauzner, like Boichenko, also points the way to the really difficult work that remains to be taken in hand by Soviet analysts.

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[2] Moscow, Academy of Sciences Publishing House. The most recent major study of the US economy as a whole is Solomon L. Vygodsky's somewhat mistitled *Sovremennyi kapitalizm: Opyt teoreticheskovo analiza (Contemporary Capitalism: An Essay in Theoretical Analysis)*, Moscow, Mysl, 1969.

[3] Gauzner's definition of the proletariat is as follows: "In the inevitably highly approximate calculations produced below on the basis of the census data, the hired personnel of industry—with the exception of administrators, supervisory administrative personnel, and some specialists accomplishing primarily exploitative functions (work organization specialists, human relations personnel, employees in personnel departments, lawyers, *etc.*)—are assigned to the industrial proletariat. Assigned to the proletariat of the non-production branches [of the economy—R.M.] are the hired workers, the office and commercial white-collar workers and the service workers, with the exception of the household servants, who work in them." (p. 72)

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For example, there is a clear need for a book investigating the implications of the following contention by the author:

In some cases, monopoly capital is forced to make substantial concessions because of the impact of the workers' *movement. That circumstance limits* the intensification of capitalist exploitation but does not change the essence of the very process. (p. 196)

One comes away from all three books struck by how much remains to be done by the Americanists of the Soviet Union. Galina Boichenko has carried Soviet studies of US politics to the level of examining what would be called "parties and pressure groups" in US political science terminology. Further steps are necessary to achieve the level of genuine systems analysis—showing the interaction of a broader range of political phenomena. Similarly, Gauzner's work is but a prolegomenon to studies of the role of the service sector of the economy and of social mobility, the latter being the larger context of the problems which concern him. Finally, Smeliakov has demonstrated the efficiency of the US economy but has not explained the causes of that efficiency, a task Soviet writers on management will doubtless have to undertake.

The study of the USA in the Soviet Union is at a stage now where the old and the new are vying for ascendancy. The older conventional theories are proving inadequate as new methodologies —analyzing concrete phenomena in depth and with relative objectivity—are applied.

Reviews in This Issue

PAUL E. SIGMUND—Professor of Politics at Princeton University; the most recent of his many books is *Models of Political Change in Latin American* (New York, Praeger, 1970).

YALE H. FERGUSON—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University and member of the University's Latin American Institute; editor of the forthcoming *Contemporary Inter-American Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall).

PHILIP D. STEWART—Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University; author of *Political Power in the Soviet Union* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

PAUL A. SMITH, JR.—An observer of Soviet affairs who has published in *Foreign Affairs; his "Leonid Brezhnev: Professional Politician Soviet Style"* will appear in *Leaders of the Communist World,* edited by Rodger Swearingen (New York, Free Press, forthcoming).

RICHARD M. MILLS—Associate Professor of Political Science at Fordham University; a specialist on Soviet studies on the US, he authored "Issues and Leadership in Soviet Politics" in *The New Russia,* edited by Denis Dirscherl (Dayton, Ohio, Pflaum Press, 1968).

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